United States v. Irfan Gill

JANE B. STRANCH, Circuit Judge. Defendant-Appellant Irfan Gill challenges his convictions for mail fraud and money laundering related to an international telemarketing scheme. He contests the sufficiency of the evidence presented at trial and the appropriateness of a sentence enhancement for perjury. For the following reasons, we AFFIRM.

I. BACKGROUND

A jury convicted Irfan Gill of seven counts of mail fraud and eleven counts of money laundering for his conduct between 2018 and 2022. We draw the following facts from the evidence presented at Gill’s trial.

Gill operated a number of U.S. businesses that received payments from victims of a telemarketing scheme. Telemarketers based out of a call center in Pakistan called cable and satellite TV customers in the United States to solicit payments for subscription discounts and equipment upgrades. Customers would then send checks or make credit card payments to the U.S. businesses Gill had created and given names such as “D Network,” or “DISH Upgrade.” No discounts or upgrades were ever provided.

Gill retrieved the checks and money orders made out to these fake businesses from various P.O. boxes in Portage, Michigan. He would then wire money back to individuals in Pakistan, sending the rest to himself or to accounts for one of his legitimate businesses. To facilitate these deposits and transfers, Gill maintained bank accounts on behalf of each of his fake businesses, amounting to eighteen different accounts across seven banks. Multiple banks noticed fraudulent activity and raised their concerns with Gill. Gill’s accounts were often frozen or closed despite his attempts to substantiate the businesses, at which point he would open new accounts at different banks. Gill’s credit card processor similarly investigated and froze his account after unusually high reports of fraud and a customer’s disputed payment to “D Network.”

In December 2021, the United States Postal Inspection Service opened an investigation into Gill and began surveilling his activities and reviewing his bank records. Their investigation revealed that Gill had withdrawn around $400,000.00 from these fake business accounts over the course of this scheme. Postal Inspection Service sent Gill a notice of its investigation in February 2022.

A federal grand jury indicted Gill on charges of mail fraud and money laundering for his participation in this scheme between June 2018 and March 2022. The matter proceeded to trial, during which the Government presented testimony from victims, bank investigators, Gill’s accountants, and law enforcement, as well as documentary and recorded evidence. At the close of the Government’s case in chief, Gill moved for acquittal based on insufficiency of evidence. The district court denied his motion. Gill then opted to testify in his own defense. During his testimony, Gill claimed that he paid taxes on his earnings from the telemarketing scheme, would only deposit checks after confirming that the promised services were received, and that he didn’t know about any potential fraud until he received the letter from the Postal Inspection Service. Ultimately, the jury convicted Gill of seven counts of mail fraud and eleven counts of money laundering.

At sentencing, the district court applied an enhancement for obstruction of justice based on its finding that Gill had committed perjury at trial. The court nonetheless varied downwards from the Guidelines to sentence Gill to 96 months in prison.

II. LEGAL ANALYSIS

Gill raises multiple issues on direct appeal concerning the evidence supporting his convictions and the sentence enhancement imposed by the district court. He contends that the district court should have granted his motion for acquittal because there was insufficient evidence presented at trial to support the jury’s decision to find him guilty of mail fraud and money laundering. He also argues that the district court erred in finding that he committed perjury at trial to support a sentence enhancement for obstruction of justice.

A. Sufficiency of Evidence

We review the sufficiency of evidence to sustain a criminal conviction de novo. United States v. Emmons, 8 F.4th 454, 477 (6th Cir. 2021). “‘[T]he relevant inquiry is whether, after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Id. at 477–78 (quoting United States v. Wallace, 597 F.3d 794, 800 (6th Cir. 2010)). “‘Circumstantial evidence alone’” can sustain a conviction and “‘need not remove every reasonable hypothesis except that of guilt.’” United States v. LaVictor, 848 F.3d 428, 456 (6th Cir. 2017) (quoting United States v. Spearman, 186 F.3d 743, 746 (6th Cir. 1999)). Accordingly, defendants bear a “‘very heavy burden’” to prevail on insufficient evidence claims. Emmons, 8 F.4th at 478 (citation omitted).

1. Mail Fraud

Gill first contests the sufficiency of evidence supporting his convictions for mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341. Mail fraud under § 1341 consists of three elements: “(1) a scheme or artifice to defraud; (2) use of mails in furtherance of the scheme; and (3) intent to deprive a victim of money or property.” United States v. Ramer, 883 F.3d 659, 681 (6th Cir. 2018) (quoting United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 310 (6th Cir. 2010)). Using language from the Sixth Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions, Gill argues that the Government failed to establish that he “caused another to use the mail in furtherance of the scheme.” Appellant’s Br. 7 (quoting Sixth Cir. Pattern Jury Instr. 10.01).

However, Gill failed to raise this issue when he moved for acquittal under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29 during trial. When a defendant moves for acquittal under Rule 29 on specific grounds, “all grounds not specified are waived.” Ramer, 883 F.3d at 682 (quoting United States v. Dandy, 998 F.2d 1344, 1356–57 (6th Cir. 1993)). At trial, Gill moved for acquittal based on the lack of evidence proving his knowledge of any scheme to defraud. In other words, he argued that the Government failed to establish his intent to defraud the victims of this scam that is necessary for a conviction under § 1341. Additionally, arguments based on propositions that are acknowledged as undisputed or conceded in open court are waived. United States v. Clark, 24 F.4th 565, 577 (6th Cir. 2022). Gill conceded that he “caused another to use the mail in furtherance of the scheme” when specifically asked by the district court. Accordingly, Gill waived this argument and may not raise it now on appeal.

2. Money Laundering

Next, Gill contests the sufficiency of evidence supporting his convictions for money laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(2)(A). To violate that section, “a defendant must move money into or out of the United States with the specific intent to promote some ‘specified unlawful activity[,]’” including mail fraud. United States v. Maddux, 917 F.3d 437, 446 (6th Cir. 2019) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(2)(A)); see 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956(c)(7)(A), 1961(1)(B) (defining “specified unlawful activity” to include mail fraud). As raised at trial, Gill argues that the Government failed to present evidence that he sent money to Pakistan with “intent to promote” mail fraud because it did not show that he knew the scheme was fraudulent. Appellant’s Br. 9–10 (quoting Sixth Cir. Pattern Jury Instr. 11.03). The evidence supporting a defendant’s intent to promote unlawful activity through money laundering often significantly overlaps with evidence of his or her knowledge of the underlying crime or fraud. Maddux, 917 F.3d at 446–47; see United States v. Trejo, 610 F.3d 308, 314–16 (5th Cir. 2010).

We turn to the record to determine whether there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s findings of guilt. The Government submitted significant evidence of Gill’s knowledge of the scheme to defraud the cable and satellite TV customers that sent payments to the entities he controlled. Gill’s credit-card processor and banks told him that there was evidence of fraudulent activity associated with his accounts. R. 87, Trial Tr. I, PageID 803–06; R. 88, Trial Tr. II, PageID 905–08, 950–52; R. 89, Trial Tr. III, PageID 1158–59, 1189–93. He also received direct complaints from victims, with at least one potential customer accusing Gill of operating a scam. R. 89, PageID 1185–86. Yet he continued to deposit the checks and money orders he received even after being made aware of the alleged fraud. R. 89, PageID 1186–89. He did not disclose the businesses he created to participate in the telemarketing scheme to his accountants, nor did he pay taxes on the payments they received. R. 88, PageID 961, 972, 977–78, 982–83, 985–87; R. 89, PageID 1150–51.

The circumstantial evidence of customer complaints and fraud investigations, construed in the light most favorable to the Government, constitutes substantial evidence to support the conclusion that Gill was aware of the fraudulent nature of this scheme and he intended to promote it by sending money to Pakistan. Further, his attempts “‘to conceal the unlawful activity’” by hiding these businesses from his accountants and the IRS further support a finding of intent to defraud. United States v. Smith, 749 F.3d 465, 478 (6th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted).

Gill nonetheless argues that this evidence is insufficient to overcome his competing testimony that he did not know he was part of a fraudulent scheme and never had any direct contact with the victims. This testimony is belied by the record at trial, including his receipt of at least one letter directly from a victim accusing his businesses of being part of a fraudulent scheme. Further, the jury chose not to credit Gill’s testimony, and we may not second guess the jury’s credibility determination on appeal. See United States v. Acosta, 924 F.3d 288, 298 (6th Cir. 2019).

The evidence in the record is thus sufficient to support the jury’s conclusion that Gill intended to promote mail fraud when transferring funds to Pakistan.

B. Perjury Enhancement

Last, Gill challenges the district court’s finding that he committed perjury during trial that supports a sentence enhancement for obstruction of justice. We recently clarified that we review for clear error both the district court’s factual findings in support of a perjury determination and its subsequent application of an obstruction-of-justice enhancement. United States v. Jackson, 154 F.4th 422, 427–28 (6th Cir. 2025). In review for clear error, “[i]f the district court’s view of the evidence is plausible in light of the entire record, an appellate court may not reverse even if it is convinced that it would have weighed the evidence differently in the first instance.” Brnovich v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 594 U.S. 647, 687 (2021).

United States Sentencing Guideline § 3C1.1 provides for a 2-level increase in offense level where the district court finds “(1) the defendant willfully obstructed or impeded . . . [the] prosecution . . . of the instant offense of conviction, and (2) the obstructive conduct related to . . . the defendant’s offense of conviction and any relevant conduct[.]” U.S. Sent’g Guidelines Manual § 3C1.1. A sentence enhancement for obstruction is “required by the Sentencing Guidelines” where “the accused has committed perjury at trial[.]” United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 98 (1993); see U.S. Sent’g Guidelines Manual § 3C1.1 cmt. n.4(B).

In order to apply a sentencing enhancement under § 3C1.1 based on a defendant’s perjured testimony, a district court must first “identify those particular portions of the defendant’s testimony that it considers to be perjurious, and second, it must either make specific findings for each element of perjury or at least make a finding that encompasses all of the factual predicates for a finding of perjury.” United States v. Bazazpour, 690 F.3d 796, 808 (6th Cir. 2012) (citation modified). The elements of perjury are “(1) a false statement under oath (2) concerning a material matter (3) with the willful intent to provide false testimony.” United States v. Watkins, 691 F.3d 841, 851 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing Dunnigan, 507 U.S. at 94).

Gill concedes that the district court made the requisite findings for each element of perjury but asks this court to reconsider the district court’s findings that his statements were false and that he willfully made them. Gill contends that his statements were merely misleading and that he may have made them due to nervousness.

At sentencing, the district court identified three specific instances in which Gill perjured himself. First, the court found that he perjured himself by claiming that any money left after sending the payments to Pakistan was placed in the accounts of his legitimate businesses so that taxes would be paid on that income. R. 130, Sent’g Hr’g Tr., PageID 2014–15. The court pointed to evidence that Gill withdrew cash directly for personal use and to pay business expenses, neither of which were taxed. Second, the court found that Gill lied when he testified that he did not deposit checks until it was confirmed by the telemarketers in Pakistan that customers received the promised services, citing evidence that Gill deposited many checks immediately after receiving them. R. 130, PageID 2015–16. Third, the court found that Gill committed perjury when he testified “he had no idea this telemarketing scam was fraud until he received the letter from the U.S. Postal Inspector in February of 2022.” R. 130, PageID 2016–17. This was directly contradicted by testimony of bank investigators that they told Gill he was involved in fraud and closed his accounts, as well as by a letter from a customer accusing him of fraud well before 2022. R. 130, PageID 2016–17.

The district court’s determination that Gill committed perjury is at the least plausible and not clearly erroneous. See Brnovich, 594 U.S. at 687. The three statements identified above were each contradicted by ample evidence in the record and the court specifically discussed why it believed each statement was a willful lie. R. 130, PageID 2014–17 (finding that each was “not true,” a “lie,” or “fl[ew] in the face of everything that was in front of [Gill]”). In reviewing its analysis, we are certainly not “‘left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.’” United States v. Loines, 56 F.4th 1099, 1105 (6th Cir. 2023) (citation omitted). Gill does not point to any error or mistake that the district court made in its perjury analysis. Rather, he offers alternative conclusions that his statements were merely misleading instead of false and that, even if they were wrong, he made them unintentionally out of nervousness. These alternative conclusions were rejected by the district court and “at most amount[] to a different reading of the trial record.” Jackson, 154 F.4th at 430. Because we find that the district court’s factual findings were not clearly erroneous, we may not disturb its perjury determination or the obstruction of justice enhancement. Id.; see Brnovich, 594 U.S. at 687.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s denial of Gill’s motion for acquittal and its application of the sentencing enhancement for obstruction of justice.