Achhar Singh v. Todd Blanche

PER CURIAM. Achhar Singh petitions this court for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denying his motion to reopen and terminate his removal proceedings. We deny in part and dismiss in part his petition for review.

Singh, a native and citizen of India, entered the United States in June 2013 as a nonimmigrant visitor with authorization to remain for six months. His wife followed him to the United States a few months later. In April 2014, after Singh’s arrest for selling alcohol to an underage person, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) served him with a notice to appear in removal proceedings, charging him with removability for having remained in the United States for a time longer than permitted. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B).

In an appearance before an immigration judge (IJ), Singh admitted the factual allegations set forth in the notice to appear and conceded removability as charged. He applied for asylum and withholding of removal based on his political opinion and also sought protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). After a merits hearing, the IJ denied Singh’s applications for relief based in part on an adverse credibility finding and ordered his removal to India. The BIA dismissed Singh’s subsequent appeal, affirming the IJ’s decision. We denied his petition for review of the BIA’s order. Singh v. Garland, No. 21-3368, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 38294, at *12 (6th Cir. Dec. 27, 2021).

Three years later, Singh moved the BIA to reopen and terminate his removal proceedings, asserting that his wife had been granted asylum in 2023, that her asylee relative petition filed on his behalf had been approved, and that he now had derivative asylee status and was no longer removable as charged. The DHS did not respond to his motion. The BIA denied his motion as untimely and declined to exercise its sua sponte authority to reopen and terminate his removal proceedings. Singh filed a timely petition for review of the BIA’s order.

We review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen removal proceedings under an abuse- of-discretion standard. Elgebaly v. Garland, 109 F.4th 426, 436 (6th Cir. 2024). “The BIA abuses its discretion when it acts arbitrarily, irrationally, or contrary to law.” Alizoti v. Gonzales, 477 F.3d 448, 451 (6th Cir. 2007). We will “find an abuse of discretion when the BIA’s decision ‘was made without a rational explanation, inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on an impermissible basis such as invidious discrimination against a particular race or group.’” Dieng v. Barr, 947 F.3d 956, 960-61 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting Alizoti, 477 F.3d at 453).

Generally, a motion to reopen must be filed within 90 days of a final order of removal. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Because Singh filed his motion to reopen three years after his final removal order, the BIA denied his motion as untimely.

Singh argues that his motion to reopen was timely because he presented new facts that were not available at the time of his final removal order—he had since obtained derivative asylee status through his wife. Although there is an exception to the 90-day deadline for motions to reopen “[t]o apply or reapply for asylum or withholding of deportation based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered,” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(4)(i), Singh asserted a change in personal circumstances arising in the United States rather than a change in country conditions arising in India. “[A] change in personal circumstances that is unaccompanied by a change in country conditions is insufficient to reopen proceedings.” Zhang v. Holder, 702 F.3d 878, 879-80 (6th Cir. 2012); see also Haddad v. Gonzales, 437 F.3d 515, 517- 18 (6th Cir. 2006); Rasi v. Mukasey, 256 F. App’x 763, 765 (6th Cir. 2007) (addressing motion to reopen based on derivative asylee status). Given that Singh does not assert any other exception to the 90-day deadline, he has failed to show that the BIA abused its discretion in denying his motion as untimely. We deny Singh’s petition for review as to this ruling.

Despite the untimeliness of Singh’s motion, the BIA retained discretion to reopen his removal proceedings sua sponte. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) (“The Board may at any time reopen or reconsider on its own motion any case in which it has rendered a decision.”). The BIA declined to exercise that discretion, noting that Singh had been denied relief based in part on an adverse credibility finding and also observing that “it is not unusual for a respondent’s personal circumstances to change subsequent to the entry of a final administrative order.” Singh argues that his “situation presents the exact type of circumstances contemplated by the” BIA’s sua sponte authority and that the DHS’s failure to respond to his motion should be read as “an acknowledgment that this is a truly unique case that warrants . . . reopening.” He, however, fails to address our “well settled” rule that we lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s refusal to reopen removal proceedings sua sponte. Herrera v. Bondi, 162 F.4th 617, 622 (6th Cir. 2025). We dismiss Singh’s petition for review insofar as he challenges this refusal.

For these reasons, we DENY in part and DISMISS in part Singh’s petition for review.