United States v. Dalonta Crudup

HELENE N. WHITE, Circuit Judge. Defendant-Appellant Dalonta Crudup pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, reserving his right to appeal the district court’s rejection of his as-applied challenge under the Second Amendment. We now address that appeal and AFFIRM.

I.

On February 24, 2024, Crudup attended a National Gun Day Gun show at the Kentucky Fair and Expo Center (KFEC) in Louisville, Kentucky. Security camera video footage from the KFEC captured Crudup and others purchasing firearms from sellers at the gun show. In the plea agreement in this case, the parties agreed to the following facts:

The vehicle Crudup was occupying was stopped by officers. The firearms possessed by Crudup are an S-Beam Precision Products (JTS), X12PT, 12 gauge shotgun, bearing serial number XP0520230112680363; a Glock 21, GEN 4, .45 caliber pistol, bearing serial number BBLW894; a Girsan, MC 28 SA T, 9 millimeter pistol, bearing serial number T6368-20AV00395; and ammunition. The firearms were recovered after a traffic stop. The traffic stop and seizure of the firearms was recorded by officer body cameras. R. 42, PID 238.

A federal grand jury charged Crudup with possessing a firearm as a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The indictment alleged that on February 24, 2024, Crudup knowingly possessed a 12-gauge shotgun, a .45-caliber pistol, a 9-millimeter pistol, and ammunition, with knowledge that he had previously been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year. Regarding Crudup’s previous convictions, the indictment recites that, on October 14, 2022, in the Hardin County, Kentucky, Circuit Court, Crudup was convicted of possession of marijuana, with a firearm enhancement, and criminal possession of a forged instrument in the second degree, both felonies.

Crudup moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that because he is not dangerous, application of § 922(g)(1) to him violates the Second Amendment. Specifically, Crudup argued that, as a result of his participation in a pretrial diversion program regarding his prior offenses, he “does not fall within the category of presumptively dangerous individuals based upon our nation’s tradition of firearm regulation.” R. 22, PID 69. He further argued that even if he falls within a group that is presumed to be dangerous, his criminal record shows that he is not dangerous. The Government opposed the motion, Crudup replied, and the district court denied relief.

The district court explained that, as a convicted felon, Crudup was part of a presumptively dangerous group, but could “attempt to demonstrate that he is not dangerous, and thus falls outside of § 922(g)(1)’s constitutionally permissible scope.” R. 38, PID 230. In deciding whether Crudup met his burden to show he is not dangerous, the district court observed that it could consider Crudup’s “entire criminal record” and “judicially noticeable information.” Id.

The district court concluded that “under Sixth Circuit caselaw, possession of a gun with a controlled substance supports a finding of dangerousness for purposes of § 922(g)(1).” Id. at PID 231. The district court rejected Crudup’s argument that because his two prior firearm offenses were not violent, his criminal record does not reflect repeated and recent actions that show a likelihood of future dangerous conduct, explaining that the crime of “[u]nlawful possession of a firearm is” indicative of dangerousness, even though it does not always involve an immediate and direct threat of violence. Id. at PID 232. The district court also noted that at the time Crudup allegedly possessed the firearms at issue, he was in violation of conditions of the Hardin County pretrial diversion program, in which he was participating. The district court found that “Crudup has not carried his burden to show that § 922(g)(1) violates the Second Amendment as applied to him.” Id. at PID 233.

Crudup and the Government then entered into a plea agreement pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C), reserving Crudup’s right to appeal the district court’s denial of his motion to dismiss, and agreeing that a sentence of no more than 33 months would be appropriate. Crudup agreed to forfeit all firearms, magazines, and ammunition involved in the commission of the offense.

At sentencing, neither party objected to the PSR, and the district court sentenced Crudup to 33 months of imprisonment, followed by three years of supervised release. Crudup appealed the denial of his motion to dismiss.

II.

A.

Crudup argues that “[t]he indictment that charged him with possessing a firearm as a felon under § 922(g)(1) violates the Second Amendment[] as applied to him.” Appellant’s Br. at 1. We review the district court’s determination that § 922(g)(1) is constitutional as applied to Crudup de novo. United States v. Morton, 123 F.4th 492, 495 (6th Cir. 2024).

The Second Amendment provides that “[a] well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” U.S. Const. amend. II. This Amendment “codified a pre-existing ‘individual right.’” United States v. Williams, 113 F.4th 637, 643 (6th Cir. 2024) (quoting District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 579–81 (2008)). However, “[l]ike most rights, the right secured by the Second Amendment is not unlimited.” Heller, 554 U.S. at 626. “Congress can regulate firearm possession so long as doing so comports with the United States’ historical tradition of firearm regulation.” Morton, 123 F.4th at 495 (citing New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1, 17 (2022)).

In Williams, this court concluded that “our nation’s history and tradition demonstrate that” “legislatures may disarm groups of people, like felons, whom the legislature believes to be dangerous—so long as each member of that disarmed group has an opportunity to make an individualized showing that he himself is not actually dangerous.” 113 F.4th at 657, 663. Section 922(g)(1) prohibits “any person” convicted of “a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” from possessing “any firearm or ammunition.” Because § 922(g)(1) is an attempt by Congress to disarm individuals it believes are dangerous, § 922(g)(1) does not violate the Second Amendment when applied to dangerous persons. Williams, 113 F.4th at 657. Accordingly, to prevail on an as-applied challenge to § 922(g)(1), a defendant must demonstrate that he or she is not a “dangerous” individual. Id. at 662–63. The burden rests on the defendant to make this showing. Id. at 662.

To determine whether a defendant is dangerous, courts must evaluate the defendant’s “unique circumstances” and make a “fact-specific” determination. Id. at 663. This includes examining a defendant’s entire criminal record—prior convictions as well as evidence of how those offenses were committed—for conduct that endangers the public, the police, or the offender. Id. at 657–63; Morton, 123 F.4th at 499. In conducting this assessment, courts “may make an informed judgment about how criminals commonly operate.” Williams, 113 F.4th at 660 (cleaned up).

Our caselaw supplies several helpful guideposts for this inquiry. First, “certain categories of offenses—like historical crimes against the person—will more strongly suggest that an individual is dangerous.” Id. Accordingly, the commission of a violent crime, such as murder, rape, or assault, is “strong evidence that an individual is dangerous, if not totally dispositive on the question.” Id. at 658. In such instances, “the dangerousness will be self-evident.” Id. at 660. “A second category of crimes, while not strictly crimes against the person, may nonetheless pose a significant threat of danger.” Id. at 659. “These crimes do not always involve an immediate and direct threat of violence against a particular person,” but may “pose[] a danger to the community” or “lead[] to violence.” Id. This category includes crimes such as fleeing and evading arrest, United States v. Williams, No. 24-1409, 2025 WL 1136326, at *3 (6th Cir. Apr. 17, 2025), drug trafficking, and burglary, Williams, 113 F.4th at 659. Because “these crimes put someone’s safety at risk,” they “justify a finding of danger.” Id.

On the other side of the spectrum are “crimes [that] cause no physical harm to another person or the community.” Id. These are crimes such as mail fraud, making false statements, or even “opening a bottle of ketchup at the supermarket and putting it back on the shelf,” a third- degree felony under New Jersey law. Id. Many of these crimes do not make a person dangerous. Id.

B.

Against this backdrop, we assess whether Crudup has met his burden of showing that he is not a dangerous individual whom Congress may disarm. We conclude that he has not.

We begin with Crudup’s 2022 Hardin County, Kentucky, felony convictions, which the indictment identifies as the § 922(g)(1) predicates. In his guilty plea proceeding, Crudup admitted that on November 7, 2021, in a vehicle in Hardin County, Kentucky, he and others possessed marijuana, codeine, drug paraphernalia, and several firearms. R. 24-3, PID 111.¹ Crudup was convicted of possession of marijuana (firearm enhanced) under KRS 218A.1422 and KRS 218A.992² and second-degree criminal possession of a forged instrument under KRS 516.060, both Class D felonies.³ Crudup was placed on pretrial diversion under terms specifying that, upon successful completion of the program, the charges would be designated as dismissed-diverted and subject to expungement. Under Kentucky law, Crudup’s status as a “convicted felon” was established upon his pleading guilty. Commonwealth v. Derringer, 386 S.W.3d 123, 128–29 (Ky. 2012) (holding that a defendant was a “convicted felon” upon pleading guilty and remained one until he successfully completed the diversion program).⁴

¹ Crudup does not object to consideration of the facts contained in his guilty plea. He

objects only to our consideration of the contents of a Uniform Citation prepared by a Kentucky state trooper who arrested him. However, we do not rely on the content of the Uniform Citation. Thus, we need not consider the proper role of police reports when conducting a dangerousness determination.

² The Government’s brief on appeal reflects that “Crudup’s indictment has a small typo:

it references ‘218A.922,’ while intending to reference 218A.992.” Appellee’s Br. at 2 n.3. We will refer to KRS 218A.992.

³ All agree that the latter conviction has no bearing on Crudup’s dangerousness.

⁴ On January 26, 2022, after his arrest for the Hardin County, Kentucky, offense, but before

he pleaded guilty, Crudup was arrested in Washington, D.C. As described in Crudup’s Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) (to which Crudup does not object), officers observed a vehicle being operated by Crudup make multiple lane changes without using hand or mechanical signals. When stopped, Crudup presented a fake Kentucky identification card. Officers recovered “a Glock 43x from [Crudup’s] center waistband area,” a 10-round magazine and ammunition from Crudup’s right pant pocket, suspected marijuana from his jacket pocket, and $112 in US currency. R. 46, PID 282–83. Crudup entered a guilty plea to a misdemeanor charge of carrying a pistol without a license outside the home/business. D.C. Code § 22-4504(a)(1). It is unclear whether the district court considered this offense in its dangerousness assessment.

Crudup first contends that his prior eligibility for Kentucky’s pretrial diversion program categorically establishes that he is not dangerous. We disagree. Eligibility for Kentucky’s pretrial diversion program is limited: a defendant must have been charged with a Class D felony, KRS 533.250(1)(a), the lowest class of felony in Kentucky, see KRS 532.060(2)(d), and must not have been convicted of a felony, been on probation or parole, or been released from serving any felony sentence within the ten years preceding the offense, KRS 533.250(1)(a). A defendant is ineligible if charged with an offense for which probation, parole, or conditional discharge is prohibited under Kentucky law, KRS 533.250(1)(b), or if the defendant has committed a sex crime, KRS 533.250(1)(d). Additionally, a defendant is only eligible for the program once in a five-year period, KRS 533.250(1)(c), and placement in the program requires the agreement of both the prosecutor and the circuit court. KRS 533.250(6); Flynt v. Commonwealth, 105 S.W.3d 415, 425– 26 (Ky. 2003).

Crudup argues that “just being eligible for diversion shows that [participants] are not dangerous individuals.” Appellant’s Br. at 15. Indeed, some of the program’s eligibility criteria do bear on the question whether Crudup is a dangerous individual. But the facts they speak to, that Crudup had no felony convictions prior to the Hardin County offense and has not been convicted of a sex crime, are part of the criminal record that, as explained below, establishes Crudup’s dangerousness nonetheless.

Additionally, Kentucky’s criteria for enrollment in the pretrial diversion program do not neatly correspond to the dangerousness inquiry. Consider, for example, other Class D felonies under Kentucky law that are eligible for inclusion in the pretrial diversion program: assault in the third degree, KRS 508.025, strangulation in the second degree, KRS 508.175, and wanton endangerment in the first degree, KRS 508.060. Under our caselaw, each of these offenses is a crime against the person that is “at least strong evidence that an individual is dangerous, if not totally dispositive on the question.” Williams, 113 F.4th at 658.

And even if Kentucky’s criteria for enrollment in the pretrial diversion program reflected a legislative judgment about dangerousness, a state legislature’s categorical determination does not relieve us of our obligation to conduct a “fact-specific” inquiry, considering “the unique circumstances of the individual defendant,” Williams, 113 F.4th at 660. Such an inquiry “cannot be made on a categorical basis.” United States v. Hostettler, 170 F.4th 539, 543 (6th Cir. 2026). Lastly, if Crudup’s admission to pretrial diversion in 2022 categorically shows that he is not dangerous, what follows from the fact that Kentucky voided that diversion in 2024 for the conduct underlying this prosecution?⁵

We thus reject Crudup’s argument that he is not dangerous by virtue of his participation in the diversion program.

Crudup next argues that the facts of his prior offenses show he is not dangerous. Again, we disagree. Crudup was convicted of possession of marijuana under KRS 218A.1422, an offense enhanced to a Class D felony under KRS 218A.992 because he “was in possession of a firearm” “at the time of the commission of the offense and in furtherance of the offense,” KRS 218A.992(1).

The Supreme Court has noted that “drugs and guns are a dangerous combination.” Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 240 (1993). And this court has held that possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug-possession offense is conduct that indicates that an individual is dangerous. See, e.g., United States v. Suggs, No. 24-2059, 2025 WL 2978046, at *3 (6th Cir. Oct. 22, 2025)

⁵ Crudup possessed the firearms in the instance case in violation of the terms of his pretrial

diversion order, which required Crudup to “not have access to a firearm, handgun, or any other deadly weapon during the pendency of the diversion agreement”—two years. R. 24-3, PID.107– 110. Accordingly, on April 29, 2024, his pretrial diversion was voided. (“They found Suggs in a car with a loaded gun on the floor and methamphetamine in the vehicle. … And ‘drugs and guns are a dangerous combination.’” (quoting Smith, 508 U.S. at 240)); United States v. White, No. 24-2064, 2025 WL 2060869, at *3 (6th Cir. July 23, 2025) (considering that the defendant “simultaneously possessed a loaded pistol, a scale, and several bags of marijuana” when assessing dangerousness).

Crudup responds that “Smith is about drug dealing” and thus “not applicable to Mr. Crudup’s conviction for possessing marijuana and a firearm in a vehicle.” Appellant’s Br. at 24– 25. True, Smith arose from the use of a firearm in relation to drug trafficking. But the Supreme Court’s observation about the danger of combining drugs and firearms was not confined to that setting, see Smith, 508 U.S. at 240 (“In 1989, 56 percent of all murders in New York City were drug related; during the same period, the figure for the Nation’s Capital was as high as 80 percent.”), and this court has since applied the observation outside the context of drug trafficking, albeit in unpublished cases. See White, 2025 WL 2060869, at *3; Suggs, 2025 WL 2978046, at *3. In any event, Crudup’s prior offense enhancement involved firearm possession in furtherance of the marijuana offense, and possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug-possession offense creates a danger and risks a violent confrontation with law enforcement or with other individuals.

Nor does the Supreme Court’s recent decision in United States v. Hemani, 146 S. Ct. 1677 (2026), change this analysis. There, the Supreme Court rejected the Government’s contention “that anyone who regularly uses marijuana is categorically violent and dangerous without any further showing.” Id. at 1693. Although the Court acknowledged that “drugs and guns can sometimes make for a dangerous mix,” id. at 1687, the Court held that the Government had not shown that automatically disarming individuals the moment they become unlawful users of any controlled substance is consistent with the historical record, id. at 1693–94. Hemani’s holding does not weigh on the question presented here—whether Crudup’s possession of a firearm in furtherance of illicit drug possession was properly determined to be dangerous conduct. It was.

Lastly, Crudup argues that he is less dangerous than the defendants in White and United States v. VanOchten, 150 F.4th 552 (6th Cir. 2025), both of whom this court found dangerous. This may be the case: the defendant in White “racked up 10 criminal convictions and three probation violations,” had “two prior felony convictions for carrying a concealed weapon,” and was found in possession of “a stolen firearm linked to a shooting that took place the year before,” White, 2025 WL 2060869, at *3–4; and the defendant in VanOchten “fired a rifle in a residential neighborhood in the direction of a propane tank while drunk and high.” VanOchten, 150 F.4th at 562. But these cases do not purport to delineate the minimum showing necessary to support a finding of dangerousness.

III.

In sum, because Crudup has failed to show that he is not dangerous, he may be constitutionally disarmed under § 922(g)(1). The district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.