Jecinta Tongka v. Todd Blanche

CLAY, Circuit Judge. Petitioner Jecinta Landoh Tongka seeks review of a final order of removal issued by the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) which affirmed the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) denial of Tongka’s application for asylum and withholding of removal under the Immigration and Nationality ACT (“INA”), and the denial of her application for Convention Against Torture (“CAT”) protection. For the reasons set forth below, Tongka’s petition for review is DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

Tongka is a native and citizen of Cameroon. Her primary spoken language is Pidgin English. She arrived and applied for admission to the United States at the Brownsville, Texas port of entry on November 30, 2016. On December 17, 2016, Tongka was issued a Notice to Appear charging her as an arriving alien subject to removal under INA § 212 (a)(7)(A)(i)(I) for lack of valid immigration documents. At a hearing in the Los Fresnos immigration court on January 19, 2017, Tongka admitted to the allegations and conceded her removability.¹1. Tongka was later released on parole and relocated to Ohio, so venue for her immigration proceedings was changed to the Cleveland immigration court.

B. Procedural History

On February 9, 2017, Tongka filed her I-589 application in open court, seeking asylum, withholding of her removal, and CAT protection. In support of her application, Tongka submitted affidavits from her brother, Eric Tongka, her former neighbor, Blanche Tako Kundih, and Assistant Police Commissioner Shewa (an officer in Cameroon who received one of Tongka’s reports). She further submitted the U.S. Department of State’s 2020 Human Rights Report for Cameroon; her marriage certificate; her husband’s death certificate; burial photographs; a USCIS Report on Cameroon child/widow marriages; an article on widowhood discrimination; and a proposed expert report on country conditions from Dr. Charlotte Walker-Said. The immigration court held merits hearings regarding Tongka’s application on December 20, 2021, and February 24, 2022. A Pidgin English translator was provided for Tongka at each hearing.

1. Testimony Presented at Tongka’s Hearings

At the outset of the first hearing, Tongka corrected some errors in her application regarding her children, and then testified that everything in her I-589 application is true and complete as updated. Tongka’s counsel confirmed that she sought protected status as a member of the Catholic religion and the Bamok tribe, as well as for her widowed status. She was 45 years old at the time of the hearing. Tongka testified that she came to the United States in November 2016, after fleeing Cameroon to escape her in-laws. She stated that she had been married in 1999, and that her husband died on February 3, 2016.²2. The record reflects either miscommunication or issues with translation regarding this question, as Tongka first stated multiple times that she married her husband in 2019. Her husband passed away after contracting HIV/AIDs, which Tongka testified is a stigmatized illness in Cameroon. Tongka and her husband did not tell her in-laws that he had contracted HIV or that he died of AIDs because of the social stigma. Tongka’s husband was from the Banso tribe, distinct from Tongka’s own background in the Bamok tribe. She testified that there are cultural differences between these tribes, though she and her husband were both Catholic. Tongka further testified that after her husband died, she was told by her in-laws to shave her head and dress in black clothing for a year. Six months after her husband’s passing, Tongka’s in- laws told her she had to “choose another husband within the family,” and that she must comply because she had “become their property” when they paid her bride price. Dec. 20, 2021 Transcript, A.R. 000195. She testified that her in-laws rejected her offer to repay the bride price and gave her the option to choose another man in the family to marry or drink poison. Tongka was “visibly upset” while providing this testimony at the hearing, and the IJ called a recess to allow her to calm down. Id. at 000199. After the recess, Tongka continued to testify. She stated that she had previously seen the poison drink she was offered put before another woman who was forced to choose between marriage and the poison. She stated she felt that she had “no choice” and “didn’t want to die,” so she chose her husband’s uncle to marry. Id. at 000203–04. Tongka testified that after she chose to marry her husband’s uncle, she was put under surveillance for two days, and then on the eve of the day arranged for their marriage, he raped her. She testified that she tried to tell the police about the situation with her in-laws, but was told that “these were traditional issues and they don’t get involved with traditional matters.” Id. at 000206. She stated that the police did not speak with her in-laws and she did not believe there are laws in Cameroon to protect a person in her situation. She further testified that she told the police she was raped by her husband’s uncle, and then fled to Nigeria. She stated that she left her children with her mother, rather than take them with her, because she “had to flee for [her] own life.” Id. at 000210. Tongka spent two months in Nigeria before coming across one of her in-laws there, who said that he would return to Cameroon and let the family—who was still searching for her—know she was in Nigeria so they could come get her. She testified that she feared being tortured or killed if she were to return to Cameroon, and that she did not believe that the government or the Catholic Church would protect her. At the second merits hearing on February 24, 2022, the Department of Homeland Security cross-examined Tongka. Before the cross-examination, the IJ noted that Tongka had filed an expert report by Dr. Walker-Said as a supplemental exhibit to her I-589 application, and the Department objected to this report on the basis that Dr. Walker-Said was unavailable for examination and had not included a curriculum vitae with her report.³3. At the time of these objections, the IJ stated that such objections were noted and that counsel for the Department “can address those arguments in closing in terms of weight and how much weight it should be given.” Feb. 24, 2022 Transcript, A.R. 000222. Tongka testified that she went to the police twice in Cameroon, once on the day her in-laws came to “take [her] husband’s property at home,” and again on the day when she fled after her husband’s uncle raped her. Feb. 24, 2022 Transcript, A.R. 000233. She stated that the police did not do anything to help her and instead mocked her, and that she did not know if the police initiated any kind of investigation into the reports she made because she then fled the country. She further testified that she did not know if anybody else had filed a complaint to the police on her behalf, though she later stated that her brother went to file his own report after she fled the country. As explanation for this discrepancy, Tongka cited confusion about what time period the prior question referred to. Tongka was next questioned regarding the affidavit from the Assistant Police Commissioner Shewa which she had submitted in support of her application. She stated that her brother obtained the letter for her. The letter refers to an “Annex B” attachment, but Tongka testified that she was not given Annex B despite the letter indicating Annex B should be her original complaint to the police. She further testified that she does not know why the police letter does not mention the rape she testified to having reported, as she “explained everything that I went through to the police.” Id. at 000243. Tongka was also questioned about the affidavit prepared by her former neighbor, Ms. Blanche Tako Kundih. Tongka testified that Ms. Tako Kundih was her immediate neighbor, but Ms. Tako Kundih had described herself in her affidavit as the neighbor of Tongka’s in-laws. Tongka then clarified that she lived a fifteen-minute walk from her in-laws, and that Ms. Tako Kundih lived in the only house located between her and her in-laws. The IJ then called another recess because Tongka had been on cross examination for over an hour and was “visibly upset.” Id. at 000258. Following the recess, the IJ clarified with Tongka that she went to the police the first time on March 27, 2016. Tongka stated that during this report, the police wrote down what she told them about how her in-laws came to take her husband’s property. Tongka was not aware of any action the police took on the matter following this report. She then told the IJ she went to the police station a second time on June 16, 2016, to report that her husband’s uncle had raped her. She stated that it was on June 16, 2016 that the officers “mock[ed]” her when she told them she had been raped. Id. at 000264. She testified that her I-589 application did not include any mention of this second police report because “the person who was writing it did not write all of what I said.” Id. at 000267. Tongka repeated multiple times this answer that the person writing her application failed to include the second police report.

2. Proceedings Below

In a written decision on March 14, 2022, the IJ found that Tongka was not credible because her “testimony was not consistent with the documentary record, and she failed to explain those inconsistencies. She also failed to submit sufficient corroborating evidence to bolster her credibility.” IJ Decision, A.R. 000082. The IJ said he made this determination based on several inconsistencies in Tongka’s testimony and the supporting record.

First, the IJ considered Tongka’s testimony in relation to her police reports. The IJ noted that Tongka testified that she reported her in-laws to the police twice, in March 2016 and June 2016, while the declaration accompanying her I-589 application states she reported her in-laws only once, in May 2016. Regarding the second police report missing from her I-589 application, the IJ considered Tongka’s explanation “that she talked about going to a police checkpoint when she made her declaration, but the women writing for her did not include it.” Id. at 00080. The IJ found this explanation unpersuasive because Tongka was given time to review her application and declaration with a translator before testifying and swore to the truth of its contents without qualification, and because she did not offer another explanation for why her declaration did not include the second police report.

Second, the IJ identified inconsistencies in Tongka’s testimony about who reported her experiences to the police. The IJ discussed how Tongka first testified she did not know if anyone filed a complaint on her behalf, but then stated she was the only one who reported her in-laws’ actions, and then ultimately cited confusion about the question when reminded that her brother’s affidavit also mentions filing a complaint on her behalf. The IJ found that “the Department’s initial question was very direct, it did not mention timelines, and [Tongka] did not seem confused.” Id.

Third, the IJ took up the affidavits Tongka submitted to support her testimony from a local police officer, her brother Eric Tongka, and her neighbor Blanche Tako Kondih. The IJ determined that each of these affidavits “raises more questions than it answers and highlights potential omissions in her testimony.” Id. at 000081. Regarding the police officer’s affidavit, the IJ noted that this letter references one of Tongka’s claimed reports to the police, but includes no dates and does not mention a second report. The IJ further noted that the letter “includes details [Tongka] did not mention and leaves out details to which she testified.” Id. For example, the letter does not mention that Tongka’s in-laws tried to force her to drink poison, or that she was raped. Further, the IJ identified that the timeline of events as set forth in the letter does not match Tongka’s timeline, and that the letter references attachments that were never submitted. Regarding her brother’s affidavit, the IJ noted inconsistencies between Tongka’s testimony about her children— namely, that they have no contact with Tongka’s in-laws—and her brother’s claims that Tongka’s in-laws have harassed and abused Tongka’s children, including abducting and raping her daughter Precious. Regarding her neighbor’s affidavit, the IJ identified inconsistencies between the affidavit and Tonga’s testimony as to where Ms. Tako Kundih lived, why Ms. Tako Kundih stated Tongka was told to drink the poison, and what has happened to Precious since Tongka left Cameroon.

Finally, the IJ took up Tongka’s other corroborating evidence. The IJ found that the articles Tongka submitted were “limited and outdated” and do not support Tongka’s fear that her in-laws would harm her if she returned to Cameroon. Id. at 000082. Further, the IJ gave Dr. Walker- Said’s expert report “reduced weight” since Dr. Walker-Said did not appear for cross-examination and her report did not include a curriculum vitae, concluding that “[w]hile the information provided by Dr. Walker-Said suggests that [Tongka’s] story is plausible, it does not overcome the inconsistencies and omissions dismissed above.” Id. Based on these findings, the IJ found Tongka not credible, and denied Tongka’s application for asylum and withholding of removal. The IJ further denied her application for protection under the CAT.

Tongka appealed the IJ’s decision to the BIA, which dismissed her appeal on November 13, 2025. The BIA determined the IJ “articulated specific, cogent reasons based in the record for finding that [Tongka] was not credible and that finding will be upheld.” BIA Decision, A.R. 000004. In particular, the BIA determined that Tongka had not shown clear error with the IJ’s findings that the police officer’s letter she submitted does not corroborate key parts of her testimony, or clear error in the IJ’s findings that she submitted inconsistent evidence about “when she reported her harm to the police in Cameroon, whether her relatives also submitted police reports, and whether her daughter, Precious, was abducted and raped by [her husband’s] family.” Id. at 00005. Accordingly, the BIA upheld the IJ’s adverse credibility determination and declined to reach her other arguments on appeal given that such determination is dispositive in this case.

II. DISCUSSION

This Court has jurisdiction to review the BIA’s final determination ordering removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1). The Court reviews the BIA’s decision as the final agency determination and reviews the IJ’s decision to the extent the BIA adopted the IJ’s reasoning. Umaña-Ramos v. Holder, 724 F.3d 667, 670 (6th Cir. 2013).

A. Standard of Review

The factual findings of the IJ and BIA, including adverse credibility determinations, are reviewed under the deferential “substantial evidence” standard. Marouf v. Lynch, 811 F.3d 174, 180 (6th Cir. 2016). Under this standard, administrative findings of fact “are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” Karimijanaki v. Holder, 579 F.3d 710, 714 (6th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation omitted) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B)). Despite this deferential standard, this Court has noted that “when evaluating credibility, an IJ should be sensitive to misunderstandings caused by language barriers [and] the use of translators.” Marouf, 811 F.3d at 180–81 (quoting Reyes-Cardona v. Holder, 565 Fed. App’x 366, 367 (6th Cir. 2014) (per curiam)).

B. Legal Framework

“The Attorney General has discretion to grant asylum to applicants who meet the definition of a ‘refugee.’” Koyo v. Barr, 768 Fed. App’x 320, 325 (6th Cir. 2019) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A)). Before considering whether an applicant is eligible for asylum, the IJ must first make a threshold determination of whether an applicant is credible. Slyusar v. Holder, 740 F.3d 1068, 1072 (6th Cir. 2014) (“An adverse credibility determination is fatal to claims for asylum and relief from removal, preventing such claims from being considered on their merits”). The credibility standards imposed by the REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub L. No. 109–13, 119 Stat. 302, apply to applications for asylum and withholding of removal filed on or after May 11, 2005. El-Moussa v. Holder, 569 F.3d 250, 256 (6th Cir. 2009). “Under the REAL ID Act, credibility determinations are based on the ‘totality of the circumstances.’” Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii)). The IJ may consider “any inaccuracies or falsehoods in [an applicant’s] statements, without regard to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to the heart of the applicant’s claim, or any other relevant factor.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). However, “although inconsistencies underlying an adverse credibility determination no longer need to go to the heart of the claim, the statute does not allow IJs to base credibility determinations on immaterial inconsistencies.” Pagoada-Galeas v. Lynch, 659 Fed. App’x 849, 858 (6th Cir. 2016).

C. The BIA’s Final Determination

Tongka asserts that the IJ erred in failing to take into account her emotional state and misunderstandings caused by language barriers and technical difficulties. Tongka argues that the BIA misunderstood this point when considering her appeal from the IJ’s determination, because the BIA pointed to portions of the transcript where the IJ paused testimony to give her an opportunity to collect herself; and what she meant by this point is that the IJ “did not take her emotional state into account when assessing her credibility in his written decision.” Appellant’s Br., ECF No. 11, 20. She further argues that the BIA erroneously dismissed her concerns regarding missed testimony and mistranslations, since “the transcript makes clear that the auditory issues were apparent to everyone present at the hearing and noted on the record numerous times by both parties as well as the IJ.” Id. Tongka focuses in particular on the IJ’s reliance on her contradictory testimony regarding her brother’s police report, and how the IJ did not consider that interpretation or technology issues may have caused this misunderstanding. While an IJ should be “sensitive to misunderstandings caused by language barriers [and] the use of translators,” Marouf, 811 F.3d at 180–81 (internal quotation omitted), Tongka’s focus on emotional, technological, and language difficulties does not show the IJ’s decision to be erroneous. To be sure, Tongka explains how misunderstandings during cross examination could have led to her inconsistent testimony regarding her brother’s police report, but she does not address the other inconsistencies that the IJ identified. These other inconsistencies include how many times Tongka herself reported her in-laws to the police and the other content in her brother’s and her neighbor’s affidavits concerning her daughter. Further, this alternative explanation of her misunderstanding the questions surrounding her brother’s police report does not provide a basis for this Court to reverse the IJ and BIA’s determinations—the Court is “bound by the decision of the IJ and the additional observations of the BIA,” even where “another IJ might have ruled differently.” Slyusar, 740 F.3d at 1073. Tongka further asserts that the IJ and BIA erred in faulting her for the content of her corroborating evidence. She argues that she “cannot control what information the police officer chose to include in his letter” and should not be faulted for the fact the letter did not include details about the poison or the rape, or the referenced attachments. Appellant’s Br., ECF No. 11, 22. She argues she is “being unfairly punished for submitting reasonably available evidence in support of her asylum claim,” and that ultimately the evidence from her brother, neighbor, and the police corroborates “key parts of her claim.” Id. at 22–23. Tying Tongka’s two arguments together, the Court notes that an IJ can “fail[] to be sufficiently sensitive to misunderstandings caused by language barriers, the use of translators, and cultural differences” where the IJ relies on inconsistencies “despite a strong indication [such inconsistencies resulted] from translation errors or language-based misunderstanding because [they were] belied by an extensive record of otherwise consistent statements and corroborating evidence.” Marouf, 811 F.3d at 183 (cleaned up). However, the record does not reflect that is what occurred in this case. The IJ considered the degree to which each affidavit matched Tongka’s own testimony and ultimately found that the police letter “does not serve to corroborate her story,” her brother’s affidavit “is not good corroborating evidence,” and her neighbor’s affidavit “does little to corroborate [Tongka’s] testimony” given the inconsistencies contained within each, particularly Tongka’s failure to mention abuse her daughter suffered at the hands of her in-laws that both her brother and neighbor included in their affidavits. IJ Decision, A.R. 000081–82. And the IJ had already established he did not find Tongka’s own testimony credible given the differences between her I-589 application and her testimony, as well as her inconsistent testimony regarding reports to the police. This Court has established that “even ancillary inconsistencies in a petitioner’s testimony can support adverse credibility determinations.” Bi Qing Zheng v. Lynch, 819 F.3d 287, 295–96 (6th Cir. 2016) (citing Slyusar, 740 F.3d at 1073). Further, “only a single relevant inconsistency that goes to the heart of the applicant’s claim… need support an IJ’s adverse credibility determination.” Marikasi v. Lynch, 840 F.3d 281, 288 (6th Cir. 2016) (citing Pilica v. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 941, 954 (6th Cir. 2004)). In this case, the IJ found—and the record reflects—inconsistencies regarding Tongka’s reports to the police, the timeline of the abuse she alleges from her in-laws, and differences in her story versus her brother’s, her neighbor’s, and the police’s. Accordingly, substantial evidence supports the IJ’s determination.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, this Court DENIES the petition for review.