Baichao Li v. Todd Blanche

KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge. Petitioner Baichao Li, a native and citizen of China, petitions for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision denying his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). Li contends that he was persecuted in China because of his religion, and that he fears renewed persecution if he were to return. The Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denied Li’s application because, as relevant, he found that Li was not credible and failed sufficiently to corroborate his claims. The BIA affirmed the denial on both grounds. After reviewing the record, we conclude that the agency’s findings are supported by substantial evidence. We, therefore, DENY Li’s petition for review.

I. BACKGROUND

On or about June 16, 2009, Li entered the United States as a B-2 nonimmigrant with permission to remain until December 15, 2009. Administrative Record (“A.R.”) at 713 (Notice to Appear at 1). On December 22, 2009, Li filed an application for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT protection with the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”). See id. at 236 (Asylum Interview at 1), 260–69 (Form I-589 at 1–10). In his initial asylum declaration supplementing the application, Li explained that he converted to Christianity “and was baptized on Easter of 2008.” Id. at 667 (2009 Asylum Decl. at 1). He went on to describe that, on January 1, 2009, “when [his] seventeen brothers and sisters were gathered at Brother ZHAO’s house,” he was “arrested by officers and taken to [the] police station.” Id. “The police then beat [him] and put [him] in jail for five days.” Id. Li interviewed with USCIS a few weeks after he filed his application. In his interview, Li stated that he was arrested at a church gathering on January 1, 2009. Id. at 243 (Asylum Interview at 8). He claimed that he was not harmed during the arrest, but he was beaten in detention and placed in jail for five days. Id. at 243–44 (Asylum Interview at 8–9). Li also confirmed that his injuries from the incident were “[j]ust bruises.” Id. at 244 (Asylum Interview at 9). After his interview with USCIS, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) served Li with a Notice to Appear. Id. at 713 (Notice to Appear at 1). Li conceded the charge of removability but continued to seek asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT protection. Id. at 75–76 (6/22/10 Hr’g Tr. at 5–6). Before his merits hearings, Li submitted an amended asylum declaration wherein he stated: “On Easter’s Day of 2008 I was baptized. Towards the ending of the gathering, the door was suddenly kicked open, in came 6 police officers with handcuffs.” Id. at 617 (2014 Asylum Decl. at 1). Contrary to his statements from the asylum interview, Li described how the officers “beat [him] with batons and kicked [him] in [his] head” during the arrest, stating that he “lost [his] tooth, [his] face was cut and [his] legs were broken.” Id. at 617–18 (2014 Asylum Decl. at 1–2). He further asserted that he was hospitalized for fourteen days after the incident. Id. at 618 (2014 Asylum Decl. at 2). Li’s wife, Aiping Zhang, also submitted a statement in support of Li’s application. She explained that she received a call from the hospital in March 2008; when she arrived at the hospital, she saw Li was “bleeding in his face,” “his leg was injured,” and “his teeth were beaten out.” Id. at 315 (Zhang Decl. at 1). Zhang echoed that Li was hospitalized for fourteen days. Id. Li testified in support of his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT protection on July 18, 2019, and August 23, 2019. Li’s counsel began the first hearing by amending the application to state: “On Easter [D]ay of 2008 I was baptized. Towards the end of the gathering the police busted in and announced the gathering was illegal. I was arrested and beaten so badly I was taken to the hospital for 14 days. Then they took me to jail for five days.” Id. at 106–07 (7/18/19 Hr’g Tr. at 31–32); see id. at 264 (Form I-589 at 5). Although Li confirmed at first that the amendment was true and correct, he later informed his counsel that the incident occurred in 2009 rather than 2008. Id. at 108–09 (7/18/19 Hr’g Tr. at 33–34); see id. at 264 (Form I-589 at 5). Li then testified that, on January 1, 2009, he was arrested at a house-church gathering. Id. at 128 (7/18/19 Hr’g Tr. at 53). The police told Li that the gathering was illegal and beat him until he lost consciousness. Id. at 129–30 (7/18/19 Hr’g Tr. at 54–55). He was transported to the hospital, where he learned that he had a wound on his right cheek that required four stitches, three broken teeth, and a broken right leg. Id. at 131 (7/18/19 Hr’g Tr. at 56). Li testified that he did not have any records from his hospital stay. Id. at 150 (7/18/19 Hr’g Tr. at 75). After fourteen days in the hospital, Li testified that he was taken to the police station and detained for four or five days until his wife paid his 8,000-yuan bail. Id. at 133–34 (7/18/19 Hr’g Tr. at 58–59). Li testified that, even after his release from detention, he was required to report to the police station every week. Id. at 146 (7/18/19 Hr’g Tr. at 71). He did not have any documentation to show this requirement, however. Id. at 147 (7/18/19 Hr’g Tr. at 72). On cross-examination, the government questioned Li about the discrepancy between his testimony that he was arrested in January 2009 and Zhang’s declaration, which stated that the incident occurred in March 2008. Id. at 155 (7/18/19 Hr’g Tr. at 80). Li explained that “in her statement she missed one sentence and she—it was March, 2008 was to be baptized and then the incident happened January of 2009.” Id. Similarly, he testified that his amended asylum application, which stated that he was arrested in March 2008, was “also missing that one sentence.” Id. at 157 (7/18/19 Hr’g Tr. at 82). Li was later asked about his asylum interview, where he had told the asylum officer that he was not hurt during his arrest. Id. at 184 (8/23/19 Hr’g Tr. at 108). He responded that “at the time . . . the family hotel people told me don’t speak too much. If you say so much, if it’s discovered by the Chinese Communist party members then you will be sent back to China.” Id. at 185 (8/23/19 Hr’g Tr. at 109). Zhang also testified on August 23, 2019, in support of Li’s application. She explained that she went to the hospital on January 1, 2009, after receiving a phone call. Id. at 203–04 (8/23/19 Hr’g Tr. at 127–28). There, she learned from Li that the police had beaten and arrested him at the church gathering. Id. at 204 (8/23/19 Hr’g Tr. at 128). She saw that Li’s “face was full of blood[, h]is teeth w[ere] broken and his right leg was broken.” Id. at 205 (8/23/19 Hr’g Tr. at 129). Zhang further testified that Li stayed at the hospital for fourteen days, after which the police took him to the police station for five days. Id. She paid 8,000 yuan for his release, but he still had to report to the police station every week. Id. When Zhang was questioned about why she wrote in her statement that the incident occurred in March 2008, she responded that the January 1 date “didn’t ma[k]e it to the draft. My child sent the e-mail to the lawyer without having that statement, missing that statement.” Id. at 209 (8/23/19 Hr’g Tr. at 133). The IJ denied Li’s application for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT protection on December 13, 2019. Id. at 67–68 (IJ Dec. at 20–21). The IJ found Li not credible, describing his testimony as “vague, confusing, nonresponsive, internally inconsistent, and inconsistent with his supporting documentation.” Id. at 60 (IJ Dec. at 13). The IJ specifically pointed to three inconsistencies: (1) the extent of Li’s injuries from the incident, (2) whether Li was injured during his arrest or detention, and (3) whether Li was arrested in March 2008 or January 2009. Id. at 60–61 (IJ Dec. at 13–14). Alternatively, the IJ found that Li “failed to sufficiently corroborate his claims.” Id. at 61 (IJ Dec. at 14). He explained that Li did not (1) provide any evidence that his “leg was broken by the police,” (2) “provide any statements from any of the church members when [Li] was allegedly beaten,” (3) “provide any evidence of his hospital stay,” or (4) provide “any evidence of his requirement to report to the police or that he was ever arrested.” Id. The IJ acknowledged that Li produced a statement from Zhang but determined that Zhang “was not present during the alleged incident and based her statement on [Li’s] claims,” and that Zhang was not credible. Id.¹1. Along with the credibility and corroboration findings, the IJ analyzed the merits of Li’s claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT protection, id. at 62–67 (IJ Dec. at 15–20), but we need not address those findings for the purposes of the present petition for review. Li appealed the IJ’s decision to the BIA. Id. at 21–23 (Notice of Appeal 1–3). On December 2, 2025, the BIA dismissed Li’s appeal. Id. at 3–5 (BIA Dec. at 1–3). It found no clear error in the IJ’s adverse credibility determination, highlighting the inconsistencies regarding the extent of Li’s injuries and whether he was harmed during his arrest or detention. Id. at 3–4 (BIA Dec. at 1–2). It also found no clear error in the IJ’s determination that Li did not adequately corroborate his claim. Id. at 4–5 (BIA Dec. at 2–3). It pointed out that Li failed to provide evidence that his leg was broken by the police and that he was in the hospital, and it noted that the IJ “found that it would be reasonable to expect [Li] to be able to obtain evidence such as statements from church members, hospital records, or proof that he was required to report to the Chinese police” while he was in his immigration proceedings for more than ten years. Id. at 5 (BIA Dec. at 3). Li now petitions for review. D. 1 (Pet. for Rev. at 1–2).

II. ANALYSIS

A. Standard of Review

Where, as here, “the BIA reviews the immigration judge’s decision and issues a separate opinion, rather than summarily affirming the immigration judge’s decision, we review the BIA’s decision as the final agency determination.” Khalili v. Holder, 557 F.3d 429, 435 (6th Cir. 2009). “To the extent the BIA adopted the immigration judge’s reasoning, however, this Court also reviews the immigration judge’s decision.” Id. “The agency’s findings of fact are reviewed for substantial evidence, and questions of law are reviewed de novo.” Abdurakhmanov v. Holder, 735 F.3d 341, 345 (6th Cir. 2012). Under the substantial-evidence standard, findings of fact “are ‘conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.’” Marikasi v. Lynch, 840 F.3d 281, 287 (6th Cir. 2016) (quoting Liti v. Gonzales, 411 F.3d 631, 636 (6th Cir. 2005)).

B. Credibility

We review the BIA’s adverse credibility determination under the substantial-evidence standard. Id. Because Li filed his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT protection after May 11, 2005, the provisions of the REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 302, apply to his application. See El-Moussa v. Holder, 569 F.3d 250, 256 (6th Cir. 2009). The Act states in relevant part: Considering the totality of the circumstances, and all relevant factors, a trier of fact may base a credibility determination on the demeanor, candor, or responsiveness of the applicant or witness, the inherent plausibility of the applicant’s or witness’s account, the consistency between the applicant’s or witness’s written and oral statements (whenever made and whether or not under oath, and considering the circumstances under which the statements were made), the internal consistency of each such statement, the consistency of such statements with other evidence of record (including the reports of the Department of State on country conditions), and any inaccuracies or falsehoods in such statements, without regard to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to the heart of the applicant’s claim, or any other relevant factor. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); see also id. § 1229a(c)(4)(C). On this record, Li fails to show that the BIA’s credibility determination is not supported by substantial evidence. The BIA cited two inconsistencies between Li’s testimony and the documentary evidence that caused it to affirm the IJ’s finding that Li was not credible. First, in his asylum interview, Li stated that he “suffered only bruises from the Chinese police.” A.R. at 4 (BIA Dec. at 2). In his amended asylum declaration and testimony, however, he explained that the police hit him in the face and broke his teeth and leg, requiring him to be hospitalized for fourteen days. Id. Second, in his asylum interview, Li claimed that the police hurt him during detention, not during his arrest. Id. In his amended asylum application, initial and amended asylum declarations, and testimony, he stated the opposite. Id. Li unsuccessfully argues that these inconsistencies do not provide sufficient support for the agency’s adverse credibility determination.²2. In his brief, Li challenges the IJ’s finding that Li was inconsistent about the date on which he was harmed by the Chinese police—March 2008 or January 2009. D. 8 (Pet’r Br. at 16–17). “Because the BIA did not rely on [this] finding[], we need not address [it] here.” Singh v. Lynch, 632 F. App’x 250, 253 n.1 (6th Cir. 2015) (citing Slyusar v. Holder, 740 F.3d 1068, 1073 (6th Cir. 2014)). He contends that his initial failure to disclose the extent and severity of his injuries is not inconsistent with the documentary evidence and testimony that he provided later in the proceedings; rather, he asserts that these later statements merely offered “additional detail.” D. 8 (Pet’r Br. at 15). First, it is inconsistent to state that one suffered only bruises, and then to attest that one had a wounded face, broken teeth, and a broken leg that required hospitalization for fourteen days. Second, even if it were not inconsistent, “omissions may form the basis of an adverse credibility determination.” Moreno v. Sessions, 694 F. App’x 391, 396 (6th Cir. 2017) (quoting Shkabari v. Gonzales, 427 F.3d 324, 329 (6th Cir. 2005)). Given Li’s “evolving claims” about the nature of his injuries, the BIA could reasonably believe that Li exaggerated or embellished his claims as the proceedings continued and find him not credible. Kolov v. Garland, 78 F.4th 911, 922 (6th Cir. 2023), abrogated on other grounds by Riley v. Bondi, 606 U.S. 259 (2025); see Parvaj v. Garland, No. 24-3208, 2024 WL 4953547, at *2 (6th Cir. Dec. 3, 3024) (holding that substantial evidence supported the BIA’s adverse credibility determination where, inter alia, petitioner “had shifted his description of the injuries over time”); Harutyunyan v. Holder, 512 F. App’x 548, 552 (6th Cir. 2013) (holding that substantial evidence supported the BIA’s adverse credibility determination where, inter alia, petitioner had initially omitted “the full extent of [his] injuries, [his] hospitalization, and his treatment”). Further, when asked about this inconsistency, Li claimed that he disclosed less information because he feared that the Chinese government would find out and harm him. A.R. at 184–85 (8/23/19 Hr’g Tr. at 108–09). Contrary to Li’s argument on appeal that the agency ignored his explanation, the BIA recited the IJ’s reasonable conclusion that Li’s explanation was unpersuasive because Li expressly named the Chinese government as his alleged persecutor in the asylum interview. Id. at 4 (BIA Dec. at 2); see Moreno, 694 F. App’x at 398 (“The IJ is free to disbelieve [petitioner’s] explanation if the IJ’s interpretation of the evidence is not unreasonable.”); Singh v. Lynch, 632 F. App’x 250, 255 (6th Cir. 2015) (“Although [petitioner] offers explanations for most of the inconsistencies in his evidence, they do not ‘meet the high standard of compelling a contrary result.’” (quoting Yu v. Ashcroft, 364 F.3d 700, 704 (6th Cir. 2004))). Li also argues that his “isolate[d]” inconsistency about whether the police beat him during his arrest or detention is “immaterial, because in either scenario he was under police control when the beating occurred and the alleged discrepancy does not undermine the substance of his claim.” D. 8 (Pet’r Br. at 14–15). The REAL ID Act, however, allows the agency to base adverse credibility findings on an inconsistency, regardless of whether that inconsistency “goes to the heart of the applicant’s claim.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); see also id. § 1229a(c)(4)(C). Hence, “‘even ancillary inconsistencies’ may ‘support adverse credibility determinations.’” Luna-Romero v. Barr, 949 F.3d 292, 295 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting Slyusar v. Holder, 740 F.3d 1068, 1073 (6th Cir. 2014)). Properly considered in light of the totality of the circumstances, Li’s inconsistent statements about the sequence of events constituting his alleged persecution support the BIA’s adverse credibility determination. Finally, Li contends that the agency’s adverse credibility finding cannot satisfy the substantial-evidence standard because it failed to reconcile these inconsistencies with Zhang’s testimony, which “corroborated the central elements of Li’s claim: that he was arrested during a Christian gathering, beaten by police, hospitalized, and detained before being released.” D. 8 (Pet’r Br. at 15). As an initial matter, we need not address this argument because Li did not raise it before the BIA and, by extension, the BIA did not consider it. See Tomaszczuk v. Whitaker, 909 F.3d 159, 167 (6th Cir. 2018). At any rate, the IJ found Zhang not credible in part because she “based the majority of her information on [Li’s] claims and representations.” A.R. at 61 (IJ Dec. at 14). The IJ could thus reasonably decide that any consistency between Zhang’s testimony and Li’s statements did not outweigh the other factors that the IJ considered in reaching its adverse credibility determination, which was ultimately affirmed by the BIA. Given the record as a whole, we hold that the BIA’s credibility finding is supported by substantial evidence. See Urias-Orellana v. Bondi, 607 U.S. 537, 544 (2026) (“Substantial evidence, we have long emphasized, is ‘more than a mere scintilla’ but ‘means—and means only—such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” (quoting Biestek v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97, 103 (2019))).

C. Corroboration

We review the BIA’s determination that Li failed to present sufficient evidence to corroborate his claim under the substantial-evidence standard as well. Marikasi, 840 F.3d at 289–90. “Where the trier of fact determines that the applicant should provide [corroborating] evidence, . . . such evidence must be provided unless the applicant does not have the evidence and cannot reasonably obtain the evidence.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii); see also id. § 1229a(c)(4)(B); Guzman-Vazquez v. Barr, 959 F.3d 253, 264 (6th Cir. 2020); Urbina-Mejia v. Holder, 597 F.3d 360, 367 (6th Cir. 2010). “The failure to produce reasonably available corroborative evidence supports a finding that the applicant has failed to meet his burden of proof.” Wang v. Lynch, 824 F.3d 587, 593 (6th Cir. 2016). “To reverse [the agency’s] determination as to the availability of corroborating evidence, we must be able to find that a ‘reasonable trier of fact [would be] compelled to conclude that such corroborating evidence is unavailable.’” Ali v. Holder, 534 F. App’x 286, 291–92 (6th Cir. 2013) (alteration in original) (quoting Win v. Mukasey, 303 F. App’x 336, 344 (6th Cir. 2008)). We cannot so conclude on this record. The BIA determined that Li’s claim suffered from four evidentiary gaps. First, Li provided evidence of his broken leg, but he did not have proof showing that the Chinese police broke his leg. A.R. at 4–5 (BIA Dec. at 2–3). Second, Li did not offer statements from his church members who were present when the Chinese police allegedly beat him. See id. at 5 (BIA Dec. at 3).³3. Li responds by pointing to a statement from a church member in the record. D. 8 (Pet’r Br. at 20); A.R. at 254 (Wang Decl. at 1). This statement, however, comes from a member of Li’s church in the United States, not in China. It does not provide a firsthand account of the arrest and beating that Li allegedly experienced. Third, Li did not present hospital records from China. Id. Fourth, Li did not have any evidence that he was required to report to the Chinese police every week. See id. Li argues that the agency misapplied the standard for corroborating evidence “by faulting Li for failing to produce additional documentary evidence without first determining that such evidence was reasonably available to him.” D. 8 (Pet’r Br. at 19). The BIA, however, expressly affirmed the IJ’s finding “that it would be reasonable to expect [Li] to be able to obtain” the corroborating evidence “while [he was] in proceedings for over 10 years.” A.R. at 5 (BIA Dec. at 3) (second alteration in original). We are not compelled to conclude otherwise. Corroborating evidence is reasonably available if it is “of ‘the type that would normally be created or available in the particular country and is accessible to the [noncitizen], such as through friends, relatives, or co-workers.’” Abdurakhmanov, 735 F.3d at 347 (quoting Dorosh v. Ashcroft, 398 F.3d 379, 382–83 (6th Cir. 2004)). We would expect the corroborating evidence that the BIA discussed to have been generated at the time of the events. Further, Li has family members in China who could have obtained this evidence on his behalf: His three brothers, with whom he has contact, live in China, and his wife lived in China until 2016. A.R. at 150–51 (7/18/19 Hr’g Tr. at 75–76), 231 (Zhang Visa Appl. at 1). Li’s only explanation for his failure to produce corroborating evidence was that the hospital in China would not provide him with documentation because he was beaten by the police. Id. at 151 (7/18/19 Hr’g Tr. at 76). Even assuming that his hospital records may be unavailable, “the burden of demonstrating such unavailability is on [Li], particularly where [his] testimony has already been deemed not credible.” Ying Chen v. Holder, 580 F. App’x 332, 342 (6th Cir. 2014). Li has not met that burden. He merely speculates about the unavailability of evidence related to his hospital stay, not even showing that he attempted to request his hospital records. See Shkabari, 427 F.3d at 331; Ali, 534 F. App’x at 292. In any event, the hospital records were not the only corroborating evidence that the BIA found was lacking. Li also argues that Zhang sufficiently corroborated his claims. As noted above, apart from Li’s failure to preserve this argument before the BIA, the IJ found Zhang not credible. A.R. at 61 (IJ Dec. at 14). In light of that finding, the IJ could reasonably conclude that Li did not submit adequate evidence to corroborate his testimony, as ultimately affirmed by the BIA. Hence, we hold that substantial evidence supported the BIA’s corroboration determination.⁴4. Li raises two other arguments on appeal. First, he maintains that the agency’s findings on future persecution and relocation are not supported by substantial evidence. D. 8 (Pet’r Br. at 17–19). The BIA did not address this argument, and it was unnecessary to do so given that the credibility and corroboration findings were dispositive. Accordingly, we need not review this argument either. See Slyusar, 740 F.3d at 1073; Tomaszczuk, 909 F.3d at 167. Second, Li argues that the agency did not exercise its independent judgment. D. 8 (Pet’r Br. at 22–23). We see no basis, however, for the contention that the IJ and BIA merely adopted the government’s theory without independently evaluating the record and governing law.

III. CONCLUSION

Consequently, because the BIA’s adverse credibility and corroboration findings are supported by substantial evidence, Li failed to meet his burden of proof for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT protection. See Sy v. Bondi, 168 F.4th 828, 834 (6th Cir. 2026); Lin v. Holder, 565 F.3d 971, 977 (6th Cir. 2009). We, therefore, DENY Li’s petition for review of the BIA’s decision.