Sandra Cabrera-Lopez v. Todd Blanche

KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge. Petitioner Sandra Cabrera-Lopez petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ denial of her application for asylum and withholding of removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”). Because the Board relied on substantial evidence to find that Cabrera-Lopez did not show that the Guatemalan government was unable or unwilling to control her alleged persecutors, we deny the petition for review.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Procedural Background

Petitioner Sandra Cabrera-Lopez is a native and citizen of Guatemala. A.R. at 703 (Notice to Appear (“NTA”)). Cabrera-Lopez entered the United States without inspection in April 2012 and was not admitted or paroled by an immigration officer. A.R. at 703 (NTA). She was seventeen years old at that time. A.R. at 702 (NTA). In 2013, Cabrera-Lopez applied for asylum and withholding of removal under the INA and the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). A.R. at 600–09 (2013 Asylum Appl.); 196–212 (2021 Am. Asylum Appl.). Cabrera-Lopez sought relief based on her race, indigenous Mayan, and her membership in two proposed particular social groups: “Guatemalan women viewed as property, based on their position in a domestic relationship,” and “Guatemalan women unable to leave a domestic partnership.” A.R. at 125 (Feb. 2021 Tr.); 202–03 (2021 Am. Asylum Appl.).

The Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against Cabrera- Lopez in 2012 by serving her with a Notice to Appear. A.R. at 700 (NTA). Cabrera-Lopez’s removal hearings began in May 2012 and continued over multiple appearances, years apart. A.R. at 85–86 (May 2012 Tr.); see also A.R. at 92–98 (May 2013 Tr.); 99–109 (Dec. 2020 Tr.); 110– 80 (Feb. 2021 Tr.). Cabrera-Lopez had her final hearing in February 2021, where she appeared and testified in support of her application. A.R. 110–80 (Feb. 2021 Tr.). Immigration Judge Donald Pashayan (“IJ”) found Cabrera-Lopez credible and determined that she had suffered past harm, A.R. at 50–52 (IJ Dec. at 7–9), but denied her application for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT protection, A.R. at 175–76 (Feb. 2021 Tr.); 44–59 (IJ Dec. at 1–16). The IJ determined that Cabrera-Lopez failed to establish “persecution” under the INA because she had not established cognizable social groups, a nexus between a protected ground and the harm she suffered, or that the Guatemalan government was unable or unwilling to protect her from that harm. A.R. at 52–57 (IJ Dec. at 9–14). The IJ also concluded that, even had Cabrera-Lopez demonstrated persecution, she could reasonably have relocated within Guatemala. A.R. at 56 (IJ Dec. at 13).

Cabrera-Lopez appealed the IJ’s denial of asylum, withholding, and CAT relief to the Board. A.R. at 35–41 (Notice of App. to BIA); 10–16 (Br. Supp. App. of IJ Dec.). In a single- judge order on August 28, 2025, the Board dismissed Cabrera-Lopez’s appeal and affirmed the conclusions of the IJ. A.R. at 3–7 (BIA Dec. at 1–5). Cabrera-Lopez now petitions this court for review of the Board’s decision. D. 13 (Pet’r’s Br. at 10). She does not seek review of the Board’s decision on CAT relief.

B. Factual Background

Cabrera-Lopez grew up in a small village in rural Guatemala, a twenty- to twenty-five- minute walk from the nearest town. A.R. at 127, 134 (Feb. 2021 Tr.); 599 (2013 Asylum Appl.). She is indigenous Mayan and speaks Mam, the only language in her home village. A.R. at 220 (2021 Am. Asylum Appl.); 135 (Feb. 2021 Tr.). For most of her life, until she came to the United States at seventeen, Cabrera-Lopez lived with her family and rarely left her village. A.R. at 128, 130, 134–35 (Feb. 2021 Tr.).

In Guatemala, Cabrera-Lopez suffered significant physical and sexual violence from multiple individuals. From ages six to nine, she was raped repeatedly by her adult cousin. A.R. at 135–36, 160 (Feb. 2021 Tr.). This cousin threatened Cabrera-Lopez and warned her not to go to the police. A.R. at 163–65 (Feb. 2021 Tr.). At the time of the IJ’s decision, this cousin was still alive and living in her home village. A.R. at 160 (Feb. 2021 Tr.). As a teenager, Cabrera- Lopez had a ten-month relationship with Pedro Lopez Cabrera, then twenty-one years old. A.R. at 128–31, 152 (Feb. 2021 Tr.). She lived with Pedro and his family for three months. A.R. at 128–30 (Feb. 2021 Tr.). During that time, Pedro “dr[ank] a lot,” “hit [her] a lot,” tried to kill her with a knife, threatened to kill her if she ever reported him to the police or to her family, A.R. at 128–32, 163–65 (Feb. 2021 Tr.), and raped her “on numerous occasions,” A.R. at 202 (2021 Am. Asylum Appl.). Pedro often threatened to kill Cabrera-Lopez both during their relationship and after, including after she “left him” and moved in with her grandparents in the same small village, and after she moved to the United States. A.R. at 130, 133, 147 (Feb. 2021 Tr.). Pedro expressed these threats to Cabrera-Lopez directly, as well as to neighbors and family members. A.R. at 132– 33 (Feb. 2021 Tr.); 210–11 (2021 Am. Asylum App). On another occasion, Cabrera-Lopez was attacked and raped on the street by three unknown, masked men. A.R. at 140–41, 161–62 (Feb. 2021 Tr.).

This kind of violence against women, Cabrera-Lopez testified, is common in the village, particularly within domestic relationships. “[M]ost of the men do these type[s] of things against the women.” A.R. at 150 (Feb. 2021 Tr.). Cabrera-Lopez knows this “[b]ecause their houses are really close to each other,” such that neighbors can sometimes “hear women screaming and the kids crying.” A.R. at 151 (Feb. 2021 Tr.). Avenues for police protection in the village are limited and of dubious utility. There is no police station in Cabrera-Lopez’s village. A.R. at 134 (Feb. 2021 Tr.). Cabrera-Lopez has “hear[d] the neighbors say that there is a police station” in the neighboring town. A.R. at 134–35 (Feb. 2021 Tr.). She has never been to or seen the police station, nor has she ever seen police in her village. A.R. at 134–35 (Feb. 2021 Tr.). She has been told by her neighbors in the village that the police can be paid off and “[s]ometimes . . . will have a blind eye about a situation” as a result. A.R. at 149 (Feb. 2021 Tr.). When Cabrera-Lopez’s neighbors have reported domestic violence but “don’t pay anything to the police, the police will do nothing to help them.” A.R. at 150–51 (Feb. 2021 Tr.). Cabrera-Lopez did not report to the police any of the attacks against her by her cousin, Pedro, or the three masked men. A.R. at 132, 143, 160–61 (Feb. 2021 Tr.).

II. ANALYSIS

A. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review

“This court has jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252 to review the Board’s final determination ordering removal.” Tista-Ruiz de Ajualip v. Garland, 114 F.4th 487, 494 (6th Cir. 2024) (citing Umaña-Ramos v. Holder, 724 F.3d 667, 670 (6th Cir. 2013)). “We review the Board’s order if it issued its own decision, but we review the IJ’s decision to the extent that the Board adopted it.” Id. at 494–95 (citing Umaña-Ramos, 724 F.3d at 670). We review questions of law de novo and findings of fact under the substantial-evidence standard. Umaña-Ramos, 724 F.3d at 670. We uphold the Board’s determination under the substantial-evidence standard “as long as it is supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record considered as a whole,” and will not reverse “unless we find that the evidence not only supports a contrary conclusion, but compels it.” Tista-Ruiz de Ajualip, 114 F.4th at 495 (emphasis in original) (first quoting Juan Antonio v. Barr, 959 F.3d 778, 788 (6th Cir. 2020), then quoting Ceraj v. Mukasey, 511 F.3d 583, 588 (6th Cir. 2007)).

B. Asylum

The Attorney General has discretion under the INA to grant asylum to applicants who meet the definition of a “refugee.” Umaña-Ramos, 724 F.3d at 670 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)). A “refugee” is “a person who is unable or unwilling to return to her home country because of past persecution or a ‘well-founded fear’ of future persecution ‘on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.’” Id. (quoting Bonilla-Morales v. Holder, 607 F.3d 1132, 1136 (6th Cir. 2010) (in turn quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42))). An applicant bears the burden of establishing that she meets the definition of a refugee. Id. at 671 (citing Bonilla-Morales, 607 F.3d at 1136).

The INA does not define “persecution,” but we have held that it “requires more than a few isolated incidents of verbal harassment or intimidation, unaccompanied by any physical punishment, infliction of harm, or significant deprivation of liberty.” Juan Antonio, 959 F.3d at 793 (quoting Mikhailevitch v. INS, 146 F.3d 384, 390 (6th Cir. 1998)). “Motive is a critical element of persecution,” and “petitioners ‘must provide some evidence of [motive], direct or circumstantial.’” Sebastian-Sebastian v. Garland, 87 F.4th 838, 847 (6th Cir. 2023) (emphasis and alteration in original) (quoting I.N.S. v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 483 (1992)). Physical harm is not necessary to show persecution, Stserba v. Holder, 646 F.3d 964, 972 (6th Cir. 2011); “‘immediate and menacing’ threats can be sufficient,” Mazariegos-Rodas v. Garland, 122 F.4th 655, 676 (6th Cir. 2024) (quoting Japarkulova v. Holder, 615 F.3d 696, 701 (6th Cir. 2010)).

To establish persecution, “an asylum applicant must demonstrate that a statutorily protected ground is ‘at least one central reason’ for their persecution.” Sebastian-Sebastian, 87 F.4th at 847 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i)). Membership in a particular social group is one protected ground. “[A] ’particular social group’ is a group of individuals who share a common, immutable characteristic that . . . members of the group either cannot change, or should not be required to change.” Marikasi v. Lynch, 840 F.3d 281, 290 (6th Cir. 2016). A particular social group must be “both particular and socially visible,” Bonilla-Morales, 607 F.3d at 1137, and “cannot be defined exclusively by the fact that its members have been subject to harm,” Kante v. Holder, 634 F.3d 321, 327 (6th Cir. 2011) (quotation marks and citation omitted). We cannot “presume that persecution is on account of” a statutory ground but rather must “examin[e] the nature of the conduct on which an application for asylum is based” including “the overall context of the applicant’s situation.” Sebastian-Sebastian, 87 F.4th at 847 (alteration in original) (first quoting Zoarab v. Mukasey, 524 F.3d 777, 780 (6th Cir. 2008), then quoting Gilaj v. Gonzales, 408 F.3d 275, 285 (6th Cir. 2005) (per curiam)).

Persecution under the INA also requires an applicant to show that her harm was inflicted “by the government” or by “persons the government is unwilling or unable to control.” Sebastian- Sebastian, 87 F.4th at 847 (quoting Al-Ghorbani v. Holder, 585 F.3d 980, 997 (6th Cir. 2009)). When, as in this case, an asylum claim is based on private, “non-governmental conduct,” an applicant can meet this burden by “show[ing] that she cannot ‘reasonably expect the assistance of the government’ in controlling her perpetrator’s actions.” Juan Antonio, 959 F.3d at 793 (quoting Al-Ghorbani, 585 F.3d at 998). Government unwillingness or inability is assessed in light of both “the government’s response to an asylum applicant’s persecution and . . . general evidence of country conditions.” K.H. v. Barr, 920 F.3d 470, 476 (6th Cir. 2019).

1. Ability and Willingness of the Guatemalan Government to Control Persecutors

Cabrera-Lopez argues that the record compels a determination that the government was unwilling or unable to protect her from her persecutors and that the Board erred in concluding otherwise. The IJ made his determination, and the Board agreed, based on three findings: (1) Cabrera-Lopez “did not report the harm she suffered or feared” which “deprived the . . . authorities of the opportunity to provide [her] with the protection she seeks”; (2) the fact that her persecutors threatened to kill her if she contacted the police indicated that the persecutors “were afraid of the police and what action the police would take”; and (3) despite Guatemala’s “difficult conditions, . . . the country conditions evidence reflects that some steps have been taken to curb domestic violence.” A.R. at 5–6 (BIA Dec. at 3–4) (citations omitted). Cabrera-Lopez counters that: (1) “Guatemalan women,” including herself, “understand the futility of reporting violence”; (2) “[e]ven if [her] persecutors” believed “that police are willing and able to act, this does not make it so”; and (3) “the overall context of [her] situation as an indigenous young woman living in a rural village in Guatemala where domestic violence is a regular occurrence” and “there is no police presence” demonstrates that “she cannot ‘reasonably expect the assistance of the government.’” D. 13 (Pet’r’s Br. at 27–29).

We apply the substantial-evidence standard to review the Board’s determination on government ability and willingness and do so in light of the record as a whole. Juan Antonio, 959 F.3d at 795. Even when “we may have reached a different result,” we can reverse the Board’s finding “only when ‘any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.’” K.H., 920 F.3d at 478 (quoting Slyusar v. Holder, 740 F.3d 1068, 1072 (6th Cir. 2014)). Moreover, our “role . . . is not to weigh the evidence,” Marikasi, 840 F.3d at 289, “or substitute our judgment for that of the [factfinder],” Gray v. SLC Coal Co., 176 F.3d 382, 387 (6th Cir. 1999).

Outside of substantial-evidence review, the Board may also err procedurally when it “does not articulate a finding ‘clearly enough’” such that the court is unable to conduct “the required substantial-evidence review.” Palucho v. Garland, 49 F.4th 532, 539 (6th Cir. 2022) (quoting T- Mobile S., LLC v. City of Roswell, 574 U.S. 293, 303 (2015)). We have, for example, held that the Board erred when it “‘disregarded’ country-conditions evidence” entirely. Id. at 537 (collecting cases); see, e.g., Zometa-Orellana v. Garland, 19 F.4th 970, 979–80 (6th Cir. 2021) (remanding for clarification where the Board “completely disregarded and failed to address” country conditions and relied “exclusively” on petitioner’s failure to contact the police); Zuniga-Martinez v. Garland, No. 21-3312, 2022 WL 2160668, at *5–6 (6th Cir. June 15, 2022) (similar). See also Saleh v. Barr, 795 F. App’x 410, 418 (6th Cir. 2019) (“[f]actual errors can qualify as legal errors when important facts have been totally overlooked and others have been seriously mischaracterized.” (alteration and emphasis in original) (quoting Shabo v. Sessions, 892 F.3d 237, 239–40 (6th Cir. 2018))).

The Board did not err procedurally or substantively in finding that Cabrera-Lopez failed to show that the government was unable or unwilling to protect her. First, the Board did not err procedurally by failing to “articulate [its] finding ‘clearly enough’” or by “disregard[ing]” relevant evidence. Palucho, 49 F.4th at 539, 537 (first quoting T-Mobile, 574 U.S. at 303, then quoting Zometa-Orellana, 19 F.4th at 979–80). The Board considered the facts that Cabrera-Lopez did not alert the police and that the Guatemalan government had made certain efforts “to curb domestic violence.” A.R. at 6 (BIA Dec. at 4). The Board also inferred that Cabrera-Lopez’s persecutors were afraid of potential police action against them. Id. The Board has, therefore, “articulate[d] [its] finding ‘clearly enough.’” Palucho, 49 F.4th at 539 (quoting T-Mobile, 574 U.S. at 303). The Board also acknowledged the “difficult” circumstances in Guatemala and “[c]onsider[ed] the evidence in the aggregate.” A.R. at 6 (BIA Dec. at 4). Accordingly, the Board properly considered both “general evidence of country conditions,” and “the government’s response to” Cabrera- Lopez’s particular situation, K.H., 920 F.3d at 476, such that it did not rely “exclusively” on her failure to alert the police or “fail[] to address” country-conditions evidence, Zometa-Orellana, 19 F.4th at 979–80; see also Zuniga-Martinez, 2022 WL 2160668, at *5–6 (granting review where the Board “did not discuss evidence of country conditions at all”).

Second, the Board’s decision is supported by substantial evidence, as “the ‘record considered as a whole’” does not “‘compel[]’” a conclusion contrary to the Board’s. Juan Antonio, 959 F.3d at 792 (quoting Mandebvu v. Holder, 755 F.3d 417, 424 (6th Cir. 2014)). Although a “failure to report crimes to the police will make it more difficult to show that the government was unable or unwilling to control” an applicant’s persecutors, Palucho, 49 F.4th at 537, an applicant’s failure to report does not bar her asylum claim when reporting would have been “potentially dangerous” or “unproductive,” In re S-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1328, 1333 (BIA 2000). An applicant may still meet this burden, for example, through evidence that “legal remedies are generally unavailable” to people in her circumstances such that “few . . . report abuse to authorities.” Juan Antonio, 959 F.3d at 793 (citation modified). Indeed, country-conditions evidence is “particularly” important when “an asylum applicant does not report alleged persecution to the authorities.” Zuniga-Martinez, 2022 WL 2160668, at *5 (citing K.H., 920 F.3d at 476). As set out below, considering the record in full, Cabrera-Lopez’s evidence does not compel the determination that the Guatemalan government was unable or unwilling to protect her despite her failure to contact the police.

Here, Cabrera-Lopez has offered more than “a bare assertion that the police ‘couldn’t do anything’ to protect her.” Mendez Lopez v. Garland, No. 23-3125, 2023 WL 7215453, at *4 (6th Cir. Nov. 2, 2023) (citation omitted). Cabrera-Lopez provided multiple reports on the conditions in Guatemala, including two State Department reports, which we have considered “the best gauge” of country conditions. Juan Antonio, 959 F.3d at 796 (quoting Dieng v. Holder, 698 F.3d 866, 872 (6th Cir. 2012)); see A.R. 231–60 (2019 State Dep’t Hum. Rts. Rep.); 269–76 (2020 State Dep’t OSAC Rep.). These reports, as the Board acknowledged, depict “difficult conditions,” A.R. at 6 (BIA Dec. at 4), including limited access to protection and legal recourse for indigenous women suffering from domestic and sexual violence, see, e.g., A.R. at 271 (2020 State Dep’t OSAC Rep.) (“cultural stigmas and sporadic police presence in rural areas cause significant underreporting” of sexual assaults). Cabrera-Lopez also credibly testified to the barriers she would have faced to access the police and her belief that doing so would have been futile. She had never visited the police station in the neighboring town, had never seen police in her village, and was aware of the police station only by word-of-mouth from neighbors. A.R. at 134–35 (Feb. 2021 Tr.). When asked if she would be “able to seek the assistance of the police” if she “returned to Guatemala” and faced further harm from Pedro or her cousin, Cabrera-Lopez explained her understanding that police had a “blind eye” and “will do nothing to help” when they are not paid, including in situations of domestic violence. A.R. at 149–50 (Feb. 2021 Tr.).

Although “troubling,” Cabrera-Lopez’s country-conditions evidence “does not compel a finding that the Guatemalan government is not willing or able to control [her] alleged persecutors.” Mendez Lopez, 2023 WL 7215453, at *5. We have relied on evidence “that the government of Guatemala is taking steps to protect indigenous women from violence” to determine that country- conditions evidence did not mandate a result contrary to the Board’s. José-Tomás v. Barr, 822 F. App’x 354, 358–59 (6th Cir. 2020); see Velasquez-Rodriguez v. Whitaker, 762 F. App’x 241, 245 (6th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (similar). As the Board found, Cabrera-Lopez’s country-conditions evidence indicated some willingness of the Guatemalan government to address domestic and sexual violence against women. See A.R. at 6 (BIA Dec. at 4) (“some steps have been taken to curb domestic violence”); 246 (2019 State Dep’t Hum. Rts. Rep.) (“The government took steps to combat femicide and violence against women.”). In light of the record as a whole, this finding provides substantial evidence to support the Board’s determination.

Cabrera-Lopez’s testimony and country-conditions evidence similarly do not compel a determination that the Guatemalan government was unable or unwilling to protect her in particular. Although Cabrera-Lopez testified to the remoteness of her village, its lack of police presence, and her indigenous identity and language, A.R. at 134–35 (Feb. 2021 Tr.), we cannot conclude from these facts that she was unable to access police assistance or that doing so would have been futile. We have recognized that, in Guatemala, “[i]ndigenous Mayan women are particularly unable to seek help from the government because they speak a different language from most of the country’s authorities.” Juan Antonio, 959 F.3d at 795. Cabrera-Lopez did not testify, however, and the record does not indicate, that the police in the neighboring village did not speak Mam. Instead, her testimony indicated that neighbors in her village, where Mam is the only language spoken, had initiated police reports, suggesting there was no language barrier between villagers (including Cabrera-Lopez) and the nearby authorities. A.R. 149–50 (Feb. 2021 Tr.). This same testimony suggests that the twenty- to twenty-five-minute walk from Cabrera-Lopez’s village to the neighboring town did not prevent other individuals from making police reports. Cabrera-Lopez also testified to her understanding that the police would not intervene in domestic violence unless paid off. A.R. at 150 (Feb. 2021 Tr.). This “subjective” belief based on word-of-mouth, without corroboration that reporting domestic violence to the neighboring police department would have been futile, does not suffice to compel a contrary determination. Velasquez-Rodriguez, 762 F. App’x at 245. Here, therefore, we cannot find that the record compels the conclusion, contrary to the Board’s, that the Guatemalan government was unable or unwilling to protect Cabrera-Lopez from her alleged persecutors.

2. Cabrera-Lopez’s Remaining Arguments

Cabrera-Lopez makes several other arguments in her petition for review. These arguments, however, cannot change the outcome of this case. Cabrera-Lopez argues that the Board erred in finding that her proposed particular social groups were not cognizable, that she failed to establish a nexus between her past persecution and a protected ground, and that she could have reasonably relocated within Guatemala. D. 13 (Pet’r’s Br. at 2, 10–11). Because Cabrera-Lopez has not established a required element of her asylum claim, as set out above, we need not address these issues.

Cabrera-Lopez also argues that the Board erred by failing to remand her application to the IJ for reconsideration after precedent relied upon by the IJ, Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018), was vacated. D. 13 (Pet’r’s Br. at 2, 12). We have remanded for reconsideration when the Board affirmed, without remanding for further review, an IJ’s decision that relied “almost exclusively” on A-B-, which “colored her actions and decisions throughout the . . . proceedings.” Tista-Ruiz de Ajualip, 114 F.4th at 492–93, 496. Here, although the IJ cited A-B- for certain determinations, he cited additional authority and did not rely on A-B- exclusively. See A.R. at 54– 55 (IJ Dec. at 11–12). The hearing transcripts do not otherwise indicate that the IJ’s “actions and decisions” were “colored” by A-B-. Tista-Ruiz de Ajualip, 114 F.4th at 492. The Board, for its part, acknowledged that A-B- had been vacated, explicitly stated that it “d[id] not rely” on A-B-, and “only applied current law” in its decision. A.R. at 4 (BIA Dec. at 2 n.2). In this case, the Board did not erroneously rely on outdated precedent. Cabrera-Lopez’s argument on this issue, therefore, does not alter our analysis.

C. Withholding of Removal

An applicant seeking withholding of removal must show “a clear probability” of persecution “if forced to return to the country of removal.” Singh v. Ashcroft, 398 F.3d 396, 401 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting Pilica v. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 941, 951 (6th Cir. 2004)). In this regard, applicants for withholding of removal face “a more stringent burden than” required for asylum. Urbina-Mejia v. Holder, 597 F.3d 360, 365 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Liti v. Gonzales, 411 F.3d 631, 640 (6th Cir. 2005)). Applicants for withholding of removal must also demonstrate that a protected ground was “a reason” for their persecution. Guzman-Vazquez v. Barr, 959 F.3d 253, 272 (6th Cir. 2020) (distinguishing withholding of removal from asylum, for which an applicant must show that a protected ground was “one central reason” for her persecution). As with an asylum claim, withholding of removal requires an applicant to show that her persecution was “by the government, or persons the government is unwilling or unable to control.” Urbina-Mejia, 597 F.3d at 365 (quoting Khalili v. Holder, 557 F.3d 429, 436 (6th Cir. 2009)). We conclude that substantial evidence supports the Board’s denial of withholding of removal based on its conclusion that Cabrera-Lopez did not show that the Guatemalan government was unable or unwilling to protect her from her persecutors.

D. CAT Protection

Cabrera-Lopez has not raised any issues pertaining to the Board’s denial of her claim for CAT protection. She has therefore forfeited any challenge to the Board’s determination on this claim by failing to raise it before this court. See Velasquez-Rodriguez, 762 F. App’x at 245.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we DENY Cabrera-Lopez’s petition for review.