United States v. Grady Chandler

CLAY, Circuit Judge. Defendant Grady Chandler appeals his convictions for distribution of methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841, and conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and 846. He also appeals his sentence of 235 months imprisonment. Defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence of his guilt to convict for either crime, that there was either a constructive amendment or variance between the superseding indictment and the evidence presented against him, and that hearsay was improperly admitted at trial. He also argues that his sentencing was procedurally unreasonable.

For the reasons that follow, we AFFIRM Defendant’s conviction and sentence.

BACKGROUND

This case concerns the distribution of methamphetamine from Defendant, his close friend Cumecus Cates, and Cates’ brother, Uribriantus Williams, to confidential informant Gary Ward. Ward was directed by the FBI to purchase fentanyl and methamphetamine from an unrelated FBI target. When Ward arrived to complete the purchase, Cates was there, offering to sell Ward methamphetamine. Cates asked Ward why he was in the market for a new methamphetamine supplier, and Ward responded that his previous supplier had been arrested for a reckless driving offense. Defendant was in fact Ward’s last dealer; Ward testified at trial that he and Defendant regularly conducted large transactions for methamphetamine, wherein Ward would receive the methamphetamine on credit and then pay Defendant after he had distributed the illegal substance.

Based on the crime of conviction, Cates immediately realized Ward was talking about Defendant, whom Cates described as his “best friend.” (Trial Ex. 9, R. 219-1, Page ID #3793.) During their conversation, which was recorded by Ward, Cates described his relationship with Defendant and his concern over Defendant’s behavior:

WARD: My dude got jammed up.

CATES: [UNINTELLIGIBLE]

WARD: Nah, he was drivin’ shit, getting arrested [UNINTELLIGIBLE] doing crazy shit.

CATES: You talkin’ about this dude here?

WARD: Yeah.

CATES: Grady?

* * *

CATES: [UNINTELLIGIBLE] That’s my best friend. Grady a wild little dude. We all . . . Grady’s my boy. Grady’s great, but he’s retarded. And like I be tellin’ him, “You doin’ shit is gonna get everybody fucked up, ‘cause you keep doin’ stupid shit. You runnin’ from the police. You be havin’ nothin’ on you. You did this shit on the police . . . uh . . . school shit in the truck.

WARD: . . . in the truck . . . Yeah he told me about that.

* * *

CATES: Just unnecessary shit. Yeah. He my guy.

WARD: Yeah.

CATES: Love him to death, but he just doin’ stupid shit. Like, someday you gotta grow up.

WARD: Yeah.

CATES: You know what I’m sayin’? Grady ain’t got nothin’ up here. That was his brother I was just talkin’ to.

* * *

CATES: Man, he went and turned himself in. You, you, you, you can’t be speedin’ off in BMWs and shit, and then go get the car out.

[MULTIPLE VOICES. AUDIO UNINTELLIGIBLE]

CATES: I be on his ass, though, ‘cause he just keep doin’ stupid shit, man. Like, settle down. You know what I’m sayin’? You got a baby on the way.

WARD: Okay.

CATES: He need to enjoy that, but Grady be actin’ any way he want . . . and then him and Mac Ross in the bar together. Him and Ross in the bar together.

WARD: [LAUGHS] (Id. at Page ID #3794–96.)

Ward would go on to purchase methamphetamine from Cates five times between September 28, 2022, to November 29, 2022. At each purchase either Cates or Williams delivered the illegal substance. A sixth purchase was planned for January 6, 2023, but Ward was unable to attend at the scheduled time. Before Ward could contact Cates to arrange a different pick-up time, Defendant, whom Ward had spoken to earlier that day, appeared in front of Ward’s home. Ward told Defendant that he needed to speak with Cates, to which Defendant responded, “Here it is right here,” and handed Ward a bag containing approximately 23 ounces of methamphetamine. Defendant described the drugs as containing some substance that diluted its value and told Ward that he could return whatever methamphetamine he could not sell to either himself or Cates. Ward turned the methamphetamine over to the FBI and met with Defendant later, completing the transaction with funds from the government.

Defendant was arrested and proceeded to trial on conspiracy and distribution charges. On the eve of trial, he challenged the admission of the statements from Cates’ conversation with Ward, detailed above. Defendant argued that he could not have been a member of the conspiracy because he was in jail at the time of Cates and Ward’s conversation, and that Cates’ statements were not made in furtherance of a conspiracy. At trial, the district court heard argument on Defendant’s objections and conditionally admitted the statements under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E) as coconspirator statements. At the close of trial, the court found the statements admissible.

After trial, Defendant renewed his motion for judgment of acquittal for both counts and alternatively asked for a new trial on his conspiracy charge. Defendant argued that the government failed to prove he belonged to a conspiracy because the only evidence offered against him at trial was his interaction with Ward on the last day of the conspiracy, and his friendship with Cates. Additionally, Defendant challenged his distribution charge. He argued that the evidence at trial showed only that he delivered “garbage” methamphetamine to Ward and asserted that he lacked the requisite intent to distribute methamphetamine because he allowed Ward to return any unsold portion of the drugs. (Mot., R. 138, Page ID #1665; see Trial Tr., R. 201, Page ID #3234.) Finally, Defendant believed he was entitled to a new trial because, he contended, the only evidence connecting him to the conspiracy with Cates was the testimony of Ward, a convicted felon seeking resentencing. The court rejected all of Defendant’s arguments, finding sufficient evidence supported his convictions for conspiracy and distribution and that Ward’s testimony was corroborated by other evidence on the record.

Post trial, the probation office attributed 555.4 grams of actual methamphetamine to Defendant. Because the drug quantity exceeded 500 grams, Defendant was assigned a base offense level of 34 and a guideline imprisonment range of 235 to 293 months.

Defendant argued that the methamphetamine attributable to him had a purity level of 84% and, as a mixture of methamphetamine, should have resulted in a base offense level of 30. He also argued that Ward testified that the methamphetamine was “garbage,” which should have precluded the government from showing Defendant distributed actual methamphetamine. The probation office filed an addendum to the Presentence Report with a lab report reflecting that the net weight of the substance Defendant distributed was 661.2 grams, resulting in about 555.4 grams of pure methamphetamine.

At sentencing, the district court overruled Defendant’s objection, finding that, based on the lab report, even if the court discounted the amount of methamphetamine attributable to Defendant to account for the margin of error, he would still have been responsible for over 500 grams of actual methamphetamine and thus subject to a base offense level of 34. The district court sentenced Defendant to 235 months for each count, to run concurrently.

DISCUSSION

On appeal, Defendant challenges the district court’s determination as to the sufficiency of the evidence of his conspiracy and distribution charges, as well as the district court’s decision to deny him a new trial. Defendant also argues that the court erred in admitting Cates’ statements under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E), and claims the proof asserted against him at trial constituted a constructive amendment or variance from the superseding indictment. Finally, Defendant claims that the district court committed a procedural error when it attributed to him over 500 grams of methamphetamine. The Court deals with each argument in turn.

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence at Trial

Defendant argues there was insufficient evidence to convict him of either conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute methamphetamine or distribution of methamphetamine.

In challenges under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29, we review “de novo the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction.” United States v. Emmons, 8 F.4th 454, 477 (6th Cir. 2021) (quoting United States v. Gunter, 551 F.3d 472, 482 (6th Cir. 2009)). Under Federal Rule 29, notwithstanding the jury verdict, “the court on the defendant’s motion must enter a judgment of acquittal of any offense for which the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction.” Id. at 478 (citing Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(a)). “In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, the relevant inquiry is ‘whether, after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’” United States v. Wallace, 597 F.3d 794, 800 (6th Cir. 2010) (emphasis in original) (quoting United States v. Budd, 496 F.3d 517, 530 (6th Cir. 2007)). “All reasonable inferences must be made to support the jury verdict.” United States v. LaVictor, 848 F.3d 428, 456 (6th Cir. 2017). “Circumstantial evidence alone is sufficient to sustain a conviction and such evidence need not remove every reasonable hypothesis except that of guilt.” Id. (quoting United States v. Spearman, 186 F.3d 743, 746 (6th Cir. 1999)). When conducting this analysis, this Court cannot “reweigh the evidence, reevaluate the credibility of witnesses, or substitute our judgment for that of the jury.” Emmons, 8 F.4th at 478 (citation modified).

a. Conspiracy to Distribute Methamphetamine

Defendant argues that his conspiracy convictions under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and 846 were not supported by sufficient evidence. Those sections prohibit conspiracies to distribute a controlled substance or possess a controlled substance with the intent to distribute. §§ 841(a)(1), 846. “[T]o sustain a conviction for drug conspiracy under section 846, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) an agreement to violate drug laws; (2) knowledge of and intent to join the conspiracy; and (3) participation in the conspiracy.” United States v. Williams, 998 F.3d 716, 728 (6th Cir. 2021) (quoting United States v. Gardner, 488 F.3d 700, 710 (6th Cir. 2007)). An agreement can be “tacit, not formal,” and an agreement may be proved through circumstantial evidence, such as “advance planning, ongoing purchases or arrangements, large quantities of drugs, standardized transactions, an established method of payment, and trust between the buyer and seller.” Id.

Defendant does not dispute that a conspiracy existed between Cates and Williams, and this Court agrees; there is ample evidence on the record to support finding a conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine to Ward beyond reasonable doubt. Therefore, at trial, the government needed to prove that Defendant had knowledge of and intent to join the conspiracy, and that he participated in the conspiracy. “Knowledge and participation can be inferred from the defendant’s conduct, but mere association with members of the conspiracy is not enough to support such an inference.” United States v. Martinez, 430 F.3d 317, 334 (6th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). Knowledge of and intent to join a conspiracy includes the defendant’s awareness “of the object of the conspiracy and that he voluntarily associated himself with it to further its objectives.” Williams, 998 F.3d at 729 (citation omitted). Because sufficient evidence of a conspiracy was shown to the jury, “evidence linking . . . [D]efendant to that conspiracy need only be slight.” United States v. Caver, 470 F.3d 220, 233 (6th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted).

Though the Court acknowledges that Defendant’s membership in the conspiracy is a close call, sufficient evidence supports his conviction. Defendant argues that “there is no evidence of [his] participation other than speculation.” (Def.’s Br. at 22.) But the jury was presented with evidence that could have reasonably led them to believe Defendant was a member of the conspiracy. During a recorded conversation with Ward, Cates stated that Defendant, his “best friend,” was a “wild little dude.” (Trial Ex. 9, R. 219-1, Page ID #3794.) Defendant, according to Cates, was always “doin[g] stupid shit.” (Id. at Page ID #3795.) Cates appeared to worry that Defendant would draw unwanted attention from the police: he told Ward that he warned Defendant that “[y]ou doin’ shit is gonna get everybody fucked up.” (Id. at Page ID #3794.) From these statements a jury could infer that Cates and Defendant may have been involved in criminal conduct together. To be sure, at the time of the recorded conversation, Defendant had just been arrested for vandalism, driving under the influence, and evading arrest. Yet it is hard to imagine how Defendant’s wild night might implicate Cates. Accordingly, a reasonable juror could have inferred that Cates and Defendant were involved in some other criminal conduct together, such that Defendant’s erratic behavior might put their joint endeavor at risk. And a reasonable juror might infer that the criminal conduct in question was the sale of methamphetamine for further distribution, an endeavor that Defendant engaged in before his driving-related arrest and one Cates was beginning to engage in with Ward at the time of the recorded conversation. From those inferences could follow the conclusion that Defendant had knowledge of and was a member of the conspiracy between Cates and Williams.

Proof of Defendant’s knowledge of and intent to join the conspiracy between Cates and Williams can also be found in the transaction between Defendant and Ward on January 6, 2023. Ward was on his way to complete the sixth and final controlled purchase with Cates and Williams when Defendant arrived at his house. Ward informed Defendant he was on his way to see Cates, in response to which Defendant handed a bag to Ward containing 23 ounces of methamphetamine and told him “Here it is right here.” (Trial Tr., R. 201, Page ID #3232.) Defendant told Ward that the methamphetamine was lower quality and, should Ward have trouble selling it, he could “bring it back” or “just give it” to Cates. (Id. at Page ID #3245.) The jury was permitted to conclude that Defendant was well aware of the object of the conspiracy when he informed Ward that the methamphetamine Ward sought from Cates was “right [t]here,” (id.), and could also find that Defendant sought to further the conspiratorial objectives by his delivery of the illicit substance. Defendant’s instruction to either return any unsold methamphetamine to himself or Cates, in light of Cates’ comments suggesting he and Defendant were members of a criminal enterprise, could lead to an inference that he intended Cates to sell the drugs in furtherance of their criminal conspiracy. It also supports the conclusion that Defendant and Cates were interchangeable and thus part of a common design.

Other evidence tending to show Defendant was a member of the conspiracy between Cates and Williams was before the jury as well. Ward testified that Defendant had the “best prices” and that this was “common knowledge.” (Trial Tr., R. 201, Page ID #3241–42.) Given that Cates warned that he did not “deal with a lot of people” because he can’t trust them, and he knew Defendant well and liked him (Trial Ex. 9, R. 219-1, Page ID #3793–95), a reasonable jury could have found that Cates was willing to use Defendant as a supplier for the conspiracy.

Defendant’s arguments to the contrary do not undermine this Court’s conclusion. Defendant argues that the interaction between Defendant and Ward represents only a buyer-seller relationship. Defendant’s argument is misplaced, because he was not convicted of conspiring with Ward. He was convicted of conspiring with Cates, and as the discussion above demonstrates, there was far more evidence of Defendant’s membership in the conspiracy than the mere fact of the transaction with Ward that the jury could rely on to reach its verdict.¹1. Defendant’s reliance on the buyer-seller relationship is also inappropriate in this matter, where the quantity of drugs given to Ward, Ward’s prior relationship with Defendant, and his receiving the drugs on consignment suggest that there was “an agreement to commit some other crime beyond the crime constituted by the agreement itself”— here, to distribute the methamphetamine and return a profit to Defendant. See United States v. Wheat, 988 F.3d 299, 308–09 (6th Cir. 2021) (noting instances where a buyer-seller relationship may undergird a conspiracy, including when “a supplier gives the drugs on credit and the distributor generates the money to repay the supplier by selling the drugs to others”).

Defendant also argues that the evidence offered against him was so weak the jury would have had to rely on a series of inferences. While it is true that we have previously warned that “charges of conspiracy are not to be made out by piling inference upon inference,” this Court concludes that is not the case in this matter. United States v. Sliwo, 620 F.3d 630, 638 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Direct Sales Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 703, 711 (1943)). In Sliwo, this Court overturned a defendant’s conviction for conspiracy to distribute 100 kilograms or more of marijuana where “[n]o evidence was presented that demonstrated Defendant’s knowledge that the purpose of the scheme was the acquisition of marijuana.” Id. The extent of the defendant’s participation in that case was “transporting [an] empty van and serving as a lookout.” Id. at 637. Therefore, the defendant may have thought the conspiracy involved “stolen electronic equipment, counterfeit handbags, weapons, or any other illegal object that could be transported in a van.” Id. at 636. Thus, the inference that he knew the truck was full of marijuana was far “too weak” to support a jury verdict. Id. at 637 (citation omitted). The conclusions drawn from the evidence presented in this matter require no such speculation.

Finally, Defendant’s delivery of methamphetamine to Ward was sufficient evidence for a jury to find Defendant’s participation in Cates and Williams’ conspiracy. As described above, the delivery was around the same time Ward was supposed to retrieve methamphetamine from Cates, Defendant’s statements surrounding the delivery (“Here it is right here”) could reasonably suggest that he was completing the order on Cates’ behalf, and any unsold methamphetamine could be returned to Defendant or Cates. The combination of Cates’ statements, Defendant’s transaction with Ward, Ward’s testimony regarding Defendant’s statements during that transaction, and the other evidence mentioned above provided sufficient evidence for a jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant was a coconspirator.

b. Distribution of Methamphetamine

Defendant also argues that there is not sufficient evidence to uphold his conviction for distribution of methamphetamine. Defendant claims there is insufficient evidence of his state of mind because the methamphetamine was so low in quality that it was actually “garbage,” not methamphetamine, and because he did not instruct Ward on what to do with the substance. At times, Chandler acknowledges that his conviction may be sustained by showing that he acted “knowingly” (Def.’s Br. at 29), but he also appears to argue that his conviction required a “showing of intent” (id. at 32). However, neither the jury nor the district court were required to find evidence of intent because Defendant was charged and convicted of knowingly distributing methamphetamine, not possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (prohibiting “any person [from] knowingly or intentionally . . . distribut[ing] a controlled substance” (emphasis added)); (see Superseding Indictment, R. 84, Page ID #262 (charging Defendant with “knowingly distribut[ing] (50) grams or more of methamphetamine . . . in violation of . . . 841(a)(l)”); see also Jury Verdict, R. 125, Page ID #436 (finding Defendant guilty of “[d]istribution of [m]ethamphetamine”).)

To convict for methamphetamine distribution under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a), the government must prove that a defendant: (1) knowingly or intentionally distributed methamphetamine, and (2) at the time of such distribution, the defendant knew that the substance was methamphetamine. United States v. Sumlin, 956 F.3d 879, 891 (6th Cir. 2020) (citing United States v. Colon, 268 F.3d 367, 376 (6th Cir. 2001)). In this case, the government provided evidence sufficient to prove either knowledge or intent. Ward testified that Defendant delivered a bag containing 23 ounces of methamphetamine, remarking “[h]ere it is right here” when Ward told him he was headed to see Cates, Ward’s methamphetamine dealer. (Trial Tr., R. 201, Page ID #3232–33.) Defendant noted that the methamphetamine had “something on it,” which Ward understood to mean that there was something in the substance that reduced its value. (Id. at Page ID #3234.) Defendant’s awareness that the substance in the bag was diluted tends to suggest that he was aware that the substance was in fact methamphetamine. Ward then transferred the bag to an FBI agent, who testified at trial that the bag contained approximately 23 ounces of methamphetamine. Later that day, Ward paid Defendant for the methamphetamine. Without more, the jury was permitted to find beyond reasonable doubt that Defendant was guilty of distributing methamphetamine.

II. Motion for a New Trial

Defendant also argues that the district court should have granted him a new trial on his conspiracy conviction because the government failed to prove his membership in the conspiracy. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedural 33(a) permits a district court judge to order “a new trial if the interest of justice so requires.” Rule 33(a) motions “may be premised upon the argument that the jury’s verdict was against the manifest weight of the evidence” and “are granted only in the extraordinary circumstance where the evidence preponderates heavily against the verdict.” United States v. Hughes, 505 F.3d 578, 592–93 (6th Cir. 2007) (citation modified). “A district judge, in considering the weight of the evidence for purposes of adjudicating a motion for new trial, may act as a thirteenth juror, assessing the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence.” Id. at 593. “Our review of the trial court’s ruling is limited to determining whether it was a clear and manifest abuse of discretion.” Id. (citing United States v. Hernandez, 227 F.3d 686, 695 (6th Cir. 2000)).

Having reviewed the record, the parties’ arguments, and the district court’s order denying Defendant’s Rule 33(a) motion, and for the reasons described above, this Court concludes that the verdict was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The district court considered the credibility of Ward and Williams, and the fact that Ward’s testimony was corroborated with other reliable evidence, such as the testimony of federal agents involved with the investigation. The district court therefore concluded that the jury’s verdict was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. This Court finds no error. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s denial of Defendant’s motion for a new trial.

III. Coconspirator Exception

Defendant argues that Cates’ statements to Ward were impermissibly admitted at trial as statements made by a coconspirator under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E). “‘In reviewing a trial court’s evidentiary determinations, this court reviews de novo the court’s conclusions of law, e.g., the decision that certain evidence constitutes hearsay, and reviews for clear error the court’s factual determinations that underpin its legal conclusions.’” United States v. Young, 553 F.3d 1035, 1045 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing United States v. Payne, 437 F.3d 540, 544 (6th Cir. 2006)). When reviewing for clear error, it is not enough that an appellate court would have decided the question differently. Instead, the “reviewing court must ask whether on the entire evidence it is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” United States v. Gardner, 649 F.3d 437, 442 (6th Cir. 2011) (citing United States v. Orlando, 363 F.3d 596, 603 (6th Cir. 2004)).

Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, an out-of-court statement is admissible against an opposing party when “made by the party’s coconspirator during and in furtherance of the conspiracy.” Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E). “On appeal, we review for clear error the three predicate factual determinations of whether a conspiracy existed, whether the defendant was a member of that conspiracy, and whether the statement in question was made in furtherance of it. We then review de novo the legal conclusions drawn from these factual determinations.” United States v. Musaibli, 42 F.4th 603, 615 (6th Cir. 2022) (citation modified). “If it is more likely than not that the declarant and the defendant were members of a conspiracy when the hearsay statement was made, and that the statement was in furtherance of the conspiracy, the hearsay is admissible.” United States v. Hitow, 889 F.2d 1573, 1581 (6th Cir. 1989). Stated differently, the three foundational prerequisites must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Clark, 18 F.3d 1337, 1341 (6th Cir. 1994)

Courts may consider whether the statements under review demonstrate any of the elements of the coconspirator exception, “but must also [require] independent, corroborating evidence to that effect.” Musaibli, 42 F.4th at 615; see also United States v. Damra, 621 F.3d 474, 493 n.5 (6th Cir. 2010) (“In the context of this independent evidence requirement, however, it is clear that corroborating ‘the statements’ means corroborating what the statements themselves show—that the defendant participated in a conspiracy.” (citation omitted)). “[I]ndependent evidence is not merely a scintilla, but rather enough to rebut the presumed unreliability of hearsay.” Clark, 18 F.3d at 1342.

Defendant does not dispute the existence of a conspiracy to traffic methamphetamine. Instead, Defendant argues that the government failed to establish his membership in the conspiracy and that the alleged statements were made in the course of and in furtherance of the conspiracy.

Defendant again claims that the evidence of his membership in the conspiracy required too many inferences and asserts that there is no evidence that he was a member of the conspiracy at the time the statements were made. However, the Court rejects this argument for the same reasons that the Court finds sufficient evidence to uphold the jury’s determination that Ward was a member of the conspiracy under its sufficiency of the evidence analysis. As to the importance of whether Defendant was a member of the conspiracy at the time the statements were made, this Court has previously “reject[ed] the argument by [defendants] that only those coconspirator statements made after they joined the conspiracy are admissible against them,” and will do so now. United States v. Cassity, 631 F.2d 461, 464 (6th Cir. 1980).

Defendant also argues that Cates’ statements were not made in furtherance of the conspiracy but were instead gossip about past events that constituted “idle chatter.” United States v. Tocco, 200 F.3d 401, 419 (6th Cir. 2000) (“If the conversations admitted were nothing more than idle chatter or casual conversation about past events, they were not properly admissible.” (citation modified)). “[S]tatements in furtherance of a conspiracy can take many forms.” Id. (citation modified). They need not “exclusively, or even primarily, [be] made to further the conspiracy.” Id. (citation modified). A statement may be in “furtherance of the conspiracy [where] it was directed at a potentially recurring customer . . . with the intention of reassuring him of” the reliability of a supplier. United States v. Mooneyham, 473 F.3d 280, 286 (6th Cir. 2007). It may also be in furtherance of a conspiracy where it is made “to induce his . . . participation, or to allay . . . fears.” See Martinez, 430 F.3d at 327.

The district court correctly concluded that each statement could reasonably be understood to accomplish conspiratorial goals. Cates’ statements identifying Defendant as a close friend after Ward disclosed that Defendant was his supplier could have been made to convince Ward that Cates was trustworthy and recruit him as a customer. Cates’ acknowledgements of Defendant’s allegedly reckless behavior, coupled with his statement that he “be on [Defendant’s] ass . . . because he just keep doin’ stupid shit,” could be understood as Cates quelling any concerns Ward may have had about Cates’ reliability or judgment given his relationship with Defendant. (Trial Ex. 9, R. 219-1, Page ID #3795.) It can also be understood as an acknowledgement that Defendant’s behavior was unacceptable and would not continue. The district court did not err by admitting the statements.

IV. Constructive Amendment or Variance

Defendant argues that the evidence introduced by the government at trial diverged so greatly from the charges set forth in the indictment that his rights under the Sixth Amendment were violated. Defendant claims that while he was charged for conspiring with Cates and Williams to distribute methamphetamine, the government only proved a conspiracy with Cates and Williams, resulting in a constructive amendment or variance from the superseding indictment. “A constructive amendment ‘results when the terms of an indictment are in effect altered by the presentation of evidence and jury instructions which so modify essential elements of the offense charged such that there is a substantial likelihood that the defendant may have been convicted of an offense other than the one charged in the indictment.’” United States v. Mize, 814 F.3d 401, 409 (6th Cir. 2016) (citing Martinez, 430 F.3d at 338). “[A] variance ‘occurs when the charging terms [of the indictment] are unchanged, but the evidence at trial proves facts materially different from those alleged in the indictment.’” Id. (citing United States v. Kuehne, 547 F.3d 667, 683 (6th Cir. 2008)).

Defendant’s argument merely restates his challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence of his conspiracy conviction. Because the Court finds sufficient evidence to uphold that conviction, it also finds that neither a constructive amendment nor variance occurred in this case.²2. Defendant also argues that the Court improperly allowed testimony regarding unrelated previous criminal conduct between himself and Ward, and that the testimony violated his Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial. However, Defendant doesn’t explain how the testimony violated his rights, and Ward was permitted to testify regarding his prior dealings with Defendant to explain Defendant’s business model, knowledge, and opportunity.

V. Sentencing

Defendant’s final argument challenges the procedural reasonableness of his sentence. Defendant argues that the court determined his guideline range by relying on a DEA laboratory report that attributed him with 555.4 grams of methamphetamine, leading to a base offense level of 34. Defendant does not challenge the drug report or the quantity of drug weight. Instead, he complains that the district court failed to make findings regarding whether Ward’s testimony on the quality of the methamphetamine was credible. According to Defendant, the district court was obligated to make specific findings on whether Ward’s testimony that the methamphetamine provided by Defendant was “garbage” was part of its consideration that the methamphetamine was “actual” methamphetamine. But Defendant does not point to any obligation to make such findings at sentencing, and this Court is not aware of any. See United States v. Gale, 468 F.3d 929, 941 (6th Cir. 2006) (“[A] district court need not describe in detail or list all of the documents or other evidence it considered during sentencing.”). The district court’s sentence is affirmed.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, we AFFIRM Defendant’s conviction and sentence.