United States v. Richard Hunt

JANE B. STRANCH, Circuit Judge. In 2025, Richard Hunt pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute an unspecified amount of methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C), 846. In the fall of that year, the district court sentenced him to 57 months of incarceration. Hunt appeals his sentence, assigning five errors to the district court. Finding no error, we AFFIRM the district court’s sentence.

I. BACKGROUND

Hunt was a member of a four-person drug conspiracy, operating as a street-level dealer of meth and fentanyl. Tony Lee was the head of the conspiracy, organizing the entire operation. Daymond Mason obtained bulk amounts of meth and fentanyl from Indiana. Lee coordinated the sale of Mason’s drugs through Hunt and Taylor Ledbetter, Lee’s former girlfriend. Ledbetter was another low-level member of the conspiracy, packaging drugs and collecting the money from drug sales. As a result of his participation in the operation, Hunt pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine.

At sentencing, Hunt’s attorney argued that Hunt has a history of severe substance abuse which led him to participate in the conspiracy. Hunt contends that his only benefit from participating in the conspiracy was to feed his habit and obtain a small payment. Hunt, however, had a secondary supply of drugs outside of the conspiracy. Hunt brings five challenges to his 57- month sentence. He contends that during his sentencing hearing the district court erred in: declining to apply a minor participant reduction; lowering his criminal history category to IV instead of III; failing to consider his history and characteristics; applying a two-level reduction instead of a three-level reduction for his assistance to the Government; and imposing a substantively unreasonable sentence.

II. ANALYSIS

We address the relevant standard of review with the analysis of each issue.

A. Minor Participant Reduction

Hunt contends that the district court erred by failing to award him a two-level minor participant reduction to his offense level under §§ 2D1.1(e)(2)(B) and 3B1.2(b) of the Advisory Sentencing Guidelines. We review denial of a minor participant reduction under the clear-error standard. United States v. Mosley, 53 F.4th 947, 963 (6th Cir. 2022). “Because we review the denial of a mitigating role reduction for clear error, the district court has a wide berth in resolving the matter.” Id. We typically find no clear error where the district court has sufficiently explained its reasons for denying a minor role reduction. United States v. Daneshvar, 925 F.3d 766, 790 (6th Cir. 2019).

Section 3B1.2 of the Guidelines contains the general mitigating role instructions, allowing a two-level decrease for minor participants. U.S. Sent’g Guidelines Manual § 3B1.2 (U.S. Sent’g Comm’n 2025). Section 2D1.1(e)(2)(B) provides specific instructions for applying § 3B1.2 in calculating the offense level of drug trafficking crimes. USSG § 2D1.1(e)(2)(B). Section 2D1.1(e)(2)(B) is new to the 2025 version of the Guidelines, which took effect on November 1, 2025, 20 days before the district court sentenced Hunt. USSG app. C, amend. 833. Section 2D1.1(e)(2)(B)(ii) provides that a minor role reduction “is generally warranted if the defendant’s primary function . . . was . . . distributing controlled substances in user-level quantities for little or no monetary compensation or with a primary motivation other than profit.” USSG § 2D1.1(e)(2)(B)(ii).

Although § 2D1.1(e)(2)(B)(ii) offers specific guidance, it is considered “[i]n addition to the circumstances identified in § 3B1.2.” Id. § 2D1.1(e)(2)(B). That means whether to award a minor role reduction is still “based on the totality of the circumstances and involves a determination that is heavily dependent upon the facts of the particular case.” Id. § 3B1.2 cmt. n.3(C). The Guidelines provide a list of nonexhaustive factors courts should consider in evaluating the circumstances, id., and also explain that a reduction is warranted when defendants are “substantially less culpable than the average participant” in the offense, id. § 3B1.2 cmt. n.3(A). In addition, if defendants receive a lower offense level because they were “convicted of an offense significantly less serious than warranted by” their criminal conduct, then a mitigating role reduction is generally not warranted. Id. § 3B1.2 cmt. n.3(B).

The district court discussed two reasons for declining to apply the minor participant reduction, though it identified a third during argument. First, the district court noted that Hunt had another source of drugs. Second, it concluded that Ledbetter and Hunt had similar roles. And while hearing argument on this point, the district court referenced § 3B1.2 cmt. n.3(B) and noted that Hunt had been charged with the lesser included offense.

For approximately three months before he was arrested, Hunt had a secondary source of drugs outside the conspiracy. The district court commented that “the point of that is, it’s not just him being a pawn of – of the guys above him. He’s got his own source of supply, for example.” R. 190, PageID 1312. From this secondary source, Hunt was purchasing half an ounce of methamphetamine and ten fentanyl pills for $200 every week. As one example of his sales, for approximately three months, Hunt was selling a customer half an ounce of methamphetamine twice a week. Hunt’s secondary source of drugs and evidence of regular sales take him out of the situation described in Section 2D1.1(e)(2)(B)(ii): they illustrate that he was dealing more than user level quantities and his motivation was profit.

Regarding culpability compared to other members of the conspiracy, the district court found that Hunt and Ledbetter had similar roles but different specialties. See United States v. Roberts, 223 F.3d 377, 381 (6th Cir. 2000) (analyzing a minor role reduction “in comparison to other participants in that relevant conduct”). The district court noted that Hunt would make the drug sales and Ledbetter would collect the money. Although on different ends of the transaction, the two had similar jobs at the same level in the conspiracy. Considering these facts, the district court reasonably concluded that Hunt was not “substantially less culpable than the average participant” in the offense. USSG § 3B1.2 cmt. n.3(A).

As for the lesser included offense, application note 3(B) instructs that a mitigating role reduction is generally not warranted where defendants receive a lower offense level because they were “convicted of an offense significantly less serious than warranted by” their criminal conduct. Id. § 3B1.2 cmt. n.3(B). Hunt was charged with conspiracy to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine and 40 grams or more of fentanyl in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) (b)(1)(A), (b)(1)(B), and 846. But he pleaded guilty to the lesser included offense of conspiracy to distribute an unspecified amount of methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C), and 846. The offense level of all of these crimes is dependent on the weight of drugs attributable to the defendant. See id. § 2D1.1(a)(5), (c). There is nothing in the record to suggest that a different drug weight should apply here. Accordingly, that Hunt pled to a lesser included offense did not provide a basis to deny the reduction.

Although the district court did not explicitly identify them, § 3B1.2’s application notes list factors for courts to consider. See id. § 3B1.2 cmt. n.3(C)(i)–(v). Turning to those, Hunt understood the scope and structure of the conspiracy. Although he did not organize the conspiracy, he participated in calls in which Lee directed the conspiracy, exposing him to the scope and structure of it. See United States v. Miller, 56 F.3d 719, 720 (6th Cir. 1995) (“A defendant does not become a minor participant simply because others planned a scheme and made arrangements for its accomplishment.”). He, however, did not exercise decision-making authority or influence the exercise of decision-making authority in the conspiracy. Hunt did stand to benefit from the conspiracy. Taken together, these factors support the district court’s decision.

Considering the “wide berth” the district court had in making its decision, the reasons it identified justifying that decision, and the totality of the circumstances, we find that the district court’s decision to not award a minor role reduction was not clear error. See Mosley, 53 F.4th at 963; Daneshvar, 925 F.3d at 790.

B. Procedural Reasonableness

Hunt asserts that the district court made two errors that make his sentence procedurally unreasonable. First, Hunt argues that the district court erred by lowering his criminal history category to IV instead of III without explaining why. Second, he contends the district court erred by failing to consider his history and characteristics in its 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) analysis.

We review the procedural reasonableness of a sentence under the abuse-of-discretion standard, legal questions under the de novo standard, and findings of fact under the clear-error standard. United States v. Rayyan, 885 F.3d 436, 440 (6th Cir. 2018). “An abuse of discretion is established where the reviewing court is left with a definite and firm conviction that the district court committed a clear error of judgment.” Coach, Inc. v. Goodfellow, 717 F.3d 498, 505 (6th Cir. 2013). Procedural reasonableness includes the errors Hunt alleges: properly calculating the Guidelines, explaining the sentence, and considering the § 3553(a) factors (which include history and characteristics). Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007).

1. Criminal History Category

Prior to sentencing, Hunt filed a motion for a downward departure based on § 4A1.3(b)(1), which allowed departures based on overstated criminal history, but the 2025 version of the Guidelines removed that subsection. USSG app. C, amend. 836. In fact, the Guidelines removed step two of the Guidelines application process––which previously required analysis of departures– –entirely. See USSG ch. 1, pt. A, introductory cmt. (U.S. Sent’g Comm’n 2025); id. § 1B1.1. “The Commission envisioned and framed this 2025 Amendment to be outcome neutral, intending that judges who would have relied upon facts previously identified as a basis for a departure would continue to have the authority to rely upon such facts to impose a sentence outside of the applicable guideline range as a variance under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” USSG ch. 1, pt. A, introductory cmt. (2025).

Before the amendments, we treated the district court’s decision not to depart as “unreviewable, so long as the district court understood that it had discretion to depart.” United States v. Taylor, 286 F.3d 303, 305 (6th Cir. 2002) (citation modified). We “presume that the district court understood its discretion to depart, absent clear evidence in the record to the contrary.” United States v. Crouch, 288 F.3d 907, 910 (6th Cir. 2002).

At the sentencing hearing, Hunt’s attorney argued for the reduction as a variance rather than a departure, requesting that the district court lower his criminal history category from V to III. The district court “grant[ed] a variance” for Hunt’s criminal history points, decreasing them from 12 to 8, moving his category from V to IV, “based on somewhat overstated criminal history.” R. 190, PageID 1318. The district court identified four of Hunt’s previous offenses which yielded points it believed were a “little on the aggressive side.” R. 190, PageID 1316.

There is no doubt that the district court understood it had the discretion to reduce Hunt’s criminal history category––it did exactly that. Hunt has not shown that the district court abused that discretion.

2. History and Characteristics Under Section 3553(a)(1)

A sentence is procedurally unreasonable if the district court failed to consider a factor listed in § 3553(a). Gall, 552 U.S. at 51; see also United States v. Battaglia, 624 F.3d 348, 351 (6th Cir. 2010) (“there must be sufficient evidence in the record to affirmatively demonstrate that the court gave each [factor] consideration”). Hunt contends that the district court failed to consider § 3553(a)(1)’s history and characteristics factor, particularly as it regards his substance abuse history, when crafting his sentence. The record shows that the district court did consider Hunt’s substance abuse. Aside from explicitly stating that “the Court has considered . . . the history and characteristics of the defendant,” R. 190, PageID 1327, the district court recommended that Hunt receive substance abuse treatment while in prison, illustrating that the district court specifically accounted for his condition. The court also noted that Hunt had “significant health challenges.” R. 190, PageID 1326. The district court adequately considered Hunt’s history and characteristics. See United States v. Sweeney, 891 F.3d 232, 239 (6th Cir. 2018) (“[W]e have been clear that district courts need not engage in a formulaic point-by-point refutation of a defendant’s mitigation arguments[.]”). Hunt’s sentence is not procedurally unreasonable.

C. Substantial Assistance Reduction Under § 5K1.1

Hunt contends that the district court erred by applying a two-level reduction under § 5K1.1 of the Guidelines instead of a three-level reduction. Section 5K1.1 allows the court to impose “a sentence that is below the otherwise applicable guideline range” upon a motion by the Government “stating that the defendant has provided substantial assistance” to the Government’s investigation. USSG § 5K1.1. The section provides a list of factors that the district court may consider, including the usefulness of the assistance (taking the Government’s evaluation into consideration), its truthfulness, its nature and extent, the injury or risk of injury it may cause, and its timeliness. Id. § 5K1.1(a)(1)–(5).

As discussed above, the 2025 version of the Guidelines folded departures into variances. Unlike the departure in § 4A1.3(b), the Guidelines retained § 5K1.1 and only removed the references to departure. See id. § 5K1.1; id. app. C, amend. 836. Although the vocabulary has changed, the effect remains the same: A judge may reduce a defendant’s sentence because he substantially assisted the Government.

Before the 2025 Amendments, we applied the abuse-of-discretion standard when reviewing a district court’s application, or lack thereof, of § 5K1.1. United States v. Smith, 75 F.4th 659, 663 (6th Cir. 2023). We also noted that “any challenge as to the extent of a downward departure based on substantial assistance is unreviewable.” Id. The 2025 Amendment offers no reason to disturb those rules of review.

The district court decided to give Hunt a two-level reduction for his assistance, although Hunt had asked for three. court heard counsel’s argument that Hunt had provided information about Mason and Lee, but counsel admitted that Hunt had not been threatened. The Government explained that Hunt’s assistance regarding Lee was not useful because Lee fully confessed, a point the district court accepted. Noting that Hunt faced no significant risk, the district court granted a two-level reduction. To the extent we can review its decision, the court did not abuse its discretion in reaching this decision; it heard and engaged with the parties’ arguments and made a reasonable choice grounded in the relevant Guidelines factors.

D. Substantive Reasonableness

Hunt appears to make an argument that his sentence is substantively unreasonable, but it is not entirely clear. He cites the familiar language noting that substantive unreasonableness concerns the length of a sentence and whether the district court gave reasonable weight to each § 3553(a) factor. He also identifies the correct, highly deferential standard of review for preserved objections: abuse of discretion. See Rayyan, 885 F.3d at 442. But his short argument is that the district court’s procedural “sentencing errors render Mr. Hunt’s sentence substantively unreasonable.” Appellant’s Br. 22.

As Hunt’s brief notes, a claim of substantive unreasonableness concerns the length of a sentence. Rayyan, 885 F.3d at 442. “The point is not that the district court failed to consider a factor or considered an inappropriate factor; that’s the job of procedural unreasonableness.” Id. Instead, substantive unreasonableness is “a complaint that the court placed too much weight on some of the § 3553(a) factors and too little on others in sentencing the individual.” Id.

Hunt attempts to characterize procedural errors as substantive ones. The previous errors, even if they were indeed errors, would not render Hunt’s sentence substantively unreasonable–– they do not speak to the length of his sentence or the weight the district court gave to the § 3553(a) factors. Had the record revealed one of those procedural errors, Hunt might have obtained relief. But the error would not make his sentence substantively unreasonable.

Whatever argument Hunt intended, his sentence is substantively reasonable. The district court gave proper weight to each § 3553(a) factor, and the sentence it imposed was within, and at the bottom of, the Guidelines range the district court adopted. The sentence is therefore presumptively reasonable and is not greater than necessary. See Holguin-Hernandez v. United States, 589 U.S. 169, 173 (2020) (sentences must but sufficient but not greater than necessary); United States v. Haj-Hamed, 549 F.3d 1020, 1025–26 (6th Cir. 2008) (within Guidelines sentences are presumptively reasonable).

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, we AFFIRM the district court’s sentence.