United States v. Jason Schaller

DAVIS, Circuit Judge. Jason Schaller pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition. After calculating Schaller’s Guidelines sentencing range as 30 to 37 months, the district court varied upward 20 months and sentenced him to 57 months in prison. On appeal, Schaller argues his sentence is procedurally and substantively unreasonable. We disagree and AFFIRM.

I.

A. Factual Background

In March 2018, Jason Schaller fired 15 to 20 rounds from a handgun into a home he knew to be occupied (the “2018 shooting”). As a result, he was convicted in Ohio state court of improperly discharging a firearm into a habitation and sentenced to three years’ imprisonment. After eight months, he received judicial release and five years of probation.

Schaller knew that he could not legally possess a firearm after that conviction. But in mid-October 2022, he gave a woman money to buy him a Glock. Law enforcement surveilled Schaller after the woman admitted to investigators that she bought him a gun. Under the guise of a would-be renter, an undercover agent approached Schaller outside of his apartment. Schaller advised the agent that the area was unsafe and indicated that he had a Glock for protection.

Law enforcement subsequently executed a search warrant at Schaller’s apartment. Inside, agents found two cell phones, 4.23 grams of methamphetamine, and two digital scales. On Schaller’s person, they found a glass pipe. In Schaller’s car, they found a plastic bag with 13.88 grams of methamphetamine a digital scale in the center console, and a bag containing a fully loaded Glock and a box of ammunition on the rear passenger side floorboard. B. Procedural Background

Schaller was indicted for being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(8), and he pleaded guilty to the offense without a plea agreement.

The presentence report (“PSR”) prepared by a probation officer calculated Schaller’s base offense level under the United States Sentencing Guidelines (“U.S.S.G.”) at 14. The PSR recommended adding four levels under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) because the firearm was found near drugs and drug paraphernalia. This raised Schaller’s adjusted offense level to 18. From there, the PSR recommended a three-level reduction for Schaller’s acceptance of responsibility. So Schaller’s total offense level was 15. The PSR also calculated Schaller’s criminal history score to be eight, placing him in criminal history category IV. With a total offense level of 15 and a criminal history category IV, Schaller’s advisory Guidelines range under the PSR was 30 to 37 months.

At sentencing, the district court agreed with the PSR’s calculations for the Guidelines range. Then, it notified the parties that it was considering an upward variance. The government requested a sentence at the high end of the 30-to-37-month Guidelines range, while Schaller requested to be sentenced at the low end of the range.

The district court varied upward four levels, taking Schaller’s offense level from 15 to 19. This increased Schaller’s Guidelines range to 46 to 57 months. The court then sentenced Schaller to 57 months in prison, to be served consecutive to his state sentence for the 2018 shooting.¹1. Schaller’s judicial release was revoked after multiple failures to report and his April 2023 commission of receiving stolen property and drug possession. Schaller’s expected release date on the sentence for the 2018 shooting was in early April 2026.

The district court explained its decision to vary upward. Schaller was “in an entirely different category than most defendants,” the court explained, because of the 2018 shooting and his sale of methamphetamine. (Sent. Tr., R. 29, PageID 141). The district court also focused on its strong desire to protect the public, deter further crime, and provide Schaller treatment for his addiction and mental-health issues. And it referred to a news article about the number of fatal shootings in Cleveland involving illegally owned firearms. The court also relayed a story about “someone like [Schaller]” who “fired a gun into a house and in essence killed someone.” (Id. at PageID 149). The court found that any disparity between Schaller’s sentence and others convicted of the same offense was warranted because his “prior record” put him “in a separate group.” (Id. at PageID 156). Schaller now appeals.

II.

We review a district court’s sentencing determination for procedural and substantive reasonableness. United States v. Golson, 95 F.4th 456, 461 (6th Cir. 2024). Generally, we review the reasonableness of such sentences for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Hoyle, 148 F.4th 396, 405 (6th Cir. 2025). This means we disturb the sentence only if we have a “definite and firm conviction that the district court committed a clear error of judgment.” United States v. Perez-Rodriguez, 960 F.3d 748, 753 (6th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted). That is true for Schaller’s substantive-reasonableness challenge, which required no objection below. See United States v. Gardner, 32 F.4th 504, 530 (6th Cir. 2022).

Schaller argues that the same is true for his challenge to the consecutive nature of his sentence. But if a defendant fails to make a specific objection on procedural-reasonableness grounds, like here, we review for plain error. See United States v. Sherrill, 972 F.3d 752, 768–69 (6th Cir. 2020); see also United States v. Dial, 694 F. App’x 368, 372 (6th Cir. 2017) (“As [imposition of consecutive term] was not raised below, we review for plain error.”). To establish plain error, Schaller must show a clear or obvious error that affected both his substantial rights and the “fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings.” United States v. Coleman, 835 F.3d 606, 615 (6th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). A sentencing error affects substantial rights if “there is a reasonable probability that, but for the error, the defendant would have received a more favorable sentence.” Id. (citation modified).

III.

A. Procedural Reasonableness

A sentence flunks the procedural-reasonableness inquiry if the district court “fails to calculate (or improperly calculates) the Guidelines range, treats the Guidelines as mandatory, fails to consider the § 3553(a) factors, selects a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or fails to adequately explain the chosen sentence.” Golson, 95 F.4th at 461 (citation omitted).

1. Consecutive Sentence

Schaller first argues that the district court failed to explain why a consecutive sentence was necessary and thus failed to meet the requirements of U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3. We disagree.

A district court may generally choose between running sentences concurrently or consecutively. 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a). In doing so, however, the court must consider “any applicable Guidelines or policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.” United States v. King, 914 F.3d 1021, 1025 (6th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted). But because district courts already consult those factors when determining a sentence, they need not “repeat the § 3553(a) analysis when deciding to impose a consecutive sentence.” United States v. Brown, 131 F.4th 337, 349 (6th Cir. 2025). In other words, the district court need not “state a specific reason for a consecutive sentence.” United States v. Johnson, 640 F.3d 195, 209 (6th Cir. 2011) (citation modified). And the court may “intertwine” any discussion about the sentence’s length with its decision to run it consecutive to another sentence. Brown, 131 F.4th at 349 (citation modified).

Imposing a consecutive sentence thus requires district courts to “do two things.” United States v. Gomez, 129 F.4th 954, 964 (6th Cir. 2025) (involving § 5G1.3(c)). The court must first “turn its attention to” U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3, the Guideline governing imposition of a sentence on a defendant who is subject to an undischarged term of imprisonment. Id. (citation modified). Though “explicit reference” to § 5G1.3 is the norm, we will be satisfied that the district court considered § 5G1.3 if “there is some other evidence in the record that the court considered the section.” Id. (citation modified). The second step is for the court to “explain why it departed from that guideline.” Id. But this is not a heavy lift. Id. It simply requires the court to “make generally clear [its] rationale” for the consecutive sentence. Id. (citation modified).

The district court met both conditions here. First, the court repeatedly referenced the presentence report, which flagged that, under § 5G1.3(d), the court could run Schaller’s sentence consecutively to his undischarged term of imprisonment for the 2018 shooting. That satisfies us that the district court “turned its attention to” § 5G1.3(d). See id. at 964–65. And, as explained below, in analyzing the § 3553(a) factors the district court adequately “explained why it was imposing a consecutive sentence.” Id. at 964; see Brown, 131 F .4th at 349. So when taken together, the explanation and “reference to the presentence report[] show[] that the district court was aware of the guidelines about consecutive sentences.” Gomez, 129 F.4th at 965 (citation modified).

Second, the district court explained why it was imposing a consecutive sentence. See id. at 964–65. The court, to be sure, only mentioned the consecutive nature of the sentence once, and it did not state in explicit language why it was imposing a consecutive sentence. But it did not have to where it separately analyzed the § 3553(a) factors. See Brown, 131 F.4th at 349. So long as the district court makes its rationale for the consecutive sentence “generally clear,” we will find its “burden of explanation” satisfied. Id. (citation modified).

The district court satisfied its burden here. It addressed Schaller’s history and characteristics, and the nature of his offense, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), and how the sentence had to reflect the seriousness of the offense, encourage Schaller’s “respect for the law,” and provide him “just punishment,” id. § 3553(a)(2)(A). The court also noted that Schaller’s criminal conduct had gone “unabated” and his previous sentences were “not sufficient,” so deterrence was on its mind. (Sent. Tr., R. 29, PageID 154); 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(B). Moreover, protecting the public was the court’s “key” consideration. (Sent. Tr., R. 29, PageID 151); 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(C). And the court, through repeated references to the PSR and recognition that its sentence would create “some disparity,” considered the kinds of sentences available and the need to avoid sentencing disparities. (Sent. Tr., R. 29, PageID 156); 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(3), (4), and (6); Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 54 (2007);. In that vein, to the extent that other felon-in-possession defendants might have received a concurrent sentence, the court explained that Schaller’s use of a straw purchaser meant his was not a “mine-run” case. (Sent. Tr., R. 29, PageID 156). And his prior record put him in a “separate class.” (Id.). The court’s discussion of the § 3553(a) factors thus makes it “generally clear” why it imposed a consecutive sentence. Johnson, 640 F.3d at 209 (citation modified); Brown, 131 F .4th at 349 (citation omitted). We therefore reject Schaller’s contention that the district court did not explain its decision to impose a consecutive sentence.

2. Local Article and Anecdote

Schaller next argues that district court erred when it relied on a local news article and an anecdote involving another individual who shot into a home. Neither ground reveals plain error.

Schaller can demonstrate procedural unreasonableness by showing that “the facts or issues on which the district court relied to impose a variance came as a surprise and [his] presentation to the court was prejudiced by the surprise.” United States v. Fleming, 894 F.3d 764, 768 (6th Cir. 2018) (citation modified). And “the weight the court ultimately assigned to unexpected considerations may contribute to the surprise.” Id. at 769 (citation modified).

In Fleming, Fleming pleaded guilty to one count of possessing cocaine with the intent to distribute. Id. at 767. In doubling Fleming’s Guidelines sentence, the district court relied on information from a local news article about “mixed cocaine-opioid overdose deaths.” Id. at 768. That reliance was problematic, we said, because before the sentencing hearing, there was “no indication that opioids were relevant to” or would “play a prominent role” in Fleming’s case. Id. at 769. And we concluded that Fleming “must have been surprised by the weight” that the mixed cocaine-opioid article received from the district court, which quoted the article “extensively” and “explicitly said” that it based its variance decision on the article. Id. at 768–69.

Fleming is distinguishable. First, Schaller cannot claim surprise from the district court’s reliance on an article about local gun crimes tied to illegally owned firearms. He pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm that he acquired through a straw purchaser. And the predicate felony underlying his conviction involved his firing of 15 to 20 rounds into an occupied house. So the article was germane, and there was every indication that illegally owned firearms and gun violence were relevant to Schaller’s case. See id. Plus, the district court marshaled the article in the context of discussing the need to protect the public. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(C). Indeed, the court briefly mentioned the article after observing that “most” community members want to “get folks off the street who possess guns.” (Sent. Tr., R. 29, PageID 149).

Second, the district court did not accord the gun-violence article significant weight like in Fleming. At the hearing, the court discussed community concerns, mentioned statistics from the article, shared an anecdote (discussed below), and then considered Schaller’s background before imposing sentence. Although the court referenced the problems with “drugs and guns” causing “serious problems” in the community, it never explicitly mentioned the article again. (Id. at PageID 151). All this shows that Fleming is an unsuitable comparison. We thus see no plain error in the district court’s discussion of the article and therefore need not address prejudice to Schaller’s presentation to the court. Fleming, 894 F.3d at 768.

Nor do we take issue with the district court’s anecdote about another person who, like Schaller, shot into a house but killed someone. True, judges must fashion a sentence on an “individualized” basis. Gall, 552 U.S. at 50. Yet judges are “not only entitled to draw upon [their] experience when sentencing defendants, but should be encouraged to do so.” United States v. Ford, 889 F.2d 1570, 1572 (6th Cir. 1989). Indeed, we regularly “uph[o]ld sentences whe[re] district judges rely on their own experience[s].” See United States v. Till, No. 22-1841, 2023 WL 8651266, at *6 (6th Cir. Dec. 14, 2023) (collecting cases). So it was “reasonably foreseeable” that the district judge would draw on his experience with other gun cases in fashioning Schaller’s sentence. United States v. Hatcher, 947 F.3d 383, 391 (6th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted). There are no errors, much less plain errors, here.

3. Sentencing Disparity

For his last procedural-reasonableness argument, Schaller argues that the district court erred when it failed to explain its decision to “create a large disparity between [his] sentence and the standard for similar offenders.” (Appellant’s Br., ECF 28, 41). We perceive no plain error.

District courts must consider “the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6). But the Sentencing Commission “clearly considered” the need to avoid “unwarranted disparities” when it “set[] the Guidelines ranges.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 54. So when a district judge “correctly calculate[s] and carefully review[s] the Guidelines range, he [has] necessarily g[iven] significant weight and consideration to the need to avoid unwarranted disparities.” Id.

Here, the district court correctly calculated and carefully reviewed the Guidelines range. But it found that the 2018 shooting and sale of methamphetamine set Schaller apart from other felon-in-possession defendants who received within-Guidelines sentences and, thus, warranted an upward variance. The court’s extensive discussion of Schaller’s offense and personal characteristics, criminal history, and other relevant § 3553(a) considerations demonstrates as much. See id. So the district court did not fail to consider unwarranted sentencing disparities or adequately justify the disparity.

Schaller’s arguments to the contrary are unconvincing. First, to the extent Schaller argues that the district court did not consider national sentencing statistics, it plainly did, even if it was not required to. See United States v. Hills, 27 F.4th 1155, 1201 (6th Cir. 2022). Second, the record does not bear out his contention that the district court took a “categorical approach” to its disparity analysis by hinging it on his criminal history. (Appellant’s Br., ECF 28, 44). Yes, Schaller’s criminal history—most notably the 2018 shooting—played a prominent role in the court’s sentencing decision. But beyond his criminal history, the district court was mindful that its sentence would create a disparity and, having reviewed the PSR, it evaluated the available sentences. It also considered the failure of past punishments to deter Schaller, the seriousness of the instant offense, the need to protect the public, and his general background and need for help with treatment. So there was nothing categorical about the district court’s analysis.

And third, the district court did not fail to explain how its sentence was sufficient but not greater than necessary to comply with sentencing’s purposes.²2. Although evaluation of the substance of the sufficient-but-not-greater-than-necessary inquiry is the job of substantive reasonableness, see United States v. Williams, 169 F.4th 727, 732 (6th Cir. 2026), failure to explain the adequacy of a sentence is for procedural reasonableness, Golson, 95 F.4th at 461. Section 3553(a) outlines those purposes. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). And as we said, the district court sufficiently addressed those factors. True, the district court may not have used the explicit words that it found Schaller’s sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary to comply with the purposes of sentencing. But it “show[ed] its work,” which enables us to perform “our job” of “review[ing] what the district court did and why.” United States v. Thomas-Mathews, 81 F.4th 530, 546 (6th Cir. 2023) (citation modified). We glean no procedural unreasonableness here. Id.

B. Substantive Reasonableness

Schaller contends that the district court’s upward variance was substantively unreasonable because the district court failed to explain how he differed from “typical § 922(g)(1) offender[s]” within his Guidelines range and double counted his criminal history. (Appellant’s Br., ECF 28, 16, 19). We disagree.

A challenge to the substantive reasonableness of a sentence is an argument that the sentence is “greater than necessary[] to comply” with the general purposes of sentencing. Gall, 552 U.S. at 50 n.6 (citation omitted). That is, the sentence is “too long,” and the district court put “too much weight on some of the § 3553(a) factors and too little on others.” United States v. Rayyan, 885 F.3d 436, 442 (6th Cir. 2018). But Schaller “must surmount a high bar.” United States v. Thomas, 933 F.3d 605, 613 (6th Cir. 2019). Indeed, we “must give due deference to the district court’s decision that the § 3553(a) factors, on a whole, justify the extent of the variance.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51.

That said, when departing upward, a district court must “consider the extent of the deviation to ensure that the justification is sufficiently compelling to support the degree of variance.” Perez-Rodriguez, 960 F.3d at 754 (citation omitted). And “the greater the variance, the more compelling the justification must be.” Id. (citation modified). If a district court decides to vary from the Guidelines, it must also explain how the case before it differs from the “typical or mine-run case that occupies the heartland to which the Commission intends individual Guidelines to apply.” Id. (citation modified). “Mine-run” refers to “a normal case under the governing Guidelines range, which is calculated to incorporate the crime at issue, the offense level, and the criminal history category based on prior offenses.” Id. If a case is a mine-run case, we give the district court’s reasons for the variance a “closer review.” Id. But for “cases that fall outside the Guidelines’ heartland,” we give “the district court’s decision to deviate from the advisory range . . . the greatest respect.” Id. (citation modified).

Schaller persuasively marshals statistics, circumstances of the crime, and background characteristics to suggest that his was a mine-run felon-in-possession case. For instance, he leans on the PSR’s disclosure that thirty-three months is the average and thirty months is the median length of imprisonment for § 922(g)(1) defendants with Schaller’s same total offense level and criminal history category. And he points out that we have previously characterized a connection to drugs in felon-in-possessions cases as “not irregular.” United States v. Burkey, No. 22-3076, 2023 WL 652812, at *5 (6th Cir. Jan. 27, 2023). He contends that cases outside the heartland typically involve more serious aggravating factors, such as discharging a firearm near people, fleeing from the police, possessing the firearm in connection to some uncharged violent conduct, or possessing multiple firearms.

Be that as it may, whether Schaller’s case is mine-run or outside the heartland, we cannot say in this instance that the district court’s decision to vary upward was an abuse of discretion. For a closer review of Schaller’s sentencing reveals sufficient reasoning for the variance. Undergirding the district court’s decision was Schaller’s “willingness to possess [and use] a firearm,” his failure to appear and to make the most of treatment opportunities, his use of a straw purchaser to obtain the Glock, his sale of methamphetamine, and his openness “about having a firearm” despite knowing that doing so was illegal. (Sent. Tr., R. 29, PageID 152). Also important was Schaller’s minimal prison time for the 2018 shooting; an empty firearm magazine found in his possession at the time he stole a vehicle and possessed drugs underlying his 2023 conviction; and his issues with drug addiction. And “key” to its decision was the need to keep the public safe from an individual willing to shoot into an occupied home, illegally obtain a firearm, and deal drugs. (Id. at PageID 151).

Thus, whether we give the 57-month sentence here the “greatest respect” or a “closer review,” we lack a definite and firm conviction that the district court committed a clear error of judgment in varying upward. See Perez-Rodriguez, 960 F.3d at 753–54 (citation omitted). The district court’s discussion of the relevant § 3553(a) factors provided a sufficiently compelling reason. Importantly, the prior offense that weighed most heavily in the district court’s calculus—Schaller’s 2018 shooting into a home—bears a “meaningful relationship” to the instant offense. See United States v. Lee, 974 F.3d 670, 677 (6th Cir. 2020). We have affirmed similar upward variances where the past and present firearms offenses are comparable, even if the Guidelines already accounted for that past conduct. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 934 F.3d 498, 499–500 (6th Cir. 2019) (affirming 14-month upward variance with a defendant on “his fifth firearm conviction”); United States v. Dunnican, 961 F.3d 859, 880–81 (6th Cir. 2020) (deeming 21-month variance substantively reasonable in case involving two firearms convictions). But see Lee, 974 F.3d at 678–79 (vacating 23-month variance on the defendant’s “first firearm offense in his entire criminal history” and noting he “had not been convicted of any violent crime” for 15 years). And although Schaller narrows in on individual characteristics and traits that have previously been deemed mine-run, we must consider the collection of traits as a whole, not in isolation. See United States v. Madden, 515 F.3d 601, 612 (6th Cir. 2008) (“Read in isolation, [the district court’s explanation for denying a downward variance] would undoubtedly be inadequate. But . . . we review a district court’s sentencing determination by looking to the entire context and record.”). Viewed through that lens, we see no reason to disturb the district court’s sentence.

Schaller’s counterarguments do not compel a different conclusion. To begin, we reject Schaller’s contention that the district court’s failure to explain his consecutive sentence contributed to his sentence’s substantive unreasonableness, because—as discussed in Section III.A.1—there was no such failure. Further, the authority Schaller cites to support his argument that the variance was otherwise substantively unreasonable is distinguishable. Specifically, United States v. Brown, 828 F. App’x 256 (6th Cir. 2020), involved a defendant with an “extensive criminal history” that landed him in criminal history category VI, and a sentence that was double the high end of his Guidelines. Id. at 259. In finding that Brown’s sentence was substantively unreasonable, we reasoned that the district court’s discussion of many of the § 3553(a) factors “did not sufficiently account for avoiding unwarranted sentence disparities.” Id. Plus, the court had relied “primarily” on Brown’s extensive criminal history in varying upward. Id. Conversely, here, the district court accounted for such disparities and relied on public safety as its primary concern (despite also stressing the importance of the 2018 shooting conviction to its decision). So Brown is inapt.

Schaller also circles back to our unpublished decision in Burkey. By his reading, the panel concluded that Burkey had a “typical felon-in-possession case” despite an “extensive criminal record,” and “affirmed only on the alternative basis that the district court permissibly relied on Burkey’s extensive prison disciplinary record . . . to remove the case from the heartland.” (Appellant’s Br., ECF 28, 25–26 (citation modified)). But Burkey’s prison record was not the basis for affirming; it simply meant we gave the district court’s sentencing decision the “greatest respect” rather than subjecting it to a “closer review.” Perez-Rodriguez, 960 F.3d at 754 (citation modified); see Burkey, 2023 WL 652812, at *5–6.

Even so, Burkey demonstrates the importance of considering the features of a defendant’s case as a collective whole rather than considering individual characteristics in isolation and considering those aspects of the case “relative to” the goals of deterrence, protection of the public, and reflecting the seriousness of an offense. See Burkey, 2023 WL 652812, at *6–7 (concluding under greatest-respect standard that the district court adequately justified an upward variance when it emphasized the defendant’s criminal history and “previous institutional misconduct,” the “efficacy” of past sentences, and drugs found in car during offense underlying conviction). The district court did the same thing here, as we outlined above.

United States v. Lightning, 835 F. App’x 38 (6th Cir. 2020), is also distinguishable. There, we took a “closer” look at the variance—more than triple the Guidelines sentence—because the district court got it “exactly backward” in concluding that Lightning’s repeat run-ins with the law set him apart from others in his criminal history category. Id. at 42. After “extensively detail[ing]” Lightning’s criminal history, the district court varied upward from the Guidelines range of 30 to 37 months to the statutory maximum, 120 months, “based on that criminal history.” Id. at 39–40, 42–43 (citation modified). Here, while the district court certainly stressed Schaller’s criminal history, it was not the court’s sole focus like it was in Lightning. So Lightning is no help to Schaller either.

Then, in United States v. Stanton, 850 F. App’x 953, 954 (6th Cir. 2021), the district court’s reasons for tripling the defendant’s Guidelines sentence were not “compelling” enough to warrant such a variance. In reaching that conclusion, though, we observed that the district court’s reasons were “potentially adequate to support some upward variance,” but the “magnitude” of the variance rendered the explanation inadequate. Id. at 956 (emphasis added). Crucially, the district court had varied upward 191%, from the 37-month Guideline range to 108 months. Id. at 954–55. Here, by contrast, Schaller’s 57-month sentence represented a 54% upward variance from the top end of his Guidelines range. Although substantial, we have approved of similar variances in the past. See, e.g., Burkey, 2023 WL 652812, at *1 (affirming as substantively reasonable a 53.6% upward variance in felon-in-possession case). Plus, while Schaller’s sentence may have been higher than the average and median sentences for other § 922(g)(1) defendants, we “do not reduce substantive reasonableness review to a rigid mathematical formula.” United States v. Boucher, 937 F.3d 702, 709 (6th Cir. 2019) (citation modified). Instead, “the size of the variance [is] relevant to our analysis” in the sense that “a major variance” needs a “more significant justification.” Id. (citation modified). As we explained, the district court’s justification passes muster.

Nor does United States v. Storck, No. 23-5684, 2024 WL 2217903 (6th Cir. May 16, 2024), move the needle. In Storck, the district court relied heavily on Storck’s history and characteristics and the nature and circumstances of the offense to vary upward and nearly double the high-end of the Guidelines range. Id. at *1–2, 5–6. Our concern in Storck, like in Stanton, was one of proportion. There, the factors the district court considered “fail[ed] to justify a variance of th[e] magnitude” at issue, even if they might “support some upward variance.” Id. at *7; see Stanton, 850 F. App’x at 956. But as discussed above, we have previously left undisturbed variances like the one at issue here. And, as the government points out, the district court in Storck recognized the defendant’s “positive response to treatment” and his 17-year sobriety. Storck, 2024 WL 2217903 at *7. Schaller is dissimilar; he struggled with a Percocet addiction that he eventually replaced with cocaine, then methamphetamine. The district court here recognized Schaller’s issues with addiction and the need for a stiffer sentence not only for the “safety [of] the public” but also to get Schaller the treatment he needed. (Sent. Tr., R. 29, PageID 151 (citation modified)). Moreover, unlike Storck, Schaller did not have a nearly two-decade gap between convictions. Id. at *6. True, Schaller’s stint of criminal activity started later in life. But as the district court recognized, it has gone “unabated” ever since. (Sent. Tr., R. 29, PageID 154). And in Storck, the district court failed to “explain how” one of the offenses at issue was “so unusual as to justify nearly doubling the top-end Guidelines sentence.” Id. at *7. But here, the district court adequately explained its reasons for a sentencing disparity and upward variance.

And in United States v. Warren, 771 F. App’x 637, 641 (6th Cir. 2019), the district court “placed substantial emphasis” on the defendant’s criminal record; indeed, it was the “only reason” the district court gave for the disparity created by its variance that doubled the Guidelines sentence. We said that “by relying on a problem common to all defendants within the same criminal history category as [the defendant]—that is, that they have an extensive criminal history”—the district court failed to provide a sufficiently compelling reason for its statutory maximum sentence. Id. at 642 (citation modified). But again, here, the district court relied on more than Schaller’s criminal history. Protection of the public was “key” to the court’s variance, and although not explicitly mentioned, deterrence was front of mind for the court. (Sent. Tr., R. 29, PageID 151). Moreover, the court considered Schaller’s need for help with addiction and his mental health. So this was not a case where the court was solely focused on past criminal conduct.

Finally, despite Schaller’s argument that the district court double counted his criminal history, we have “rejected defendants’ arguments that a district court cannot impose upward variances based on criminal history, simply because the Guidelines calculation already accounts for criminal history as a factor.” Dunnican, 961 F.3d at 881; see also United States v. Haile, 157 F.4th 820, 833 (6th Cir. 2025). The district court’s “attaching of great weight to a few factors” is not “reversible error.” Dunnican, 961 F.3d at 881 (citation modified).

IV.

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM.