United States v. Lee Logan

SILER, Circuit Judge. Defendant Lee Logan appeals his sentence. We AFFIRM.

I. Background

In 2024, Logan sold crack cocaine to a confidential informant (“CI”) near a residence. Within five days of the transaction, investigators obtained a search warrant for the residence. Before executing the warrant, investigators witnessed Logan approaching the residence on foot. The investigators told Logan to stop, but he fled. As law enforcement chased and tackled Logan, a loaded .380 caliber pistol fell from his waistband. A search of Logan’s person revealed 2.21 grams of cocaine and 0.94 of a gram of fentanyl. Logan claimed the drugs were for personal use and that the gun was for his protection.

Upon searching the residence, investigators discovered evidence of low-level drug trafficking, including digital scales and a Pyrex cup with residue. In a bedroom closet, investigators found .380 caliber ammunition next to a pill bottle bearing Logan’s name. Investigators found four other people in the residence during the search.

Following the incident, the government indicted Logan on one charge: possession of a firearm as a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(8). Logan subsequently pled guilty without a plea agreement to the indicted offense.

Prior to sentencing, probation issued a presentence report (PSR), which applied the federal sentencing guidelines to calculate Logan’s offense level and criminal history category. The PSR assigned Logan a base offense level of 24 because Logan committed the instant offense while having two prior controlled substance offenses. The PSR then assigned an additional four levels pursuant to USSG § 2K2.1(b)(7)(B)¹1. The PSR cites USSG §2K2.1(b)(6)(B) as the source of the sentencing enhancement, but that enhancement has been moved to USSG § 2K2.1(b)(7)(B). For the sake of clarity and consistency, we refer to the enhancement where it is now codified, at USSG § 2K2.1(b)(7)(B). because Logan possessed a firearm in connection with another felony offense—distribution of cocaine base. The PSR then subtracted three offense levels for acceptance of responsibility, resulting in a total offense level of 25. In addition, because of his prior criminal convictions, the PSR assigned Logan a criminal history score of 15, thus establishing a criminal history category of VI.

In an addendum to the PSR, Logan objected to the recommended USSG § 2K2.1(b)(7)(B) sentencing enhancement, arguing that his firearm did not facilitate or have the potential of facilitating another offense. Logan contended that he was merely “a drug user” and that the gun was not found in connection with any drug transaction.

At sentencing, Logan’s counsel appeared to concede that Logan had sold drugs to the CI. Indeed, Logan’s counsel noted that “[a]s the government says, five days prior to [Logan’s arrest] . . . he had sold drugs to a [CI].” But Logan challenged the four-level enhancement because “there are no facts which support that he was armed at the time of any drug deal.” Logan also contended that the quantity of drugs found on his person during his arrest “could easily be user quantity.” In response, the government averred that Logan was carrying a gun for protection and that he “was seen selling drugs from a house where drug trafficking materials were found.”

Addressing USSG § 2K2.1(b)(7)(B), the district court noted the government’s concession that “Logan was not involved in a drug transaction on the day of his arrest.” But it recognized that Logan had sold drugs to the CI “within a few days of his ultimate arrest.” And the court emphasized that investigators found “scales and plastic baggies” in the residence. Finally, the court stated that Logan’s admission that he used his firearm for “protection” in conjunction with the discovery of paraphernalia further suggested that the gun facilitated or had the potential to facilitate drug trafficking.

The district court thus determined that the applicable sentencing range was 110 to 137 months. It then heard the parties’ arguments regarding the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors, Logan’s allocution, and imposed a sentence of 132 months.

II. Discussion

On appeal, Logan argues that the district court committed reversible error by applying the USSG § 2K2.1(b)(7)(B) sentencing enhancement because (1) the record does not show that Logan was involved in distributing drugs when he was arrested and (2) the residence containing evidence of drug distribution was insufficiently connected to Logan. In response, the government points to evidence justifying the enhancement, including evidence that Logan sold drugs to the CI, that Logan had drugs and a gun on his person when arrested, and that the searched residence had evidence of Logan’s presence and drug distribution.

According to its own terms, the USSG § 2K2.1(b)(7)(B) sentencing enhancement applies if the defendant “used or possessed any firearm or ammunition in connection with another felony offense.” Thus, the enhancement contains three essential elements: “(1) use or possession of a firearm; (2) in connection with; (3) another felony.” United States v. Clay, 187 F.4th 493, 501 (6th Cir. 2026) (citing United States v. Seymour, 739 F.3d 923, 929 (6th Cir. 2014)). And the government must establish each of these elements by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. Further, the commentary to USSG § 2K2.1 explains that the (b)(7)(B) enhancement applies “if the firearm . . . facilitated, or had the potential of facilitating, another felony offense.” USSG § 2K2.1 cmt. n.13. So, the government need not show that the firearm facilitated another felony offense; potential for facilitation is enough. See id. That said, the government must establish more than a “merely coincidental” connection between the underlying felony and the firearm possession. Seymour, 739 F.3d at 929 (quoting United States v. Angel, 576 F.3d 318, 321 (6th Cir. 2009)).

The district court did not commit reversible error by finding that the government had established the USSG § 2K2.1(b)(7)(B) enhancement by a preponderance of the evidence. Satisfying the first element of the enhancement (firearm possession), Logan admitted to possessing a firearm.

Satisfying the third element of the enhancement (another felony offense), the record establishes that Logan distributed drugs because he sold drugs to a CI days before the arrest— Logan did not contest the drug transaction at sentencing. Also supporting the third element, the firearm could have facilitated additional drug distribution because Logan had drugs and a firearm during his arrest and was arrested outside a residence that contained both evidence of drug distribution and some of his personal belongings.

Finally, regarding the second element (nexus), the drug transaction with the CI, the discovery of drugs and a gun on Logan’s person during his arrest, and the contemporaneous proximity of a residence containing evidence of drug distribution and Logan’s belongings sufficiently establish a connection between Logan’s firearm possession and drug distribution. Stated differently, there was a consistent theme of drug distribution and the potential for Logan to use his firearm to facilitate drug distribution, particularly at the time of his arrest. Thus, the district court properly applied the USSG § 2K2.1(b)(7)(B) sentencing enhancement.

In response to the above, Logan first argues that the district court incorrectly concluded that Logan participated in a controlled buy. Second, Logan urges that there is little evidence showing that he lived at the residence searched by investigators. Third, Logan contends that he is a mere drug user and that any link between firearm possession and drug distribution is coincidental. Thus, Logan attacks the evidence suggesting that he engaged in drug distribution and the evidence indicating a connection between firearm possession and drug distribution.

Regarding the district court’s characterization of Logan’s drug transaction as a controlled buy, Logan’s argument misses the point. The district court’s primary concern was that Logan sold drugs to the CI. And the CI’s representations to investigators, combined with the other evidence of drug trafficking, corroborate that Logan sold drugs to the CI. So, the district court did not clearly err on this front.

Logan’s second argument—that the district court committed clear error by finding that Logan lived at the residence searched by law enforcement—is likewise unconvincing. The court addressed whether there was a connection between Logan, his firearm possession, and the residence. Again, Logan sold drugs to the CI just outside the residence. Investigators arrested Logan while he was returning to the residence with drugs and a gun. And the residence itself contained evidence of drug distribution along with a pill bottle bearing Logan’s name and ammunition for his firearm. So, the record supports the district court’s finding.

Finally, the record contradicts Logan’s contention that he is a mere drug user and his argument that the connection between firearm possession and drug distribution is coincidental. For one, regarding the mere-user argument, the district court did not find a connection between the drug trafficking and firearm possession based solely on the drugs found on Logan’s person. Indeed, the court agreed with the government’s concession that “Logan was not involved in a drug transaction on the day of his arrest.” The court found a nexus based on a recent drug sale, Logan’s connection to the residence, and his admission that he possessed the firearm for protection.

To argue that the drugs and guns were coincidentally linked, Logan relies on United States v. Briggs, 919 F.3d 1030 (7th Cir. 2019). But Briggs is distinguishable. For one, the underlying felony in Briggs was drug possession—a crime different in kind from drug distribution. See id. at 1032-33. Most important, however, the Briggs court emphasized that the district court made no findings of fact tying the defendant’s firearm possession to his possession of drugs. Id. at 1033. Here, the district court made relevant findings of fact. So, Briggs is unlike the case here.

Logan further contends that United States v. Shields, 664 F.3d 1040 (6th Cir. 2011), supports his reasoning. But again, the underlying offense in Shields was drug possession, not distribution. Id. at 1044. And nothing in Shields tied the defendant’s possession of a firearm to his possession of a small quantity of drugs. Id. at 1044-46. Here, by contrast, Logan possessed a firearm for protection while carrying drugs back to a residence that contained evidence of drug distribution. Therefore, Shields does not help Logan either.

III. Conclusion

For the above reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.