United States v. Dejon Boone

READLER, Circuit Judge. Dejon Boone received a 60-month sentence for possessing ammunition as a felon. His sentence stemmed from an incident in which he fired multiple gunshots toward a moving vehicle exiting a gas station. Those circumstances resulted in the application of a Sentencing Guidelines enhancement for committing the possession crime in connection with another felony offense—here, the gas station shooting. On appeal, Boone argues that the district court erred in its analysis that the shooting constituted a separate felony under state law. We disagree and affirm.

I.

Early one morning, officers learned of a shooting outside of a gas station in Elyria, Ohio. As confirmed by video surveillance, an individual was pumping gas into his vehicle as a white Ford Explorer exited the gas station. As the Explorer pulled into the roadway, the individual left the gas pump to chase after the vehicle, eventually firing several shots in its direction. The shooting led several bystanders to duck for cover. Six spent shell casings were later recovered from the scene.

Officers identified Dejon Boone as the shooter. Boone had a lengthy criminal history, including several felony convictions. His recent conduct in conjunction with his felonious past resulted in a federal grand jury charging Boone with one count of possessing ammunition as a felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), a charge to which he later pleaded guilty.

At the sentencing phase, the probation office calculated an advisory Guidelines range by factoring in a sentencing enhancement under then-§ 2K2.1(b)(6)(B). (The provision has since been recodified in the latest version of the Guidelines at § 2K2.1(b)(7)(B). See U.S. Sent’g Guidelines Manual § 2K2.1(b)(7)(B) (U.S. Sent’g Comm’n 2025).) That provision authorizes a four-level enhancement if a defendant “used or possessed any . . . ammunition in connection with another felony offense.” Id.

The separate felony offense in question here? Ohio’s prohibition on “[d]ischarg[ing] a firearm upon or over a public road or highway” in a manner that creates “a substantial risk of physical harm to any person.” Ohio Rev. Code § 2923.162(A)(3), (C)(2). The probation office maintained that Boone created such a risk when he shot a gun towards an occupied vehicle leaving a downtown gas station. Boone responded that he merely aimed above the car and therefore did not create a substantial risk to any person. The district court agreed that Boone’s conduct constituted an Ohio felony and concluded that the government proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the felony was connected to Boone’s possession of ammunition. With a Guidelines range of 70 to 87 months, the district court opted to vary downward and sentenced Boone to 60 months in prison.

II.

Boone challenges the district court’s application of the sentencing enhancement. We review that determination with “due deference.” United States v. Williams, 184 F.4th 474, 484 (6th Cir. 2026) (citations omitted); see also United States v. Alvarado, 95 F.4th 1047, 1053 (6th Cir. 2024). What does due deference mean? It generally “depends on the nature of the question presented.” Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 98 (1996). The district court “may be owed no deference” in some cases, yet “substantial deference” in others. Id. That has been our experience when considering a sentencing court’s application of § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B). For instance, review of “whether the text of a criminal statute reaches the defendant’s undisputed conduct” raises a legal question, requiring de novo review. United States v. Clay, 187 F.4th 493, 501 (6th Cir. 2026); United States v. Taylor, 648 F.3d 417, 431 (6th Cir. 2011) (recognizing de novo review when “application of the § 2K2.1(b)(6) enhancement . . . present[s] strictly a question of law”) (citation modified). When a “factual finding underpins the defendant’s challenge, we review for clear error.” Clay, 197 F.4th at 501. And when the challenge centers on whether the district court has provided some “meaningful explanation of its reasons for applying” § 2K2.1(b)(6), we have reviewed that process-based challenge for an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., United States v. Logan, No. 24-3264, 2025 WL 1012722, at *3 (6th Cir. Mar. 31, 2025) (citations omitted). This comports with our understanding that “[m]ixed questions are not all alike.” United States v. Brown, 131 F.4th 337, 343 (6th Cir. 2025) (citation modified).

Boone’s appeal broadly asks whether the district court erred in arriving at its conclusion that it was more likely than not that Boone’s violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) was connected to another felony? The answer centers on whether his actions created “substantial risk” of physical harm to another person as defined under Ohio law. The phrase “substantial risk” requires a “strong possibility” that a certain result may occur. Ohio Rev. Code § 2901.01(A)(8).

Affording “due deference” to the district court, we see no error in the district court’s determination that Boone’s conduct created a strong possibility that someone would be physically harmed. See Williams, 184 F.4th at 484; Alvarado, 95 F.4th at 1053. In firing multiple shots toward a moving vehicle in an urban setting with bystanders present, there was a “strong possibility” that someone would be harmed. Ohio Rev. Code § 2901.01(A)(8). Each shot imperiled the vehicle’s occupants as well as the bystanders, not only directly, but indirectly, in that each shot could have caused the driver to lose control of the vehicle, further jeopardizing the safety of those at the scene. Even Boone himself admitted to the probation office that he put “lives” in “harm’s way,” observing that he was “grateful no one got hurt or killed that night.” R. 46, PageID 205–06. Ohio courts would agree that shooting toward a moving vehicle in this setting creates a substantial risk of harm. See State v. Robinson, No. 31127, 2025 WL 475540, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 12, 2025) (recognizing that even firing a single shot at another vehicle can create a substantial risk for those that are in the “path of the trajectory of a bullet” and by risking a “car crash” that causes further damage); State v. Spates, No. 100933, 2015 WL 1249711, at *10 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 19, 2015) (“The act of shooting in an area where individuals are located and in the range of the shooter creates a substantial risk of physical harm.” (first citing State v. Ingram, No. 1-08-53, 2009 WL 737777, at *5 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 23, 2009); and then citing State v. Windom, No. 97APA03-370, 1997 WL 798774, at *3–4 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 30, 1997))); see also United States v. Armstrong, No. 22-3540, 2023 WL 6636245, at *2 (6th Cir. Oct. 12, 2023) (firing a single shot “in the direction” of another individual satisfies the substantial risk element). And that risk multiplied with each shot Boone fired. See, e.g., State v. Berry, No. 2020CA00137, 2024 WL 1084597, at *7 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 12, 2024) (firing multiple shots in the direction of another individual creates a substantial risk of harm).

Boone disagrees. He faults the district court for failing to explicitly parse whether the conduct created a substantial risk, or simply a risk, the latter amounting to a misdemeanor only. But the district court need not “‘recite any “magic words”’ when passing a sentence,” United States v. Pineda-Duarte, 933 F.3d 519, 525 (6th Cir. 2019) (quoting McClellan, 164 F.3d 308, 310 (6th Cir. 1999)), and it necessarily rejected the view that Boone created an insubstantial risk, see United States v. Histed, 93 F.4th 948, 959 (6th Cir. 2024) (deciphering a court’s sentencing findings based on its “general tone”). This is not an instance, we note, where the district court wholly ignored the argument raised by the defense. See United States v. Taylor, 696 F.3d 628, 634 (6th Cir. 2012) (distinguishing between when a sentencing court does not consider an argument and when a sentencing court fails to address each argument “head-on,” yet is still clear as to its reasoning). To the contrary, the record shows that the district court understood and rejected Boone’s counterarguments, including that Boone firing over (not at) the car did not present a substantial risk and that the government could not meet its burden of proof. See United States v. Petrus, 588 F.3d 347, 356 (6th Cir. 2009). Nor was the district court’s analysis confined to explaining why Boone’s actions were risky in the abstract. Rather, the court examined the totality of the circumstances surrounding the shooting—from its location to the number of people in close proximity to the variety of risks the shots created—to conclude that “[a]ll of this creates a substantial risk.” R. 46, PageID 213. That analysis fits comfortably within the Ohio courts’ understanding of the type of conduct that violates Ohio Rev. Code § 2923.162(A)(3) and (C)(2). See supra.

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We affirm the judgment of the district court.