United States v. Rose Marie Rhear

KETHLEDGE, Chief Judge. Rose Rhear pled guilty to conspiring to possess with the intent to distribute methamphetamine. Her plea agreement included an appeal waiver and recited a certain drug quantity as the “relevant conduct” of her offense. At sentencing, the district court attributed a higher drug quantity to Rhear, but sentenced her to 144 months’ imprisonment—well below her guidelines range of 210 to 240 months. She now argues, among other things, that the government breached the plea agreement by acquiescing to the district court’s drug-quantity finding. We reject that argument and affirm.

I.

In March 2021, Tennessee police pulled over Rebecca Taylor Lustre in her car for a traffic violation. The police questioned Lustre and then searched her car, in which they found large amounts of fentanyl and methamphetamine. Lustre then told investigators that she and several others, including Rhear, had been working together to distribute fentanyl and methamphetamine throughout the state. According to Lustre, Rhear had rented a storage unit to hold the drugs and also distributed them. A few weeks after the traffic stop, investigators searched the storage unit and found 4,287 grams of methamphetamine and 706 grams of fentanyl.

Rhear thereafter pled guilty to conspiring to possess methamphetamine with the intent to distribute it, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and 846. Her plea agreement stated that the “relevant conduct” for the offense was her possession of the drugs found in the storage unit. The agreement also provided that Rhear waived “all rights conferred by 18 U.S.C. § 3742 to appeal any sentence imposed or to appeal the manner in which the sentence was imposed,” subject to certain exceptions not relevant here.

A probation officer thereafter determined—in a Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) and addendum—that Rhear was responsible for half the drugs that Lustre had trafficked, and for all the drugs recovered from the storage unit. At Rhear’s sentencing hearing, the district court agreed, and neither Rhear’s counsel nor the government objected. Based in part on that determination, the court found that Rhear’s total offense level was 37 and that her guidelines range was 210 to 240 months.

The prosecution soon pointed out, however, that “the government did enter into an agreement that we would hold the defendant accountable for the drugs that were seized” from the storage unit. The prosecution also told the court that “we believe the correct calculations” for Rhear’s drug quantity would be limited to those same drugs—“which makes the guideline range 168 to 210.”

The court then proceeded to explain the relevant considerations for Rhear’s sentence. Those included that the government had “already allowed a certain reduction in the guideline range by agreeing to just limit Ms. Rhear’s responsibility to the drugs that were seized in the storage unit.” The court added that Rhear’s personal history warranted an “additional slight variance” downward, and sentenced Rhear to 144 months.

This appeal followed.

II.

Rhear challenges her sentence on several grounds, one of them that, in her view, the government breached the plea agreement. Rhear never made that argument to the district court, so we review only for plain error. United States v. Keller, 665 F.3d 711, 714 (6th Cir. 2011). “A plain error is one that is clear or obvious and affects a defendant’s substantial rights.” United States v. Cox, 565 F.3d 1013, 1016 (6th Cir. 2009) (cleaned up).

Specifically, Rhear argues that the government breached the plea agreement when the prosecution did not object—as Rhear herself had not—to the district court’s finding as to her drug quantity. As an initial matter, that finding was for the district court and not the parties to make. See United States v. Simmonds, 62 F.4th 961, 966 (6th Cir. 2023). Rhear herself acknowledges as much in her reply brief in this appeal. Reply Br. at 9. Meanwhile, on this point, the agreement itself recited only that “the parties agree that the relevant conduct for the defendant in this matter is the controlled substances seized” from the storage unit. Plea Agreement ¶ 3. That provision stands in contrast to the government’s obligation, in a neighboring provision, to “recommend” a reduction for acceptance of responsibility. Id. ¶ 8. Thus, the plea agreement required only that the government “agree” that Rhear’s offense conduct was possession of the drugs found in the storage unit—not that the government affirmatively advocate that her drug quantity be limited to that amount.

The government met that obligation. True, the government did not formally object to the district court’s drug-quantity finding (which itself tracked the finding in the PSR). But the government promptly told the court that the “correct calculations” for drug quantity would be limited to the drugs found in the storage unit, and that Rhear’s guidelines range would be substantially reduced (to “168 to 210”) as a result. The court sentenced Rhear accordingly. The government thus made clear—indeed it emphasized—that it “agree[d]” with the drug quantity specified in paragraph 3 of the plea agreement. The government therefore did not breach that agreement.

Nor do we see in Rhear’s sentence any “egregious error that would bring the judicial system into disrepute.” Hunter v. United States, 608 U.S. 713, 727 (2026). Her remaining claims therefore implicate no “miscarriage of justice,” so we enforce her appeal waiver. Id. Rhear does make serious allegations that her counsel provided ineffective assistance during her sentencing; but that claim is better addressed in a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 petition. See United States v. Williams, 184 F.4th 474, 483 (6th Cir. 2026).

The district court’s judgment is affirmed.