United States v. Kane Jacques Malone

LARSEN, Circuit Judge. After Kane Malone violated his supervised-release conditions, the district court sentenced him to twelve months’ imprisonment. Malone now appeals his sentence. We AFFIRM.

I.

In 2019, Kane Malone pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm as a felon. United States v. Malone, 827 F. App’x 556, 557 (6th Cir. 2020). After serving a prison term for his conviction, Malone began a term of supervised release. But it was not long before the United States Probation Office sought to revoke his release, citing, among other misconduct, a state court charge for drug possession and attempting to shoot his girlfriend, Jessica Brown, in the head. Malone admitted to several violations of his supervised-release conditions. The court sentenced Malone to ten months’ imprisonment, followed by a new two-year term of supervised release. A condition of Malone’s new supervised release was that he not have any contact with Brown.

Malone was released from custody in 2025 and began his second term of supervised release. Malone didn’t stay out of trouble long, however. He soon made contact with Brown and tested positive for methamphetamine. Probation again sought to revoke his supervised release. Malone again admitted to violating his release terms. The court sentenced him to twelve months’ imprisonment, to be followed by a one-year term of supervised release. Malone appeals.

II.

Malone challenges the procedural reasonableness of his sentence. We review Malone’s challenge for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Rayyan, 885 F.3d 436, 440 (6th Cir. 2018). To impose a procedurally reasonable sentence, the district court must, among other things, “select the sentence based on facts that are not clearly erroneous.” Id.; see also United States v. Parrish, 915 F.3d 1043, 1047 (6th Cir. 2019). But the fact that a court merely mentions an incorrect fact during sentencing is not enough to warrant reversal; the erroneous fact must have been “an important factor in determining the sentence.” United States v. Green, 167 F.4th 832, 856 (6th Cir. 2026) (citation modified). Malone argues that the district court erred by relying on the “clearly erroneous ‘fact’ that [he] threatened Jessica Brown.” Appellant Br. at 11.

During sentencing, the district court said that Malone “resorted to, according to [Brown’s] statement, threatening statements.” R. 71, Sent’g Tr., PageID 912. A few moments later, the court stated, “[T]his is the greatest concern to the Court: His reaction just seems to be a little bit out of the ordinary. All of us are faced with relationships that end. Most of us, though, don’t resort to stalking and making threatening remarks to the other person.” Id. at 913. The government concedes, however, “that no evidence suggested that Malone threatened Brown.” Appellee Br. at 12–13.

That said, there is no indication that the district court’s statements regarding “threatening remarks” had any effect on Malone’s sentence. Almost immediately after making the statements, the court asked Malone for allocution. Malone stated, “I never made no threatening remarks. She actually told the police that I didn’t threaten her.” R. 71, Sent’g Tr., PageID 913. The district court seemingly accepted Malone’s statements because neither the district court nor the parties mentioned the alleged threats again.

And a look at the court’s explanation for the twelve-month sentence shows that the court had one goal in mind in imposing the twelve-month sentence: ensuring Malone’s compliance with his release terms. Malone focused on his rehabilitation during his allocution, but the court explained: “[T]his is not about rehabilitation. It’s about compliance with the terms and conditions of your supervision.” Id. at 914. The court further explained that “it is imperative that people on supervised release understand respect for the Court.” Id. at 917. “When you don’t obey the rules,” the court continued, “you’re telling me that you don’t care about my authority, about my desires, and my goal for you to be a law-abiding, productive citizen.” Id. And that is exactly what Malone had done—for a second time. The court’s remarks reveal its objective: to “impose a sentence to . . . impress upon [Malone] that [he] ha[d] to obey the Court’s rules,” including the conditions of supervised release. Id.

We see no indication that the district court’s initial pre-allocution statement regarding “threatening remarks” had any bearing on Malone’s sentence. His sentence therefore was procedurally reasonable. See Green, 167 F.4th at 856.

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We AFFIRM.