Frank Joel Achu Tsi v. Todd Blanche

JANE B. STRANCH, Circuit Judge. Frank Joel Achu Tsi applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), asserting that he feared persecution in Cameroon based on his membership in the particular social group “Anglophone Cameroonian” and because of imputed political opinions. Because substantial evidence supports the determination of the Immigration Judge (IJ) that Tsi’s testimony was not credible and because the IJ did not err in finding that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) established that Tsi is a Nigerian citizen, we deny his petition for review.

I. BACKGROUND¹

Tsi is an English-speaking citizen and native of Cameroon. He entered the United States on October 12, 2022, and Border Patrol arrested him. They released him three days later with a Notice to Appear (NTA) in immigration court. That NTA charged that Tsi was a citizen of Cameroon and did not allege citizenship of any other countries. Tsi conceded his removability and applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). In the application, Tsi stated that he was and will be persecuted in Cameroon based on his nationality, political opinions, and membership in a particular social group— “Anglophone Cameroonian.” He claimed that he was captured and tortured by the Cameroonian military because it believed he was a separatist fighter.

On July 25, 2024, an IJ held an individual merits hearing to evaluate Tsi’s application. At that hearing, Tsi testified about his experience in Cameroon, including the times he was detained and beaten by military forces there. He also testified that his father was Nigerian, leading the DHS to request, and the IJ to grant, time to file evidence of Tsi’s Nigerian citizenship. Tsi was the only witness to testify.

After the hearing, the DHS added a charge to the NTA issued to Tsi that alleged “You are a citizen of Nigeria.” Admin. R. (A.R.) 212. Tsi challenges the veracity of this addition, arguing that Nigerian citizenship may not be automatically imputed because of his father’s status. The IJ held a virtual hearing to evaluate the issue of Tsi’s citizenship and review the evidence the parties submitted in the interim.

After everything, the IJ denied Tsi’s applications for relief and determined that the DHS had established Tsi is a Nigerian citizen. In her ruling, she noted several discrepancies in Tsi’s testimony, ultimately finding it not credible. She did not reach the merits of Tsi’s asylum and withholding of removal claims, and she found that there was “no sufficient independent evidence [to] support[] his burden of proof” for his CAT claim. A.R. 58. The IJ ordered Tsi removed “to Nigeria with Cameroon as the alternative.” A.R. 60.

Tsi appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), arguing that the IJ made a clearly erroneous adverse credibility determination, failed to consider corroborating evidence in support of his claims, and erred in finding that the DHS met its burden of proof for its allegation that Tsi is a Nigerian citizen. The BIA dismissed Tsi’s appeal, concluding that the IJ did not err in refusing to credit Tsi’s testimony or in finding that the DHS sufficiently established that Tsi is a Nigerian citizen.

Tsi now petitions this court for review of the BIA’s order, challenging the adverse credibility finding, the IJ’s subsequent failure to reach the merits of his asylum and withholding of removal claims, and the IJ’s determination that there is sufficient evidence to support the allegation that Tsi is a Nigerian citizen.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Adverse Credibility Determination

We review Tsi’s challenge to the IJ’s credibility finding before addressing his other claims because “[a]n adverse credibility determination is fatal to claims for asylum and relief from removal.” Slyusar v. Holder, 740 F.3d 1068, 1072 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing Perlaska v. Holder, 361 F. App’x 655, 661 & n. 6 (6th Cir. 2010)). The same is generally true of a claim for protection under the CAT: “An adverse credibility finding is usually fatal to an applicant’s ability to prove entitlement to asylum, withholding of removal, or protection under the Convention Against Torture.” Luna-Romero v. Barr, 949 F.3d 292, 294 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting Rubio-Mauricio v. Barr, 782 F. App’x 444, 446 (6th Cir. 2019)).

1. Standard of Review

We review adverse credibility determinations under the substantial evidence standard. Slyusar, 740 F.3d at 1072. Review under this standard is highly deferential: “Adverse credibility determinations are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to make a contrary conclusion.” Id. at 1073. This court upholds a BIA determination “as long as it is supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record considered as a whole.” Id. at 1072 (quoting Marku v. Ashcroft, 380 F.3d 982, 986 (6th Cir. 2004)). Generally speaking, IJs have “substantial leeway to make the credibility call.” Masiko v. Holder, 562 F. App’x 469, 472 (6th Cir. 2014).

As is the case here, “[w]hen the BIA adopts the IJ’s reasoning and supplements the IJ’s opinion, that opinion, as supplemented by the BIA, becomes the basis for review.” Zhao v. Holder, 569 F.3d 238, 246 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Ka v. Gonzales, 236 F. App’x 189, 191 (6th Cir. 2007)). This means that we “directly review[] the decision of the IJ while considering the additional comment made by the BIA.” Id. (quoting Mapouya v. Gonzales, 487 F.3d 396, 405 (6th Cir. 2007)).

2. Analysis

An IJ must keep a number of factors in mind when assessing an applicant’s credibility. The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) instructs an IJ to “[c]onsider[] the totality of the circumstances, and all relevant factors,” which can include “the demeanor, candor, or responsiveness of the applicant,” “the inherent plausibility [and consistency] of [their] account,” and “any inaccuracies or falsehoods.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). When taking these factors into consideration, the IJ need not determine whether the inconsistencies “go[] to the heart of the applicant’s claim”; what is important is the presence of the inconsistencies themselves. Id. These instructions apply “to claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and for relief under the [CAT].” El-Moussa v. Holder, 569 F.3d 250, 256 (6th Cir. 2009).

The IJ supported her adverse credibility finding as to Tsi with three categories of evidence: (1) Tsi’s demeanor at the hearing; (2) Tsi’s inconsistent testimony; and (3) the absence of independent corroborating evidence. We take each in turn.

a. Tsi’s Demeanor at the Hearing

An applicant’s demeanor and responsiveness can be an important indicator of credibility, and the INA singles it out as a factor ripe for the IJ’s consideration. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii) (permitting an IJ to consider “the demeanor, candor, or responsiveness of the applicant” in forming a credibility determination). Within this ambit, an IJ can appraise whether she was required to repeat questions to elicit the applicant’s response and whether the applicant “appeared to be controlling the response rather than being responsive.” Mohamedene v. Lynch, 620 F. App’x 475, 480 (6th Cir. 2015) (quoting the record).

The IJ noted concerns about Tsi’s behavior in her decision and order. She observed him “moving his arm in a motion that indicated he was operating a mouse” while testifying about his experience in Cameroon. A.R. 55. His eyes also appeared to track the screen, like “he was reading something” on it while testifying, and he evaded eye contact with the camera. A.R. 55–56. Tsi’s tone lacked inflection, even when testifying about “traumatic incidents of his mother being shot, him being jailed and beaten for many days.” A.R. 55. At the hearing, the IJ offered Tsi opportunities to recalibrate, such as by instructing him to look at the camera, but his conduct persisted. This behavior gave the IJ the impression that Tsi “was reviewing something on his computer while testifying, likely his written statement of what occurred.” A.R. 56.

The hearing transcript supports this conclusion. Early on, the IJ observed that Tsi was “being really quiet” and that his “words kind of [ran] together” and requested that he “be a little louder and . . . articulate so that [she] can understand [him].” A.R. 100. Soon after, she repeated the request: “Hold on. You’re doing it again. You’re kind of like . . . mumbling and kind of spreading everything together. I need you to slow down and tell me what happened.” A.R. 106. Because Tsi still had not remedied the problem after wading deeper into his testimony, he and the IJ had a longer exchange in which she again noted that he was “doing that again where [his] voice starts lowering” and asked him to “look directly at the camera.” A.R. 139–40. Then, another time, the IJ paused Tsi’s testimony because his “eyes are wandering again.” A.R. 143. Given this record, there was reason for the IJ to take this pattern of behavior to suggest Tsi was “controlling the response rather than being responsive,” thereby contributing to an adverse credibility finding. Mohamedene, 620 F. App’x at 480 (quoting the record).

Tsi protests that the IJ misinterpreted his actions by relying on suppositions and inferences unsupported by what he actually did. But an adverse credibility determination is, by nature, subjective. See J-Y-C-, 24 I & N Dec. 260, 262 (B.I.A. 2007) (noting that the INA advises IJs to take a “commonsense approach” when assessing an applicant’s credibility (internal quotations omitted)). And particularly so when observing an applicant’s demeanor, which is comprised of subtle body language and mannerisms. The IJ’s concerns about Tsi’s behavior during the hearing were grounded in the record, and that is enough.

Consideration of an applicant’s demeanor, however, is only one piece of the puzzle; we must also review the alleged factual discrepancies and lack of corroborating evidence relevant to the IJ’s credibility determination.

b. Factual Discrepancies

We begin with the half-dozen factual discrepancies identified by the IJ and discussed by the BIA: Tsi’s inconsistent testimony about (1) “ghost town” days in Cameroon; (2) the food he was provided in detention; (3) where he lived; (4) the year he graduated from high school; (5) how he was able to leave his detentions in 2021; and (6) where on his body he was beaten while in detention in 2021.

As incorporated into the INA, the REAL ID Act amplified the role inconsistent testimony plays in an IJ’s credibility evaluation. The Act permits IJs to consider any inconsistency, regardless of whether the inconsistency goes “to the heart of the applicant’s claim.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). Prior to the Act’s enactment, the inconsistencies’ relationship to the claim was part of the calculus. But “[e]ven before the REAL ID Act was adopted, while ‘minor inconsistencies in dates which reveal nothing about an asylum applicant’s fear for his safety . . . would be an inadequate basis for the adverse credibility finding, their cumulative effect gives support to the other grounds’ for finding a lack of credibility.” Akmatov v. Barr, 799 F. App’x 897, 904 (6th Cir. 2020) (citation modified) (quoting Yu v. Ashcroft, 364 F.3d 700, 704 (6th Cir. 2004)) . Synthesizing these points, IJs may consider any inconsistency—even an ancillary one— when making a credibility determination, and a cumulation of minor inconsistencies can support an adverse credibility finding.

The hearing transcript supports the inconsistencies the IJ identified. Tsi testified that, pursuant to the “ghost town” days in Cameroon, he closed his shop for two days instead of the singular day he listed in his applications for immigration relief. He also testified that he was beaten under his legs by the Cameroonian military, but later said he was beaten on his stomach, too. He testified that he was fed “a banana or bread” in detention, then added “poorly cooked rice” and beans to his recollection thirty minutes later. A.R. 108, 116, 141–42. He said that he graduated from high school in 2018 instead of 2019. Tsi testified that he lived with his uncle for almost a year after his 2021 arrest, though this detail was absent from his original statement. He also gave potentially conflicting accounts of how he left the military police station in Cameroon—first he said he bribed the officers but then said others “snuck [him] out.” A.R. 148–49. The inconsistencies in Tsi’s testimony were not rare; they span the hearing transcript.

Tsi generally acknowledges these inconsistencies but argues they are inconsequential— insignificant enough to be chalked up to nerves or misunderstandings rather than viewed as supporting a lack of credibility.

We agree that many of the inconsistencies, especially when viewed in isolation, are minor. If we take Tsi’s account of his experience in Cameroon as true, it should be no surprise that he momentarily forgot the exact meal he was served in prison after being brutally beaten. Nor is it disquieting that he was off a year when recalling his high school graduation. But our task is not to view these instances in isolation, nor is it of any consequence whether they “go[] to the heart” of Tsi’s immigration claims. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). The only question is if “any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude” that Tsi was credible. Akmatov, 799 F. App’x at 903 (quoting Pilica v. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 941, 952 (6th Cir. 2004)). And the answer is no. The standard of review is highly deferential and the REAL ID Act fairly expansive. It is possible that a different factfinder would decide that these minor inconsistencies are shy of justifying an adverse credibility finding, “but, under our limited review, even an ‘inaccuracy categorized as de minimis [ ] may still support an adverse credibility determination.’” Rivas- Dubou v. Garland, No. 21-3347, 2022 WL 1073721, at *2 (6th Cir. Apr. 11, 2022) (alteration in original) (quoting Slyusar, 740 F.3d at 1074). The record does not compel a contrary conclusion.

c. Lack of Corroborating Evidence

The IJ also found that Tsi failed to present supporting documentation that would change her adverse credibility finding or independently establish his eligibility for relief.

An applicant can rehabilitate noncredible testimony or independently support his burden of proof through corroborating evidence. Dong v. Holder, 345 F. App’x 965, 970 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Pilica, 388 F.3d at 954). Corroborating evidence could include medical documentation substantiating alleged injuries, police reports confirming the dates and times of encounters, or witness testimony. See, e.g., Arias-Hernandez v. Sessions, 685 F. App’x 372, 376–77 (6th Cir. 2017); Dong, 345 F. App’x at 970.

Tsi did not offer corroborating evidence sufficient to rehabilitate his noncredible testimony or independently support his burden of proof. He provided no medical records to support his claims of the harm he suffered in Cameroon. Nor did he present any testimony from his sister, who now lives in the United States; Tsi was the only witness to testify at his individual merits hearing. The evidence he did provide tended to harm rather than help his credibility. His mother’s medical book, for instance, lists a birth date different from that included in other documents and states that she was “caught by a stray bullet” rather than shot point-blank as Tsi’s testimony suggests. A.R. 57, 264–73.

Considering these discrepancies, Tsi’s behavior at the hearing, and the absence of independent corroborating evidence, we conclude that the IJ’s adverse credibility determination was supported by substantial evidence. Because an adverse credibility conclusion defeats applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT protection, we decline to reach Tsi’s arguments regarding the merits of his claims. Slyusar, 740 F.3d at 1072; Luna-Romero, 949 F.3d at 294; see Korir v. Sessions, 700 F. App’x 514, 519 (6th Cir. 2017) (“[I]f the IJ finds that an applicant is incredible, and there is no independent persuasive evidence, this ‘necessarily disposes’ of his application [for relief from removal.]”) (quoting Slyusar, 740 F.3d at 1074)).

B. Nigerian Citizenship

The only remaining issue is Tsi’s citizenship. He challenges the IJ’s determination that sufficient evidence exists in the record to support the allegation that Tsi is a Nigerian citizen. The DHS stated at Tsi’s individual merits hearing that his citizenship status was of consequence because it “would directly impact his current eligibility for asylum.” A.R. 167. Tsi appears to challenge the determination based on a fear that a finding of Nigerian citizenship will lead to his removal to Nigeria.²2. Tsi states in his brief that “[t]he Court erred in ordering removal to Nigeria.” (Appellant’s Br. 49). This is not an argument Tsi raised before the BIA and thus is not an argument before us on appeal. See Mazariegos-Rodas v. Garland, 122 F.4th 655, 664–65 (6th Cir. 2024); 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1) (requiring administrative exhaustion).

“We review the BIA’s legal determinations de novo and its factual findings for substantial evidence.” Perez-Hernandez v. Blanche, 184 F.4th 520, 528 (6th Cir. 2026) (citing Tista-Ruiz de Ajualip v. Garland, 114 F.4th 487, 495 (6th Cir. 2024)). An IJ’s determination of an applicant’s nationality or citizenship is a question of law receiving de novo review, but the conclusions underpinning that determination are questions of fact reviewed under the substantial evidence standard. Menghistab v. Garland, 37 F.4th 1240, 1246 (7th Cir. 2022).

The IJ made her determination by relying on Tsi’s testimony that his father and grandparents are Nigerian, combined with evidence from the DHS showing that Nigerian citizenship can be achieved through descent if a child has at least one Nigerian parent. Tsi also listed his father’s “Country of Birth” as Nigeria in his application for asylum and withholding of removal. Substantial evidence supports the IJ’s determination that Tsi has a Nigerian father and two Nigerian grandparents, because this is exactly what he testified at his hearing.

Because we find that substantial evidence supports the IJ’s finding about Tsi’s Nigerian ties, the only question left is whether those facts mean that Tsi himself is a Nigerian citizen. This analysis begins and ends with the Nigerian Constitution. It provides for jus sanguinis citizenship, stating without qualification that “[t]he following persons are citizens of Nigeria by birth . . . every person born outside Nigeria either of whose parents is a citizen of Nigeria.” Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, ch. III, art. 25 (as amended).³3. Dual citizenship is recognized in Nigeria, meaning that Tsi’s status as a Cameroonian citizen does not deprive him of his Nigerian citizenship. Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, ch. III, art. 28 (as amended). The IJ did not err in its determination.

III. CONCLUSION

For the aforementioned reasons, we deny Tsi’s petition for review.

1. Because the IJ determined that Tsi’s testimony was not credible, some facts underlying his claim are controverted.