Franklyn Garrison v. Bryan Morrison

READLER, Circuit Judge. A Michigan jury convicted Franklyn Garrison of murdering Kevin Walker and torching Walker’s home. The Michigan Court of Appeals later rejected Garrison’s argument that the prosecution presented insufficient evidence at trial and, in addition, that his counsel rendered him ineffective assistance, thereby prejudicing his defense. Now in a federal habeas posture, Garrison maintains that the state appeals court’s decision involved an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent or rested on an unreasonable determination of the facts. The district court granted his habeas petition. Recognizing the high bar federal law sets for granting such relief, we reverse.

I.

A. Someone killed Kevin Walker, set fire to his home, stole his vehicle, and then set fire to the vehicle as well. Officers identified Franklyn Garrison as a key suspect. Ultimately, he was charged with first-degree felony murder, second-degree arson, and fourth-degree arson.

At trial, the State’s theory was that Garrison killed Walker while robbing him. To support its theory, the State presented evidence of motive, opportunity, and consciousness of guilt.

As to motive, the State introduced evidence that Garrison was having financial difficulties. According to his mother, Garrison’s income was less than $750 per month, which he used to pay rent while helping cover his daughter’s college expenses. Walker, by contrast, was known to carry substantial amounts of cash and to keep tens of thousands of dollars at his home.

As to opportunity, the State offered evidence placing Garrison at Walker’s home on the night of the murder. Desmond Johnson, who had known Garrison for many years, testified that he drove Garrison and a friend to Walker’s residence on the evening Walker was murdered. Johnson watched the two men walk toward the house before he drove away. Later that evening, at 11:27 p.m., Garrison called Johnson and asked for a ride from Walker’s home. Johnson declined. Cell phone records placed Garrison near Walker’s residence when he made the call to Johnson, at which point his phone remained inactive until 2:55 a.m.

The State also presented testimony from Walker’s neighbors regarding the period during which Garrison’s whereabouts were unaccounted for. Geraldyne Reed, Walker’s next-door neighbor, testified that she heard sounds resembling “firecrackers” and then noticed Walker’s vehicle leaving Walker’s home. R. 12-15, PageID 887–88. She did not remember the exact time these events occurred but testified that she was certain it was “after 11:00” p.m. Id. at 897. Within minutes, she noticed that Walker’s house was on fire. Geraldyne’s son, Edward, similarly testified that he heard several gunshots before the fire. He acknowledged, however, that he was uncertain about the precise timing because he had taken sleep medication that evening. After noticing Walker’s body in the driveway, Edward called 911 at 12:48 a.m., and law enforcement arrived soon thereafter. Law enforcement found Walker’s body with his pockets turned inside out and injuries consistent with gunshot wounds.

The fire investigator’s testimony added more details to that timeline. He testified about the timing of the fire and his conclusion that it had been intentionally set. As he arrived at Walker’s charred house, his team was notified of a burning vehicle located roughly 20 miles from Walker’s residence and six blocks from Garrison’s home. The vehicle proved to be Walker’s car.

Finally, as to consciousness of guilt, the State offered evidence that Garrison resumed using his cell phone when he placed three calls at 2:55 a.m. to the friend who had been dropped off at Walker’s house with Garrison hours earlier. Cell phone data showed that these calls were placed near Garrison’s home.

When later confronted by law enforcement, Garrison gave the officers inconsistent accounts of his activities that evening. He initially denied that anyone accompanied him to Walker’s home and claimed that someone other than Johnson had driven him there. He revised portions of his account only after investigators confronted him with contrary evidence. Police also discovered that information concerning calls made in the months leading up to the murder had been manually deleted from Garrison’s phone.

The State’s case was not without its gaps. The defense emphasized, among other things, that the bullets recovered from the scene could not be matched to bullets later found in Garrison’s home, that Garrison was excluded as the major donor of DNA recovered from certain items, and that an impression found on a gas can near Walker’s burned vehicle could not be linked to Garrison’s shoes.

The defense presented one witness at trial: Garrison’s mother. She testified as to her recollection of the events occurring the morning after the murder, as well as to Garrison’s financial situation.

Before trial, the defense had identified another potential witness—Garrison’s sister and housemate, Sharee Garrison. Sharee executed an affidavit stating that Garrison arrived at her home sometime between midnight and 12:30 a.m. on the night of the murder. Nonetheless, she did not testify on Garrison’s behalf. After the trial, Sharee executed a second affidavit in which she added a few more details and confined the time during which Garrison allegedly arrived at her home to “around 12:30 am.” R. 12-21, PageID 1580. She also stated that, on the day she was going to be called to testify, she “arrived to court at around 10:30 AM” while “the trial was in recess” and after the defense had rested. Id. Garrison’s counsel, however, “did not come outside to speak” with her. Id.

The jury convicted Garrison of first-degree felony murder and the related arson offenses, either as a principal or as an aider and abettor. He received a sentence of life imprisonment without parole.

B. On direct appeal, Garrison challenged both the sufficiency of the evidence and the performance of his trial counsel. With respect to sufficiency, he argued that the evidence failed to establish that he was the perpetrator. As to performance, Garrison asserted that his counsel provided him constitutionally deficient assistance by failing to seek an adjournment that could have afforded Sharee an opportunity to testify.

The Michigan Court of Appeals rejected both claims. Regarding sufficiency of the evidence, the appeals court highlighted testimony and evidence placing Garrison at Walker’s home near the time of the murder, his false and inconsistent statements to police, and the discovery of Walker’s stolen vehicle near Garrison’s residence. People v. Garrison, 2018 WL 626028, at *2– 3 (Mich. Ct. App. Jan. 30, 2018). Viewing that record in the light most favorable to the State, the court concluded that “there was sufficient evidence to convince a jury beyond a reasonable doubt that [Garrison] committed or aided and abetted in the crimes for which he was convicted.” Id. at *3.

The court likewise rejected Garrison’s ineffective assistance claim. It did so based on a lack of prejudice to Garrison. Sharee’s proposed testimony, the appeals court explained, “would not have accounted for [Garrison’s] whereabouts when the crimes were committed.” Id. at *5. As a result, the court reasoned, the absence of that testimony did not make a difference in the trial’s outcome, and thus did not prejudice Garrison’s defense. Id. The Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal. People v. Garrison, 935 N.W.2d 720, 721 (Mich. 2019) (mem.).

C. Garrison next sought federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, renewing his sufficiency of the evidence and ineffective assistance arguments. The district court granted Garrison habeas relief on both claims. The court ordered the State to retry Garrison or otherwise release him from custody. The State now appeals that order.

II.

Federal courts view the writ of habeas corpus as “an extraordinary remedy,” one that is “reserved for only extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice system.” Brown v. Davenport, 142 S. Ct. 1510, 1524 (2022) (citation modified). To that end, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) cabins the instances in which a federal court may disturb a state conviction. When a state court adjudicates a habeas petitioner’s claim on the merits, federal courts may grant a writ of habeas corpus only where the state court’s decision was “contrary to” or “an unreasonable application of” federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court, or if the decision rested “on an unreasonable determination of the facts.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)–(2). A decision is “contrary to” clearly established federal law if the state court “applies a rule that directly conflicts with a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court” or “confronts a case with materially identical facts to a Supreme Court decision and decides the case differently.” Rogers v. Mays, 69 F.4th 381, 389 (6th Cir. 2023) (en banc). And a state court unreasonably applies federal law when it comes to a legal conclusion that no “fairminded jurist[]” would accept. Mack v. Bradshaw, 88 F.4th 1147, 1154 (6th Cir. 2023) (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011)).

To prevail under § 2254(d)(2), a petitioner must first show that the state court’s factual findings were not just debatable or incorrect but “unreasonable,” which is “a substantially higher threshold” for obtaining relief. Shoop v. Twyford, 142 S. Ct. 2037, 2043 (2022) (quoting Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473 (2007)). To be unreasonable, the factual determinations must be rebutted by “clear and convincing evidence.” Randolph v. Macauley, 155 F.4th 859, 869 (6th Cir. 2025) (citation modified). And even then, the petitioner must also show that the unreasonable factual determination was a “but-for cause of the state court’s decision.” Hale v. Cool, 122 F.4th 637, 645 (6th Cir. 2024) (citation modified).

With these standards in mind, and recognizing that we review the district court’s grant of habeas relief de novo, Bergman v. Howard, 54 F.4th 950, 956 (6th Cir. 2022), we conclude that Garrison is not entitled to the extraordinary remedy of a writ of habeas corpus.

A. Begin with Garrison’s challenge to the Michigan Court of Appeals’ rejection of his sufficiency claim. He contends both that the state appeals court unreasonably applied Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979), and that its conclusion on that issue rested on an unreasonable determination of the facts. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)–(2). Under Jackson, we ask whether, “viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” 443 U.S. at 319. Because Michigan law permits conviction as a principal offender or as an aider and abettor to an offense, the Jackson inquiry is satisfied where the evidence allowed any rational juror to conclude either that Garrison committed the offenses, or that he merely aided and abetted the offenses. See Tackett v. Trierweiler, 956 F.3d 358, 367 (6th Cir. 2020); Mich. Comp. Laws § 767.39.

Remember that AEDPA adds another layer of deference. To honor that command, we ask not only whether a rational juror could find the evidence sufficient to convict Garrison, but also whether it was “objectively unreasonable” for the Michigan Court of Appeals to conclude that a rational juror could do so. Coleman v. Johnson, 566 U.S. 650, 651 (2012) (per curiam); see also Hodge v. Plappert, 136 F.4th 648, 661 (6th Cir. 2025). This forgiving standard is often referred to as “double-layered deference,” as we must defer both to the jury’s verdict, and then again to the state court’s review of that verdict. White v. Steele, 602 F.3d 707, 711 (6th Cir. 2009).

Garrison’s argument, both in state court and here, centers on identity. He contends that no rational juror could conclude that he committed, or aided and abetted, the charged offenses and the state court’s determination to the contrary was thus an unreasonable application of Jackson. And, Garrison adds, in applying Jackson and concluding that Garrison was not entitled to a new trial, the state appeals court unreasonably determined the facts that supported that conclusion. We disagree.

A.1. Garrison first faults the state appeals court for relying on circumstantial evidence to uphold his convictions under Jackson. Recall the evidence presented by the State, starting with motive. Although motive is not an element of the charged offenses, evidence of motive is relevant to assessing a defendant’s guilt, especially “[w]hen identity is in question.” House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 540 (2006). Here, the government presented evidence that Garrison had a financial incentive to rob Walker. Garrison was unemployed, lived on less than $750 per month, and had numerous financial obligations. As for Walker, he was known to keep large amounts of cash and jewelry at his home and on his person. Prior to the murder, Garrison had recently rekindled a relationship with Walker and Walker’s family, contacting Walker’s daughter days before the murder after a lengthy period without contact. And when Walker’s body was discovered, his pockets had been turned inside out. From this evidence, a rational juror could infer that Garrison had a financial motive to rob Walker and that he renewed contact with Walker shortly before the murder to further that effect. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319.

Turn to opportunity. The State also presented evidence placing Garrison at Walker’s home when the crimes could have occurred, permitting the jury to find that Garrison was the last known person to see Walker alive. See Johnson v. Coyle, 200 F.3d 987, 991–92 (6th Cir. 2000) (identifying evidence that is probative of identity). The State’s evidence was ample. Johnson drove Garrison and Garrison’s friend to Walker’s residence on the evening of July 18, with Garrison later admitting he was there. Cell site evidence placed Garrison’s phone near Walker’s residence with intermittent call activity until approximately 11:27 p.m., at which point his phone went inactive for several hours. During that same period, neighbors testified that they heard gunshots, saw Walker’s vehicle leave the residence, and observed Walker’s house on fire. Officers would later find Walker deceased in his driveway.

What is more, Garrison apparently had no ride home from Walker’s house, yet he made it home somehow. And Walker’s vehicle, which was taken from Walker’s home and later burned, was discovered roughly twenty miles away from Walker’s home and just six blocks from Garrison’s home. The vehicle’s path thus supplied a ready explanation for Garrison’s return: After Johnson refused to pick him up, Garrison took Walker’s vehicle and then abandoned it at a spot close enough for him to walk home. From these “uncontradicted circumstances,” “a rational factfinder readily could have inferred beyond a reasonable doubt that” Garrison committed, or at least aided and abetted, the murder of Walker, set fire to his house, and fled home in Walker’s vehicle. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 325.

Garrison’s conduct after the murder added to the evidence of guilt. Garrison gave inconsistent accounts of who accompanied him to Walker’s home, how long he remained there, and how he returned home, revising portions of his account once officers confronted him with contrary evidence. Officers also discovered that Garrison’s call history, including communications with Walker, had been manually deleted from his phone before his arrest. And two days after the murder, a photograph depicting twenty- and one-hundred-dollar bills appeared on Garrison’s social media page. Behavior like this, including false exculpatory statements, can reflect a consciousness of guilt. Myers v. Neal, 975 F.3d 611, 626 (7th Cir. 2020); see also United States v. Holmes, 797 F. App’x 912, 919 (6th Cir. 2019). Taking all of this evidence together, the jury’s verdict comfortably satisfies the “threshold of bare rationality.” Coleman, 566 U.S. at 656. The Michigan Court of Appeals therefore did not unreasonably apply Jackson in upholding Garrison’s convictions.

Garrison resists that conclusion by pointing principally to what the State’s case lacked, namely, inculpatory forensic evidence. On that score, he sees the record differently than we do. By and large, he portrays the record as either affirmatively excluding him as the perpetrator or, at a minimum, exposing fatal gaps in the State’s case, especially in light of the absence of inculpatory forensic evidence. For example, Garrison suggests that the purported shoe print on the gas can exclude him as a suspect. As we understand the record, however, the forensic examiner stated that she could not determine whether the impression was even a shoe print. Nor did the ballistics evidence rule out Garrison. The firearms examiner could neither identify the caliber of the recovered bullet fragments nor determine whether they came from the same firearm, meaning the evidence neither implicated nor excluded the ammunition found in Garrison’s home. The DNA evidence was similarly inconclusive. Walker was the major donor on every sample collected, while Garrison could not be excluded as a minor contributor. Nor is the absence of additional inculpatory forensic evidence particularly unusual in this setting, as the fire very well could have destroyed whatever physical evidence remained. See Marquette Transp. Co. v. La Mach. Co., 367 F.3d 398, 402 (5th Cir. 2004) (“[I]n a fire case, [the crime] . . . must be established by circumstantial evidence because of the fire’s destruction of the physical evidence.”); see also Technical Working Grp. on Fire/Arson Scene Investigation, Nat’l Inst. of Just., Fire and Arson Scene Evidence: A Guide for Public Safety Personnel 4 (2000) (“The destructive power of the fire itself compromises evidence from the outset.”).

Garrison’s analogies to our notable award of habeas relief in Tanner v. Yukins, 867 F.3d 661 (6th Cir. 2017), do not move the needle. In Tanner, the State’s case suffered from more than a dearth of forensic evidence. Rather, some of that evidence affirmatively pointed elsewhere: Blood recovered from the victim’s clothing excluded both the victim and the defendant. Tanner, 867 F.3d at 674. Other evidence undermined the State’s theory, too. An officer’s testimony regarding the defendant’s confession contradicted the recorded interview, and witnesses observed a suspicious vehicle and unknown individuals near the scene around the time of the murder. Id. at 670–74. Here, by contrast, the forensic evidence neither implicated nor excluded Garrison, while the state introduced substantial circumstantial evidence connecting him to the crimes.

To be sure, the case against Garrison was not rich in physical evidence. The State presented neither fingerprints nor inculpatory DNA evidence, nor did surveillance footage show Garrison driving Walker’s vehicle or disposing of evidence. No eyewitness identified Garrison as the perpetrator, and he did not confess. On top of that, Johnson testified that Garrison did not appear upset with Walker and that he did not observe Garrison carrying a weapon when he drove him to Walker’s home. All of that said, because the State may satisfy its burden through circumstantial proof alone, the absence of direct evidence (e.g., forensic evidence) does not make the State’s circumstantial case constitutionally insufficient. Cooper v. Chapman, 970 F.3d 720, 732 (6th Cir. 2020); see also Britt v. Howes, 404 F. App’x 954, 956–57 (6th Cir. 2010) (underscoring the probative value of circumstantial evidence). And, as explained, the State presented sufficient circumstantial evidence for a rational juror to find Garrison guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

2. Turn next to Garrison’s argument that the state appeals court based its conclusion on an unreasonable determination of the facts. His argument centers on the state appeals court’s description of the timeline. According to Garrison, the state appeals court concluded that the crimes occurred “shortly ‘after 11:00 [p.m.],’” when the evidence placed Garrison at Walker’s house. Br. Appellee 37 (quoting Garrison, 2018 WL 626028, at *3). That factual finding, says Garrison, was unreasonable because the evidence established that the murder occurred around 12:30 a.m., a time when “[n]o evidence placed Garrison at Walker’s.” Id. at 21. On that basis, Garrison argues that the appeals court unreasonably determined the facts.

The record, however, does not “clear[ly]” and “convincing[ly]” reflect that the crimes occurred close to 12:30 a.m., as Garrison suggests. Hodge, 136 F.4th at 666. Garrison relies primarily on Edward Reed’s 12:48 a.m. 911 call and Reed’s testimony that he heard gunshots roughly ten to fifteen minutes before he began to record the fire on his phone. Yet Reed also testified that he was “a hundred percent guaranteed” that he heard the gunshots between 11:30 p.m. and midnight. R. 12-15, PageID 927. When confronted with the apparent inconsistency, Reed tied it to his use of a sleep aid and because he “wasn’t paying [any] attention.” Id. at PageID 929, 932. A rational juror thus could have credited Reed’s testimony placing the shooting earlier in the night. And as we “resolve all issues of credibility in favor of the jury’s verdict,” see United States v. Baskerville, 164 F.4th 459, 472 (6th Cir. 2026) (citation modified), the Michigan Court of Appeals did not unreasonably conclude the same.

The fire-related evidence does not compel a different conclusion. The fire investigator testified that the fire must have burned for “at least” twenty to thirty minutes before it reached the point at which the house was fully engulfed in flames. R. 12-15, PageID 1040. Both Edward Reed and the responding officer testified that the house was engulfed at 12:50 a.m. At most, then, the investigator’s testimony simply establishes the latest the fire could have begun (no later than roughly 12:30 a.m.), leaving open the possibility that the fire started significantly earlier.

Even were we to accept Garrison’s preferred timeline that the crimes occurred close in time to 12:30 a.m., our conclusion would remain the same. A state court’s unreasonable factual determination warrants relief only if it was the “but-for cause” of the court’s ultimate decision. Hale, 122 F.4th at 645. That is not the case here. Circumstantial evidence still permitted the jury to conclude that Garrison remained at Walker’s house when the crimes were committed. Garrison admitted that he had been there earlier that evening. His cell phone records placed him in the area until 11:27 p.m., and his phone went to an inactive status until 2:55 a.m. Garrison identified no evidence presented to the jury placing him anywhere else between 11:27 p.m. and 12:30 a.m. And his preferred timeline does nothing to undermine other significant circumstantial evidence against him—for example, that Walker’s burned vehicle was later found just six blocks from Garrison’s home, even though Garrison had lacked a ride home from Walker’s house. Viewed in “the light most favorable to the prosecution,” the trial record allowed a rational juror to place Garrison at Walker’s home the night the crimes occurred, even if those crimes happened closer to 12:30 a.m. than 11:00 p.m.

* * *

All told, the Michigan Court of Appeals neither unreasonably applied Jackson nor based its decision on an unreasonable determination of the facts in rejecting Garrison’s sufficiency challenge.

B. Garrison next argues that the Michigan Court of Appeals made both legal and factual errors in rejecting the argument that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to request an adjournment after an alibi witness failed to appear at trial. The familiar two-part test articulated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), governs claims for ineffective assistance of counsel. We ask first whether counsel’s performance was constitutionally deficient. Hill v. Mitchell, 400 F.3d 308, 329 (6th Cir. 2005). If so, we then ask whether that deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Id. The Michigan Court of Appeals rejected Garrison’s claim on the latter basis due to his failure to demonstrate prejudice. Garrison, 2018 WL 626028, at *1–2, 5. For today’s purposes, we can likewise skip to the second inquiry, as well. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697 (recognizing that courts need not address both prongs “if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one”). To establish prejudice, Garrison must show “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694.

B. 1. Start with Garrison’s argument that the state appeals court unreasonably applied Strickland’s prejudice standard. On federal habeas review, again, the question is not whether we would find prejudice ourselves but instead whether there was “[any] reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief.” Harrington, 562 U.S. at 98. In this case, the state appeals court’s conclusion that there was no prejudice was not “so lacking in justification” as to be objectively unreasonable. Id. at 103; see also Harris v. Haeberlin, 526 F.3d 903, 910 (6th Cir. 2008).

Even assuming that the trial court would have adjourned for long enough for Sharee to arrive, it was not objectively unreasonable to conclude that her expected testimony did not give rise to a “substantial” likelihood that the jury’s verdict would have been different had Sharee taken the stand. Harrington, 562 U.S. at 112. To begin, the jury may have been deeply suspicious of Sharee’s accounting. As Garrison’s sister, she was hardly a disinterested witness, leaving the jury free to discount her testimony on that basis. See Stadler v. Berghuis, 483 F. App’x 173, 176–77 (6th Cir. 2012) (crediting trial counsel’s decision not to call family alibi witnesses); Ball v. United States, 271 F. App’x 880, 884 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (holding that the decision not to call family alibi witnesses was “strategic” because, as family members, they had “strong motive to fabricate an alibi defense”). Her account also appears to have shifted over time, narrowing the window in which she claimed to have seen Garrison and leaving her susceptible to impeachment on that score. And even if the jury credited her account, it would not explain away other significant circumstantial evidence against Garrison, like the fact that Walker’s burned vehicle was later found just six blocks from Garrison’s home.

Nor, for that matter, did Sharee’s testimony provide Garrison an airtight alibi. According to her affidavit, Sharee would have testified that Garrison arrived home around 12:30 a.m. Yet, as already discussed, the evidence supported competing inferences regarding when the crimes occurred, including one placing them earlier in the night. Edward Reed testified that it was “a hundred percent guaranteed” that he heard gunshots between 11:30 p.m. and 12:00 a.m. R. 12-15, PageID 927. A rational juror could have credited that testimony along with Sharee’s testimony that Garrison was home around 12:30 a.m. and yet still conclude that Garrison had enough time to commit the crimes before making the roughly 30-minute drive (plus the six-block walk from the car) home. Given those competing inferences, “fairminded jurists could disagree on the correctness of the state court’s decision,” foreclosing habeas relief. Harrington, 562 U.S. at 101 (citation modified).

B. 2. Believing otherwise, Garrison portrays the Michigan Court of Appeals’ decision as resting on an unreasonable factual premise, namely, that the crimes definitively occurred close to 11:00 p.m. To that end, he notes that the appeals court recounted the relevant timeline in a somewhat imprecise manner, beginning from “[s]ometime after 11:00 p.m.,” when:

Walker’s neighbor Geraldyne Reed, saw one of Walker’s cars pull out of the spot where it had been parked for months, heard what she thought were firecrackers, and saw the car drive off seconds later. Ten or fifteen minutes later, her son Edward Reed heard someone yelling “fire,” and observed Walker’s home ablaze. He also saw Walker’s body outside of the home on the ground. Mr. Reed waited a few minutes before he placed a call to 911 at 12:48 a.m. Garrison, 2018 WL 626028, at *1. If the crimes occurred significantly later than 11:00 p.m., as Garrison believes, then Sharee’s alibi testimony would have had more explanatory power than the appeals court gave it credit for, making its absence all the more prejudicial.

At the outset, we agree with Garrison that the state appeals court’s discussion of the timeline is not a model of clarity. The court did not expressly acknowledge the competing timelines supported by the evidence or explain what it meant when it described the crimes as occurring “sometime after 11:00 p.m.” But any imprecision in that description does not entitle Garrison to relief. As already explained, the evidence supported competing timelines as to when the crimes occurred, so Garrison has not shown by “clear and convincing evidence” that the appeals court unreasonably determined the facts. Randolph, 155 F.4th at 869. Nor, even accepting Garrison’s preferred timeline, was the appeals court’s description the “but-for cause” of its prejudice determination. Hale, 122 F.4th at 645.

That leaves Garrison’s objection to the state appeals court’s reasoning. On that score, we “review the reasonableness of a state court’s decision, not the clarity of its prose.” White v. Plappert, 131 F.4th 465, 498 (6th Cir. 2025); see also Rogers, 69 F.4th at 392 (“After all, AEDPA instructs us to look for ‘a decision’—not a few words or a stray thought—that was ‘contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law.’” (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1))). And, to that end, the state appeals court “did not act unreasonably by describing [the timeline] more generally than [Garrison] would have liked.” Rogers, 69 F.4th at 393. It is enough to say that, on the record before us, the appeals court reasonably described the events at issue.

B. 3. The same principle disposes of Garrison’s related contention that the state appeals court applied a rule “contrary to” Strickland when it cited a state-court decision employing a “substantial defense” test. A state-court decision is “contrary to” clearly established federal law only if it “applies a rule that directly conflicts with a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court” or “confronts a case with materially identical facts to a Supreme Court decision” and yet reaches a different result. Rogers, 69 F.4th at 389. Neither is true here. Read as a whole, the appeals court’s opinion expressly identifies Strickland as the governing standard before applying it to Garrison’s claim, and nothing in its subsequent discussion suggests that it displaced that standard with a conflicting rule. See People v. Payne, 774 N.W.2d 714, 721 (2009) (citing Strickland); People v. Pickens, 521 N.W.2d 797, 804 (1994) (adopting the Strickland standard). Either way, Garrison’s line of attack presupposes that the jury would have credited his sister’s testimony—by no means a foregone conclusion. In the end, a reasonable jurist could comfortably conclude that Sharee’s alibi testimony was not likely to tip the scales.

* * *

We reverse.