Ernest Jarrett v. Dominic Archibald

BLOOMEKATZ, Circuit Judge. The district court dismissed this dispute between a pro se attorney and his former client over fees. Because the complaint does not state a plausible claim for relief, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

This appeal comes to us after the district court granted a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). We therefore assume the truth of factual allegations in the complaint. E.g., Robbins v. New Cingular Wireless PCS, LLC, 854 F.3d 315, 319 (6th Cir. 2017). In addition, we may refer to “outside-the-complaint exhibit[s]” that are “public records” of which a district court may take judicial notice. Blackwell v. Nocerini, 123 F.4th 479, 487 (6th Cir. 2024) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, both parties attached exhibits to their briefs on the motion to dismiss, including filings and judicial decrees from prior, related court proceedings. We may judicially notice the existence of these exhibits as well as subsequent related litigation history without converting the motion into one for summary judgment. Buck v. Thomas M. Cooley L. Sch., 597 F.3d 812, 816 (6th Cir. 2010); Jackson v. City of Columbus, 194 F.3d 737, 745–46 (6th Cir. 1999), abrogated on other grounds by Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002).

This dispute stems from an attorney-client relationship between plaintiff Ernest L. Jarrett, representing himself and his law practice, Ernest L. Jarrett, P.C., and defendant Dominic Archibald. Over a decade ago, a police officer killed Archibald’s son. Archibald hired Jarrett to bring a wrongful death suit, and they signed a contingency fee agreement providing that Jarrett would receive a third of the total recovery after deducting litigation costs. In the agreement, Archibald agreed to “employ and retain” Jarrett “to represent [her] as legal counsel for all purposes in connection with injuries and damages arising out of” the death of her son, and Jarrett “agree[d] to represent [Archibald]” and promised to “devote his full professional abilities to the case.” Compl., Ex. A, R. 1, PageID 7.

According to Jarrett, he “drafted and caused a complaint to be filed” and remained an attorney of record throughout the litigation. Compl. ¶¶ 10–12, PageID 2–3. The case went to trial and ultimately settled after “several post-trial motions and/or rulings of the court.” Id. ¶¶ 13–14, PageID 3. But Archibald, “acting in concert with other attorneys involved in the case,” “wrongfully concealed” the settlement from Jarrett. Id. ¶ 14, PageID 3. In the end, Archibald never paid Jarrett in accordance with the agreement. Hence this litigation.

The complaint asserts six causes of action: breach of contract; unjust enrichment; “equitable relief” for “wrongful and unjust deprivation of attorney fees”; conspiracy to deprive Jarrett of “the full benefits to which he was entitled”; breach of an implied contract; and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id. ¶¶ 17–30, PageID 3–4.

The district court dismissed the case with prejudice. It cited three other cases in which Jarrett sought payment from Archibald and other lawyers involved in the wrongful death suit; those cases spanned two state courts and one federal court, with litigation continuing over five years.¹1. See Jarrett v. Terrell, No. 19-CV-6234, 2021 WL 2376932 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 13, 2021), aff’d, No. 21-55263, 2022 WL 1056645 (9th Cir. Apr. 8, 2022); Jarrett v. Galipo, No. 20PSCV00030 (L.A. Cnty. Sup. Ct. Oct. 28, 2021), aff’d, No. B321246 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 30, 2022); Jarrett v. Archibald, No. 22-015292-CZ, 2024 WL 6993959 (Wayne Cnty. Cir. Ct. Mar. 7, 2024), rev’d, No. 370025, 2025 WL 3226292 (Mich. Ct. App. Nov. 18, 2025). The district court concluded that this case was claim-precluded by the previous litigation. The court also concluded in the alternative that Jarrett’s complaint did not plausibly state a claim for relief. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Jarrett appealed.

DISCUSSION

We may affirm the district court’s dismissal of a case on any grounds supported by the record. See Bright v. Gallia County, 753 F.3d 639, 652 (6th Cir. 2014). Because we agree that Jarrett fails to state a plausible claim for relief, we do not reach the district court’s holding as to claim preclusion.

We review a dismissal for failure to state a claim de novo, and we assess whether the complaint alleges facts, taken as true and construed most favorably to Jarrett, sufficient to “draw the reasonable inference that [Archibald] is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Lipman v. Budish, 974 F.3d 726, 740 (6th Cir. 2020) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). We apply our ordinary rules on plausibility pleading to Jarrett despite his self-representation because he is a licensed attorney. Lonergan v. Gallagher Sharp, LLP, No. 24-CV-02067, 2025 WL 2578155, at *5 n.10 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 5, 2025); Huffman v. Lindgren, 81 F.4th 1016, 1020–21 (9th Cir. 2023).

We start by determining the law that applies to this dispute. Because this is a diversity action, we apply the choice-of-law rules of the forum state in which the suit was filed. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941). In contract cases, Michigan law instructs courts to apply the law of the jurisdiction in which the contract was entered absent an exception not applicable here. In re Bibi Guardianship, 890 N.W.2d 387, 391 (Mich. Ct. App. 2016). Because “[a]ll events[,] transactions[,] or occur[r]ences underlying the formation and execution of the contract pertinent to this case occurred in whole or in part in Detroit, Michigan,” Compl. ¶ 5, R. 1, PageID 2, Michigan law applies.

1. Breach of contract. Jarrett’s first claim is for breach of contract, which requires showing that “(1) there was a contract (2) which the other party breached (3) thereby resulting in injury to the party claiming breach.” El-Khalil v. Oakwood Healthcare, Inc., 934 N.W.2d 665, 672 (Mich. 2019) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). For a lawyer representing a client under a contingency fee agreement, the lawyer may recover under the agreement only after “completing one hundred percent of the services contracted for under” that agreement; otherwise, the lawyer’s remedy is to seek compensation for the reasonable value of their services under quantum meruit. Morris v. City of Detroit, 472 N.W.2d 43, 47 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991).

Jarrett has not plausibly pleaded that he fully performed his obligations under the contingency fee contract. He alleges only that he “entered into a contingent fee agreement” with Archibald, that he “associat[ed] with local counsel” and “drafted and caused a complaint to be filed on behalf of” Archibald, and that he “continued to be an attorney of record throughout” the action after having been granted permission to practice pro hac vice. Compl. ¶¶ 9–12, R. 1, PageID 2–3. He does not allege that he performed any legal services beyond aiding in the filing of the complaint; indeed, he does not say he fully performed the work promised in the contract. Archibald employed him to “represent [her] as legal counsel for all purposes in connection with” her son’s death, Compl., Ex. A, R. 1, PageID 7, and the contract gives no indication that Jarrett’s representation was of limited scope. The wrongful death suit proceeded to trial and included multiple post-trial motions and rulings. “[J]udicial experience and common sense,” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, suggest that an attorney would have done more had he fully represented his client in a wrongful death suit that settled after trial.

What’s more, nothing prevented Jarrett from specifically alleging the services he performed. Jarrett knows what he did. He previously said he performed over 190 hours of services, including over thirty at trial, for the wrongful death case. Mot. for Taxation of Costs & Att’y Fees by Ernest L. Jarrett at 3–4, Archibald v. County of San Bernardino, No. 16-CV-01128 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 15, 2018), Dkt. No. 225. Yet he withdrew that motion before the court could adjudicate his claim. See Not. of Withdrawal of Ernest L. Jarrett’s Mot. for Att’ys’ Fees Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988, Archibald v. County of San Bernardino, No. 16-CV-01128 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 11, 2019), Dkt. No. 249. He does not renew his claim for compensation for those hours. He does not appear to be listed as an attorney on any important litigation documents, including the complaint, the amended complaint, the summary judgment briefing, or pre- and post-trial briefing; nor does he ever state an appearance at trial.²2. See Archibald v. County of San Bernardino, No. 16-CV-01128 (C.D. Cal.), Dkt. Nos. 1 (complaint), 36 (amended complaint), 62 (motion for summary judgment), 106 (memorandum of contentions of fact and law), 122 (proposed voir dire questions), 123 (proposed jury instructions), 126 (statement of the case), 159 (list of exhibits and witnesses), 164 (trial transcript), 165 (same), 166 (same), 167 (same), 168 (same), 178 (post-trial briefing). Instead, he seeks a portion of a settlement alleging only that he drafted and caused the complaint to be filed and served as an attorney of record throughout the litigation. Under Michigan law, that is not enough for a breach of contract claim based on a contingency fee agreement for full representation in a wrongful death case.

2. Unjust enrichment. Jarrett also asserts a claim for unjust enrichment, which under Michigan law requires showing “(1) the receipt of a benefit by the defendant from the plaintiff and (2) an inequity resulting to the plaintiff because of the retention of the benefit by the defendant.” Morris Pumps v. Centerline Piping, Inc., 729 N.W.2d 898, 904 (Mich. Ct. App. 2006). Michigan law equates a claim for unjust enrichment with a claim of quantum meruit. See id. So this claim is conceivable even if Jarrett has not sufficiently pleaded his breach of contract claim. Cf. Reynolds v. Polen, 564 N.W.2d 467, 469–71 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997) (discharged or withdrawn attorney with a contingent fee arrangement may be entitled to quantum meruit compensation).

Nevertheless, we conclude that this claim fails because we cannot say that Archibald “has been unjustly or inequitably enriched at [Jarrett’s] expense.” Morris Pumps, 729 N.W.2d at 904. Jarrett previously alleged that Archibald paid the contingency fee to the other attorneys involved in the case who had agreements with Jarrett to split that fee. See First Am. Compl. ¶¶ 23–24, 40– 41, 52, Jarrett v. Terrell et al., No. 19-CV-06234 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 20, 2020), Dkt. No. 92. At most, then, Jarrett should sue the other attorneys who were paid. Indeed, he has done so. See Jarrett v. Terrell, No. 19-CV-6234, 2021 WL 2376932 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 13, 2021); Jarrett v. Galipo, No. 20PSCV00030 (L.A. Cnty. Sup. Ct. Oct. 28, 2021). While we infer that Jarrett performed antecedent services to filing the complaint, such as fact investigation and research, he is already suing Archibald in Michigan state court for those efforts, which he undertook to secure the prosecution of the police officer who killed Archibald’s son. See Jarrett v. Archibald, No. 370025, 2025 WL 3226292 (Mich. Ct. App. Nov. 18, 2025), review denied, 38 N.W.3d 468 (Mich. 2026). Dismissing Jarrett’s claim therefore does not leave him without any opportunity for compensation for his contributions to building the case.

3. Remaining claims. We also affirm the district court’s dismissal of the other causes of action. First, Jarrett points us to (and we are aware of) no authority establishing the existence of a cause of action under Michigan law for “wrongful and unjust deprivation of attorney fees.” Compl. ¶ 23, R. 1, PageID 4. Second, his claim for conspiracy fails for being conclusory: He includes no facts in his complaint beyond the barebones assertion that the settlement was “wrongfully concealed from [Jarrett] by [Archibald], acting in concert with other attorneys.” Id. ¶ 14, PageID 3. Third, we affirm the dismissal of Jarrett’s “implied contract” claim. See id. ¶ 27, PageID 4. If by “implied contract” Jarrett means to say that he seeks compensation for a benefit he conferred onto Archibald—a contract “implied in law,” City of Detroit v. City of Highland Park, 39 N.W.2d 325, 334 (Mich. 1949) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)—then this is the unjust enrichment claim with a new label. See Morris Pumps, 729 N.W.2d at 903–04. On the other hand, if Jarrett alleges the breach of a contract “implied in fact,” then he must allege conduct that, by “implication or proper deduction,” “show[s] a mutual intention to contract.” Erickson v. Goodell Oil Co., 180 N.W.2d 798, 800 (Mich. 1970). He has not done so. Fourth, Jarrett’s claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress fails because he includes no factual allegations beyond bare legal conclusions. Compl. ¶¶ 29–30, R. 1, PageID 4–5.

4. Dismissal with prejudice. Finally, we affirm the district court’s decision to dismiss all claims with prejudice, a decision we will not disturb absent an abuse of discretion. Ernst v. Rising, 427 F.3d 351, 366 (6th Cir. 2005) (en banc). Dismissal with prejudice precludes Jarrett from seeking leave to file an amended complaint. The rules enact a “liberal amendment policy” with respect to pretrial pleadings, BLOM Bank SAL v. Honickman, 605 U.S. 204, 213 (2025); see generally Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2), and ordinarily a dismissal for failure to state a claim is “without prejudice to give parties an opportunity to fix their pleading defects,” Crosby v. Twitter, Inc., 921 F.3d 617, 627 (6th Cir. 2019) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). Yet Jarrett never filed a formal request to amend his complaint, and he has never explained what else he would plead if he could amend his complaint. That suffices to affirm. See id. at 627–28.

But here, there is more. Jarrett has all the information relevant to his claims, so he has no excuse for failing to plead with specificity. Moreover, he raised his claim for compensation in the underlying litigation before the federal court in California nearly a decade ago. Yet he withdrew that motion, depriving the court of the chance to adjudicate the issues he seeks to litigate today. Then he proceeded to sue in multiple forums throughout the country, raising the same or related claims. “All litigants and lawyers must avoid multiplying litigation.” Ewing v. Carrier, 35 F.4th 592, 594 (7th Cir. 2022). The district court did not abuse its discretion in ending this litigation.

CONCLUSION

We affirm the dismissal of the complaint with prejudice.