Patience Fofo Allotey v. Todd Blanche

JOHN K. BUSH, Circuit Judge. Patience Allotey is a native and citizen of Ghana. She overstayed her temporary welcome and was deemed removable. She conceded removability but applied for cancellation of removal, arguing that removing her to Ghana would cause exceptional and extremely unusual hardship for her three United States children who are United States citizens. The immigration judge disagreed and denied cancellation of removal. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed and also denied her motion for remand. She petitioned this court for review. We DISMISS her petition in part and DENY her petition in part.

I.

In 2000, Allotey entered the United States for the first time, arriving at New York City as the spouse of an F-1 student-visa holder, with temporary authorization to remain in the United States. That same year, she had a child, Godson, with her first husband, Henry Adotey. In 2003, she both divorced Adotey and had a second child with him; the record does not show in what order these events occurred. A few years later, she married her second husband, Antonio Smith, and set about trying to adjust her status to remain in the United States permanently. She also had her third child around the same time, but the father was her first husband, Adotey. And Allotey’s marriage to Smith did not last long; they divorced in 2009.

In 2008, Allotey left the United States for roughly two months. When she returned to New York City, she was admitted as a parolee with authorization to remain in the United States for a temporary time not to exceed one year. The limited period was for Allotey to resume her application to adjust her status. But her application for adjustment of status was denied. Nonetheless, she continued to remain in the United States unauthorized. The Department of Homeland Security hauled her into immigration court, charging her as removable under the Immigration and Nationality Act because of her lack of valid entry documentation. Allotey conceded her removability. The immigration judge (IJ) therefore sustained the charge of removability.

In response, Allotey filed an application for cancellation of removal, claiming that her removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to her three children who, as noted, were United States citizens. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1).¹1. In relevant part, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1) provides that “[t]he Attorney General may cancel removal of . . . an alien . . . if the alien (A) has been physically present in the United States for a continuous period of not less than 10 years immediately preceding the date of such application; (B) has been a person of good moral character during such period; (C) has not been convicted of an offense under [certain sections] of this title . . . ; and (D) establishes that removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to the alien’s spouse, parent, or child, who is a citizen of the United States . . . .” Only the final factor is at issue. The IJ held two hearings on the merits of her cancellation application. Testimony came from Allotey, her child Godson, and her friend Dorothy Vanderpuije, all of whom the IJ found credible. But the IJ also concluded that Allotey’s children would not experience exceptional and extremely unusual hardship. That conclusion was underpinned by two key factual determinations made by the IJ. First, Adotey, the children’s father, could take on more responsibility caring for his children should Allotey be deported. Second, Godson, who was 20 by the time of the IJ’s determination, had the ability to provide financial assistance to his two younger siblings. Accordingly, the IJ found that Allotey’s children would not experience hardship substantially beyond that which would normally accompany the deportation of a parent. So the IJ denied Allotey’s cancellation application and ordered her deported to Ghana.

Allotey appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals and filed a motion to remand so that she could pursue another adjustment of status. The Board dismissed the appeal, adopting and affirming the IJ’s decision that denied cancellation of removal. It agreed that Allotey had not shown exceptional and extremely unusual hardship and found no clear error in the IJ’s findings regarding Adotey. The Board also denied the motion to remand because Allotey had not filed a new adjustment of status application with the appropriate supporting documentation.

Allotey petitioned for review.

II.

We start by addressing Allotey’s challenge to the denial of cancellation of removal. “Because the Board issued its own decision, rather than summarily affirming the IJ, we review the Board’s decision and look at the IJ’s decision only to the extent the Board adopted its reasoning.” Dodaj v. Blanche, 177 F.4th 770, 772 (6th Cir. 2026).

We first consider whether we have jurisdiction to review the Board’s decision not to grant cancellation of removal. “We lack jurisdiction to review judgments regarding discretionary cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b.” Id.; 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i). This includes questions of fact, such as factual findings supporting the conclusion that removal would not cause exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to a relative. Patel v. Garland, 596 U.S. 328, 339–40 (2022); Hernandez v. Garland, 59 F.4th 762, 767 (6th Cir. 2023) (applying Patel in the cancellation-of-removal context). But we can review constitutional claims or other questions of law if the petition raises them; this includes “mixed questions of law and fact.” Dodaj, 177 F.4th at 772 (quoting Singh v. Rosen, 984 F.3d 1142, 1149 (6th Cir. 2021)); 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D). Thus, “we can review the Board’s denial of cancellation only to the extent that [Allotey] asserts that the Board misinterpreted or misapplied the law.” Dodaj, 177 F.4th at 722.

Based on this standard, we lack jurisdiction over Allotey’s petition for review of the Board’s denial of cancellation because Allotey does not raise any questions of law. Instead, Allotey challenges only the IJ’s factual determinations. Allotey first argues that the IJ and the Board “erred in finding that the children’s father would intervene in care . . . .” Pet’r’s Br. at 17. We lack jurisdiction to review that factual finding. See Hernandez, 59 F.4th at 767. Allotey then argues that the IJ and the Board “erred in finding that Godson could support his siblings if his mother were removed from the United States . . . .” Pet’r’s Br. at 20–21. We lack jurisdiction to review that factual finding too.

Relying on this court’s unpublished decision in Navarro v. Holder, 505 F. App’x 441, 445 (6th Cir. 2012), Allotey argues that “factual findings may be classified as questions of law where material facts have been seriously mischaracterized.” Reply Br. at 4–5 (cleaned up). That cannot be the case after Patel. In Patel, the Supreme Court held that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) “precludes judicial review of factual findings that underlie a denial of relief.” 596 U.S. at 331. Our circuit has emphasized that § 1252(a)(2)(B)’s jurisdiction-stripping provision applies universally to any factual findings. Patel v. Garland, 116 F.4th 617, 623 (6th Cir. 2024). That means factual findings are unreviewable—full stop. Nothing in the relevant statute suggests that Congress intended to carve out an exception for factual findings, even if we seriously question them. Cf. Patel, 596 U.S. at 347–48 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (“Today, the Court holds that a federal bureaucracy can make an obvious factual error, one that will result in an individual’s removal from this country, and nothing can be done about it. No court may even hear the case.”). So even were we to agree with Allotey that the IJ’s factual findings were erroneous—even egregiously erroneous—Congress has stripped us of jurisdiction to review them.

We retain jurisdiction, however, over the mixed question of law and fact as to whether Allotey’s situation rises to the level of hardship required by the statute. Nwosu v. Blanche, 177 F.4th 732, 739 (6th Cir. 2026). In theory, Allotey could therefore avoid the jurisdictional bar by arguing that, even if Adotey and Godson could provide assistance, her children would still face exceptional and extremely unusual hardship. But she does not make that argument. Instead, she contends that the hardship analysis is incorrect because the IJ and the Board “erred in finding that [Adotey] would intervene in care,” Pet’r’s Br. at 17, and “further erred in finding that . . . Godson could be in a position to assist his siblings financially” if Allotey were removed, id. at 20 (citation omitted). Again, these are factual disagreements unreviewable by this court, and Allotey cannot avoid the jurisdictional bar by labeling her factual disagreements as mixed questions of fact and law. Singh, 984 F.3d at 1149. We therefore dismiss Allotey’s fact-based challenge to the decision denying her cancellation of removal.

III.

Allotey also argues that her previous counsel was ineffective and requests that we order the Board to remand her case for further consideration of this point.

Prior to the Board’s decision, Allotey received notice that an I-130 petition filed by her son had been approved.²2. Approval of an I-130 petition establishes the existence of a valid family relationship between the citizen petitioner (Allotey’s son) and the foreign-born relative (Allotey), but approval does not result in any change to immigration status. U.S. Citizenship and Immigr. Servs., I-130, Petition for Alien Relative, https://www.uscis.gov/i-130 (last visited Aug. 26, 2026). It merely enables the foreign-born relative to apply for an adjustment of status. See Dia v. Garland, 852 F. App’x 981, 983 (6th Cir. 2021). Based on her approved I-130 petition, Allotey asked the Board to remand her case so that the immigration judge could consider her application for an adjustment of status. But the Board denied her motion because she failed to include the proper supporting documentation. Allotey indicates that while her prior counsel submitted a copy of her I-130 approval notice to the Board, her prior counsel did not submit her application for adjustment of status with her motion. Allotey argues that this failure constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel.

We review the Board’s denial of the motion to remand for an abuse of discretion. Abu-Khaliel v. Gonzales, 436 F.3d 627, 634 (6th Cir. 2006). “The Board abuses its discretion when it acts arbitrarily, irrationally[,] or contrary to law.” Dodaj, 177 F.4th at 772 (cleaned up). But Allotey does not argue that the Board abused its discretion in denying her motion to remand. In fact, she does not argue that the Board erred in denying her motion to remand at all.

Instead, Allotey frames her petition for review on this point as a “request[]” for “this Court [to] remand her proceedings based on the record evidence” of ineffective assistance. Reply Br. at 13. In effect, she wants us to treat the petition as an original motion to remand filed in this court. We decline to do so.

At the outset, we are skeptical that Allotey adequately advanced her remand argument. Not only did Allotey fail to file any standalone motion “in writing” that “state[s] with particularity the grounds for the motion, the relief sought, and the legal argument necessary to support it.” Fed. R. App. P. 27(a)(1)–(2)(A). Her opening brief failed to clearly identify her requested relief, and the argument supporting it, beyond a “perfunctory” statement. Buetenmiller v. Macomb Cnty. Jail, 53 F.4th 939, 946 (6th Cir. 2022) (citation omitted). Respondent’s brief, in turn, understands Allotey to challenge only the Board’s denial of the motion to remand she filed with the Board. To whatever extent Respondent was mistaken, that mistake was a reasonable one; Allotey’s opening brief discusses the substantive requirements governing motions to reopen before the Board, and Allotey never says outright that she is filing an original motion before this court. Although Allotey clarified her request in her reply brief, Reply Br. 12, arguments raised for the first time on reply are forfeited. Overstreet v. Lexington-Fayette Urb. Cnty. Gov’t, 305 F.3d 566, 578 (6th Cir. 2002).

Another prudential concern supports our decision. None of Allotey’s ineffective-assistance arguments have been litigated before the agency. Indeed, she admits that she could not possibly satisfy the elements of an ineffective-assistance claim based on the record before us. Further, she has a motion to reopen pending before the Board. This motion makes her ineffective-assistance argument and, Allotey alleges, provides sufficient evidence to satisfy the elements of her claim. Allotey’s motion to reopen is thus the “proper avenue for raising [her] ineffective assistance of counsel” claim. Sswajje v. Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 528, 533 (6th Cir. 2003). Compared to the Board, we are ill-equipped to adjudicate Allotey’s ineffective-assistance argument in the first instance. See Patel, 116 F.4th at 625. Consistent with our position as “a court of review, not of first view,” we decline to construe Allotey’s opening brief as bringing an original motion to remand before our court. Byrd v. Haas, 17 F.4th 692, 700 (6th Cir. 2021).

Accordingly, we deny Allotey’s petition for review in this respect.

IV.

The petition for review is DISMISSED in part and DENIED in part.