Gerson Gerardo Rosales-Camaja v. Todd Blanche

MURPHY, Circuit Judge. Gerson Gerardo Rosales-Camaja fled Guatemala after gang members threatened him. But the Board of Immigration Appeals found that he did not prove that the Guatemalan government was unable or unwilling to protect him from gangs. So it denied his requests for asylum and withholding of removal. And the record evidence would not compel a reasonable adjudicator to reach a contrary conclusion, especially considering Rosales-Camaja’s failure to alert the police to the gang threats. We thus deny his petition for review.

I

Rosales-Camaja was born in Guatemala in 1998. At some point, his parents moved to the United States and settled in Nashville, Tennessee. Rosales-Camaja’s grandmother thus has taken care of him since he was one year old. He later moved in with his aunt to attend school in the town of Cubulco.

In 2015, gang members affiliated with Maras 18 began to threaten Rosales-Camaja on his way to and from school. He suggests that the gang members singled him out for harassment because they knew his parents had moved to the United States. On the first occasion, the gang members told him that he had to pay money if he “wanted to still live and keep studying,” and they also demanded that he become a member of the gang. Admin. R. (A.R.) 149. Rosales-Camaja responded that he had no money and no interest in joining.

About two weeks after this incident, another group of gang members told him that they would kill him if he did not pay $200 in eight days. Rosales-Camaja falsely said he would get the money. Instead, he moved to his grandmother’s home about three hours away. Worried that the gang would track him down there, he fled to the United States eight days later. Rosales-Camaja never asked the Guatemalan police to intervene before he left the country because “things happened very fast” and he did not have the time to do so. A.R. 119.

Rosales-Camaja entered the United States in December 2015. He was only 17 years old. Given his youth, immigration authorities released him a month later into his father’s custody in Nashville.

Even after leaving Guatemala, Rosales-Camaja claims that the Maras 18 gang continued to harass him. About seven months after he came to the United States, an unknown caller from a “private” number ominously told him to “be careful in the streets.” A.R. 149. Since then, he has not answered phone calls from suspected gang members. Then, in September 2017, someone in a gray Chevy followed him as he drove to the store. Rosales-Camaja believes gang members were tailing him because he has “no problems” with anyone else. Id.

When Rosales-Camaja entered the United States, the Department of Homeland Security issued him a “notice to appear” in removal proceedings. The notice charged him with being inadmissible because he had entered at a “time or place other than as designated by the Attorney General[.]” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). Rosales-Camaja admitted to this charge. But he applied for asylum and withholding of removal. In April 2017, while this application remained pending, Rosales-Camaja’s grandmother filed a police report in Guatemala about the harassment he faced back in 2015. According to Rosales-Camaja, she filed the report “[f]or [his] case.” A.R. 119.

After holding a hearing, an immigration judge found Rosales-Camaja credible but denied his application. The judge reasoned that the gang’s prior threats against him did not rise to the level of past persecution and that he lacked an objectively reasonable belief that he would face future persecution in Guatemala. Next, the judge found that Rosales-Camaja had failed to show that the Guatemalan government was “unable or unwilling to” protect him from the gang. A.R. 55. Among other evidence, the judge pointed to Rosales-Camaja’s failure to call the police at the time of the threats. And although his grandmother filed a police report some two years later, the judge found that she did so to bolster Rosales-Camaja’s claims—not to deter violence against him. A country-conditions report about Guatemala also showed that the government had made “substantial efforts” to stop gang violence because it suggested that the prisons were “literally full” with gang members. A.R. 57. Lastly, the judge found that Rosales-Camaja had failed to show the required causal connection between the gang’s threats and the personal characteristics protected by the asylum and withholding-of-removal statutes.

The Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed Rosales-Camaja’s appeal. To deny relief, it invoked only one of the reasons that the immigration judge had given: that Rosales-Camaja had failed to show that the government was unable or unwilling to protect him from gang violence. The Board recognized that Rosales-Camaja presented some evidence that the police would not protect him, including allegations of police corruption from the country-conditions report. But the Board added that it must review the immigration judge’s finding under a deferential clear-error standard and concluded that the judge reasonably gave “greater weight to other evidence of record.” A.R. 4. Separately, the Board rejected Rosales-Camaja’s argument that the immigration judge overlooked evidence (such as his grandmother’s affidavit) that corroborated his gang- violence claims. It explained that the immigration judge had recognized the grandmother’s affidavit as a “post-script” to her opinion. A.R. 58; see A.R. 4 n.3. Besides, even assuming that there were “no issues with corroboration” of Rosales-Camaja’s allegations, the Board held that this assumption would not affect the immigration judge’s finding about the Guatemalan government’s ability and willingness to protect him. A.R. 4 n.3.

II

Rosales-Camaja petitioned us to review the Board’s denial of his asylum and withholding- of-removal claims. These claims have similar (but not identical) elements. As for asylum, the Attorney General has discretion to grant this relief to refugees. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A). The word “refugee” includes immigrants who cannot or will not return to their home countries because they have faced “persecution” in the past (or have a “well-founded fear of persecution” in the future) “on account of” one of several protected traits, including their “membership in a particular social group[.]” Id. § 1101(a)(42)(A). The immigration laws do not define “persecution.” See Ortiz v. Garland, 6 F.4th 685, 688 (6th Cir. 2021). But courts have long read the word to contain a state-action element: the inflicted or feared harm must arise from “the government” itself or from “private parties that the government is ‘unable or unwilling to control.’” Id. (quoting Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 222 (B.I.A. 1985)).

As for withholding of removal, the Attorney General must grant this relief to immigrants who prove that their “life or freedom would be threatened” in a country “because of” one of the protected traits listed in the asylum statute. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A). The withholding-of- removal statute does not contain the word (“persecution”) that led courts to interpret the asylum statute to contain a state-action element. See id. Nevertheless, circuit courts have upheld the Board’s decision to interpret the withholding-of-removal statute’s language (in particular, the phrase “life or freedom would be threatened”) as analogous to the word “persecution” in the asylum statute. See Palucho v. Garland, 49 F.4th 532, 536 (6th Cir. 2022) (citing cases). So they have held that the withholding-of-removal statute also contains a state-action element. See id.

For both claims, then, immigrants must show that the government is “unable or unwilling” to protect them when a private actor has inflicted or threatened the harm. See id. at 535–36. Our cases have used somewhat different language to describe what this element requires. See id. at 536; see also Rivera-Gaona v. Bondi, 2026 WL 789402, at *3 (6th Cir. Mar. 20, 2026). Sometimes, we have suggested that immigrants must show that they “cannot ‘reasonably expect the assistance of the government’” for protection. Juan Antonio v. Barr, 959 F.3d 778, 793 (6th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted). Other times, we have suggested that the government must have either “condoned” the private violence “or at least demonstrated a complete helplessness to protect the victims.” Kere v. Gonzales, 252 F. App’x 708, 712 (6th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). Either way, our cases incorporate a totality-of-the-circumstances test to decide whether a government is unable or unwilling to protect an immigrant. See Ortiz, 6 F.4th at 689. Those circumstances include both the specific things that the government has done in an immigrant’s own case as well as the general conditions existing in the country. See K.H. v. Barr, 920 F.3d 470, 476 (6th Cir. 2019).

Here, Rosales-Camaja fears private violence from gang members. And for both of his claims, the Board upheld the immigration judge’s finding that he had not proven that the Guatemalan government was “unable or unwilling to protect him” from these gang members. A.R. 4. We treat this conclusion as a finding of fact that triggers deferential judicial review. See Ortiz, 6 F.4th at 688–89 (citing cases). That is, we must uphold the finding “unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary[.]” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B).

This deferential test forecloses Rosales-Camaja’s claim. A “reasonable adjudicator” would not be compelled to disagree with the Board’s finding that he failed to show that the Guatemalan government was unable or unwilling to protect him from the gang members. Id. Start with Rosales-Camaja’s specific circumstances. See K.H., 920 F.3d at 476. Our cases have repeatedly relied on an immigrant’s failure to alert the government about private violence as a reason to reject a claim that the government would not protect the immigrant from that violence. See Palucho, 49 F.4th at 537 (first citing Seye v. Barr, 768 F. App’x 381, 383 (6th Cir. 2019); and then citing Ralios Morente v. Holder, 401 F. App’x 17, 24 (6th Cir. 2010)); see also Castanon Bamaca v. Bondi, 2025 WL 1672260, at *2 (6th Cir. June 13, 2025). This rule matters here. Rosales-Camaja never sought police aid in Cubulco (where the gang threats took place) before he fled the country. As the immigration judge added, he also offered no evidence about “the particularized police in” Cubulco or their “reputation” for deterring gang violence. A.R. 54. And although Rosales- Camaja’s grandmother alerted the local police of the gang threats some two years later, he admitted that she did so to help his “case,” not to address the crime. A.R. 119.

True, an immigrant’s failure to go to the police is not always dispositive. For example, a woman’s fear of retaliation by an abusive partner—when backed up by general evidence showing the government’s refusal to protect domestic-violence victims—might explain her failure to report the abuse to the police. See Zometa-Orellana v. Garland, 19 F.4th 970, 979–80 (6th Cir. 2021). But Rosales-Camaja provided no similar excuse. Instead, he asserted only that he did not “have enough time to do a police report” before he left. A.R. 118. Unlike the justification in Zometa- Orellana, this explanation does not suggest that the police are unwilling or unable to protect him.

Turn to the general conditions in Guatemala. See K.H., 920 F.3d at 476. Our cases have also repeatedly relied on a government’s concrete “steps” to combat gang violence as a basis to hold that this generic violence did not show the government’s inability or unwillingness to protect crime victims. Barcenas-Sales v. Garland, 2022 WL 620153, at *3 (6th Cir. Mar. 3, 2022) (quoting Ortiz, 6 F.4th at 690); see Palucho, 49 F.4th at 537 (citing cases). Indeed, we have already rejected reliance on Guatemala’s general conditions, explaining that the relevant country-condition reports showed that it had put “anti-gang efforts” in place. Mendez Lopez v. Garland, 2023 WL 7215453, at *5 (6th Cir. Nov. 2, 2023) (citation omitted). Likewise, the immigration judge here explained that a country-conditions report confirmed the Guatemalan government’s “substantial efforts” to combat gang violence. A.R. 56–57. To be sure, the report identified the country’s “high murder rate” and “substantial problems with gang” crimes. A.R. 56. Yet we have added that “[g]eneral conditions of rampant gang violence alone” do not suffice without case-specific evidence showing that the police would not protect a specific immigrant. Galicia v. Garland, 2023 WL 3318393, at *4 (6th Cir. May 9, 2023) (quoting Umaña-Ramos v. Holder, 724 F.3d 667, 670 (6th Cir. 2013)). Rosales-Camaja did not present this case-specific evidence.

His responses do not change things. He initially argues that the Board wrongly overlooked the immigration judge’s failure to credit his corroborating evidence. The judge at first missed that Rosales-Camaja’s grandmother filed an affidavit corroborating Rosales-Camaja’s claims before mentioning this affidavit as a “post-script” to her opinion. A.R. 54, 58. And the judge never acknowledged his aunt’s sworn statement about the gang threats. A.R. 58. But the immigration judge did not deny relief based on a lack of evidence “corroborating” Rosales-Camaja’s encounters with the gang members. A.R. 4 n.3. In any event, the Board explained that—even “assum[ing] that there [were] no issues with corroboration”—Rosales-Camaja’s claims would still lack merit because he did not prove that the government would not protect him. Id. Because the Board found that Rosales-Camaja’s claims could not succeed even if he testified credibly about the gang threats, it was “unnecessary” to resolve any corroboration issues. Rahman v. Bondi, 131 F.4th 399, 409 (6th Cir. 2025) (quoting INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25 (1976) (per curiam)).

Rosales-Camaja next reargues his case as if we were the trier of fact. He, for example, points to another part of the country-conditions report that identifies “widespread institutional corruption, particularly in the police and judicial sectors[.]” A.R. 159. He also reiterates that his grandmother filed a belated police report about the threats and that she and his aunt confirmed the gang threats. We do not doubt that this evidence supports Rosales-Camaja’s claims. But he cannot obtain judicial relief merely by showing that a “reasonable adjudicator” could have found that the Guatemalan government was unable or unwilling to protect him. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). Rather, he had to show that “any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled” to reject the Board’s “contrary” finding. Id. And he has not met this “highly” “deferential” standard because other record evidence—including his failure to go to the police and the government’s general anti-gang efforts—permitted the Board to conclude that the government was willing and able to protect him. Palucho, 49 F.4th at 540 (quoting Garland v. Ming Dai, 593 U.S. 357, 365 (2021)).

We deny the petition for review.