United States v. John Farris

HERMANDORFER, Circuit Judge. John Farris pled guilty to three crimes involving the distribution of methamphetamine. At sentencing, the district court concluded that Farris had directed his girlfriend to help facilitate his drug-trafficking offenses and so applied a two-level sentencing enhancement under § 3B1.1 of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. The district court also denied Farris’s request for a downward departure. Farris appealed, challenging both aspects of his sentencing. We affirm.

I

In February 2024, law enforcement began receiving reports of a drug dealer distributing large quantities of methamphetamine throughout Northern Kentucky. The investigation quickly focused on John Farris. Over the next two months, officers used a confidential informant (CI) to complete three controlled purchases of methamphetamine from Farris.

Farris coordinated each transaction, contacting the CI to give updates leading up to each sale and setting the meeting time and location for the third purchase. Farris’s girlfriend, Stephanie Simms, was with him for the first two purchases—once as the passenger and once as the driver. For the third purchase, Farris arrived alone but drove a car rented by Simms. Officers moved in and arrested him shortly after he reached the location.

After his arrest, Farris told officers that Simms was familiar with his drug-trafficking activities. He also explained that he used Simms’s rental car to go purchase the methamphetamine and drive it to the meeting point for the third transaction. He also stated that Simms supplied the funds used to obtain the methamphetamine for the third controlled purchase. The CI—who had a history of purchasing drugs from Farris—reported that Simms was frequently involved in Farris’s drug trafficking. According to the CI, on “multiple occasions” Farris arranged deals with the CI and sent Simms to deliver the drugs on his behalf. Sent’g Hr’g Tr., R.44, PageID 165.

Following his arrest and confession, a federal grand jury indicted Farris on two counts of distributing fifty grams of methamphetamine and one count of possession with intent to distribute fifty grams of methamphetamine. Farris pled guilty to all three counts and proceeded to sentencing.

Farris’s presentence investigation report recommended a two-level enhancement under § 3B1.1(c) of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines based on his leading, directing, or supervising at least one other person during his criminal activity. It also placed Farris in criminal-history category III based on his six criminal-history points. As relevant here, Farris raised two objections: (1) he disagreed with application of the U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c) sentencing enhancement, and (2) he requested a downward departure on the ground that two of his six criminal-history points derived from marijuana-possession convictions. He acknowledged, however, that removing those points would still leave him in criminal-history category III and would not alter his advisory Guidelines range.

Farris’s sentencing hearing featured one witness: an officer who described the investigation into Farris, the three controlled purchases, and the CI’s statements about past interactions with both Farris and Simms. Based on that testimony, the district court overruled Farris’s first objection and applied the leadership-role enhancement. But it varied downward one level, producing an advisory range of 121-151 months’ imprisonment. The district court then denied Farris’s departure request and imposed a sentence of 135 months. Farris timely appealed, and we have jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1291; 18 U.S.C. § 3742.

II

Farris first contends that the district court erred in applying the § 3B1.1(c) enhancement. He then argues that the district court misunderstood its authority to depart downward under former § 4A1.3, and from there requests a remand for resentencing. We disagree on both fronts.

A

In the sentencing context, we review “the district court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo.” United States v. Minter, 80 F.4th 753, 757 (6th Cir. 2023) (citation omitted). When it comes to evaluating the application of a leadership-role enhancement under § 3B1.1(c), our review is “deferential” because the enhancement turns on “factual nuances that a district court is better positioned to evaluate.” United States v. Washington, 715 F.3d 975, 983 (6th Cir. 2013).

Section 3B1.1(c) of the Guidelines recommends a two-level enhancement “when a defendant ‘was an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor in any criminal activity’ involving four or fewer participants that was not otherwise extensive in its scope.” Minter, 80 F.4th at 758 (quoting U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c)). The Government must prove that “the enhancement applies by a preponderance of the evidence.” Id. (citation omitted). To sustain the enhancement’s application, the Government needed to show that Farris was “the organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor of one or more other participants.” United States v. Wright, 747 F.3d 399, 412 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 cmt. n.2). It did so by pointing to Farris’s reliance upon his girlfriend, Simms, to help facilitate his drug-trafficking activities. We agree that Simms’s participation and Farris’s leadership together justified application of the § 3B1.1(c) enhancement.

Simms’s participation. The relevant Guidelines provision requires the involvement of other “participants” in the criminal activity. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 & cmt. n.1. A participant, this Court has instructed, is someone “criminally responsible for the commission of the offense.” United States v. Hills, 27 F.4th 1155, 1199 (6th Cir. 2022) (citation omitted). Participants thus must be “(i) aware of the criminal objective, and (ii) knowingly offer[] their assistance.” United States v. Anthony, 280 F.3d 694, 698 (6th Cir. 2002). But participants need not be charged or convicted for the enhancement to apply. Hills, 27 F.4th at 1199. When it comes to drug-trafficking offenses, those who knowingly assist in drug distribution, such as drivers and couriers, qualify as participants. United States v. Vasquez, 560 F.3d 461, 473 (6th Cir. 2009); United States v. Plunk, 415 F. App’x 650, 652-53 (6th Cir. 2011) (collecting cases).

Farris’s own post-arrest statements establish Simms’s participation. According to Farris, Simms knew that he trafficked drugs, and she provided both the transportation and financing for the third controlled purchase. Simms’s conduct during the controlled purchases confirms that she was a knowing participant. She then lent Farris her rental car for the third transaction while also financing the original purchase of the drugs at issue. These actions constitute knowing, active assistance sufficient to establish participant status. See, e.g., Plunk, 415 F. App’x at 652 (participant “obtain[ed] rental cars” for the defendant and “dr[o]ve him to drug sales”).

Farris’s chief counter—that Simms was merely present for the offenses and had no other “personal involvement”—runs aground on the record evidence demonstrating Simms’s knowing assistance in the drug-trafficking activities. Farris Br. 14 (citation omitted). Because Simms was well acquainted with Farris’s dealing and “knowingly offered [her] assistance” by helping with transportation and drug procurement, she was a participant under the Guidelines. Anthony, 280 F.3d at 698.

Farris’s leadership. For § 3B1.1(c) to apply, the defendant must have been “an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor” in the criminal activity. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c). To determine whether a defendant was a leader, we ask whether he “exercised decisionmaking authority, recruited accomplices, received a larger share of the profits, was instrumental in the planning phase of the criminal venture, or exercised control or authority over at least one accomplice.” Vasquez, 560 F.3d at 473; U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1, cmt. n.4. These factors are not exhaustive, and district courts “need not find each factor” for the enhancement to properly apply. United States v. Castilla-Lugo, 699 F.3d 454, 460 (6th Cir. 2012). We have upheld the application of the enhancement when “a defendant takes an active role in directing a drug deal,” United States v. McNoriell, 176 F.4th 413, 431 (6th Cir. 2026) (quotation marks omitted), including by managing others’ help with transportation and delivery, see United States v. Washington, 127 F.3d 510, 515 (6th Cir. 1997); Vasquez, 560 F.3d at 473.

The district court did not err in concluding that Farris exercised leadership over Simms. Farris organized each of the three controlled drug sales, calling the CI to provide updates and coordinate arrival details. Simms, by contrast, merely assisted Farris in executing his prearranged transactions. Further corroborating the couple’s dynamic, the CI told law-enforcement officers that on “multiple occasions” Farris would arrange deals and send Simms to deliver the drugs on his behalf. Sent’g Hr’g Tr., R.44, PageID 165. District courts are “free to make reasonable inferences from facts in the record when fashioning a sentence.” United States v. Parrish, 915 F.3d 1043, 1048 (6th Cir. 2019). Together, the record evidence supports an inference that Farris took the lead in planning and executing each controlled purchase and then exercised authority over Simms and directed her assistance with carrying out his plans. That supports application of the enhancement. See McNoriell, 176 F.4th at 431; Plunk, 415 F. App’x at 652-53 (collecting cases).

Farris’s counterarguments center on the CI’s report that Simms previously delivered drugs on Farris’s behalf. He first argues that the CI’s statements were insufficiently corroborated. He further asserts that the district court should not have considered any earlier deliveries by Simms because those deliveries preceded the offenses of conviction.

We start with Farris’s corroboration challenge. District courts often rely on hearsay during sentencing. United States v. Armstrong, 920 F.3d 395, 398 (6th Cir. 2019). To be properly considered, statements must have “some evidentiary basis” that provides a “minimal indicium of reliability beyond mere allegation.” United States v. Silverman, 976 F.2d 1502, 1504 (6th Cir. 1992) (citation omitted). We review the district court’s reliability determination “under the highly deferential, clearly erroneous standard” and reverse only if we have a “definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Armstrong, 920 F.3d at 398 (citation omitted). Consideration of testimony that comprises hearsay from informants carries a marginally higher burden: “There must be good reason for not revealing the informant’s identity, and there must be sufficient corroboration of the informant’s statements.” Id. (cleaned up). Farris challenges only the corroboration requirement.

Farris fails to show that the CI’s prior statements lacked sufficient corroboration. The district court heard evidence indicating that the CI’s statements had a sound foundation. That included undisputed testimony that the CI had a history of purchasing from Farris, that officers independently verified other details offered by the CI, and that each transaction proved consistent with the CI’s information. Based on those details, the district court did not clearly err by concluding that there was “sufficient testimony to corroborate” the CI’s previous statements. Sent’g Hr’g Tr., R.44, PageID 187-88; see Armstrong, 920 F.3d at 398-99.

Farris’s attempt to fence off the prior transactions from the district court’s consideration fares no better. District courts may consider all relevant conduct as defined by § 1B1.3 when applying a role enhancement. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1, intro. cmt. “Relevant conduct need not be charged, nor must it otherwise even be within the jurisdiction of the sentencing court.” United States v. Gill, 348 F.3d 147, 151 (6th Cir. 2003). Farris maintains that his “relevant conduct is limited to the instant offense.” Reply Br. 7. But for offenses that group under § 3D1.2(d)—like Farris’s—relevant conduct includes not just the instant offense, but also “all acts” that Farris “aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, procured, or willfully caused,” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(A), “that were part of the same course of conduct or common scheme or plan as the offense of conviction,” id. § 1B1.3(a)(2). “For two or more offenses to constitute part of a common scheme or plan, they must be substantially connected to each other by at least one common factor, such as common victims, common accomplices, common purpose, or similar modus operandi.” United States v. West, 962 F.3d 183, 188 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3 cmt. n.5(B)(i)) (alterations omitted). Under those standards, the district court did not err by considering prior transactions in which Farris “commanded, induced,” “or willfully caused” Simms to deliver drugs. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(A). And those transactions were substantially connected because they involved common perpetrators (Farris and Simms), a common buyer (the confidential informant), and “a common purpose (for [Farris] to receive money from illicit transactions).” West, 962 F.3d at 189.

The district court did not err in applying the § 3B1.1(c) role enhancement.

B

We next turn to Farris’s departure-based challenge. At the time of Farris’s sentencing, the Guidelines recognized that certain circumstances may warrant imposing a sentence below—or departing downward from—the applicable Guidelines range. See U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3(b) (2024). A district court’s refusal to apply a downward departure “is unreviewable, so long as the district court understands that it has discretion so to depart.” United States v. Taylor, 286 F.3d 303, 305 (6th Cir. 2002). We “presume that the district court understood its discretion to depart, absent clear evidence in the record to the contrary.” United States v. Crouch, 288 F.3d 907, 910 (6th Cir. 2002).

Farris sought a downward departure pursuant to since-deleted U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3(b)(1). That provision stated that “a downward departure may be warranted” if “the defendant’s criminal history category substantially over-represents the seriousness of the defendant’s criminal history or the likelihood that the defendant will commit other crimes.” U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3(b)(1). The Guidelines commentary to § 4A1.3(b)(1) offered examples of offenses whose inclusion in a defendant’s criminal history might justify departure. Relevant here, those examples included “possession of marihuana for personal use, without an intent to sell or distribute it to another person.” Id. cmt. n.3(A)(ii) (2024). In his sentencing memorandum, Farris flagged two such marijuana convictions and asked for a departure on that basis.

The district court declined Farris’s request for a departure. In doing so, the district court explained that it “certainly ha[d] the ability to depart based upon marijuana possession convictions.” Sent’g Hr’g Tr., R.44, PageID 188. But it rejected that course, observing that Farris “would still have four criminal history points, still be a category 3,” meaning the convictions would not “impact the advisory range in any way.” Id. at PageID 189.

Farris insists that those statements can only be interpreted as reflecting the district court’s mistaken belief that “it was without authority to grant the departure.” Farris Br. 18. We disagree. Instead, the district court’s explanation bears directly on the inquiry under § 4A1.3(b)(1) by addressing whether Farris’s criminal-history category, with the inclusion of the marijuana- possession offenses, “substantially over-represent[ed] the seriousness of [his] criminal history.” U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3(b)(1). Particularly given the district court’s earlier affirmation that it could “certainly” depart downward, the cited statements are not “clear evidence” that the district court misunderstood its discretion. Crouch, 288 F.3d at 910.

Farris and the Government spend some time disputing the mechanics of former U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3. We need not join them in that exercise. As explained, nothing in the record shows—let alone clearly—that the district court misunderstood its discretion to depart downward based upon Farris’s criminal history. See Crouch, 288 F.3d at 910. So we may not review its decision declining a downward departure. Taylor, 286 F.3d at 305.

* * *

We affirm.